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FATAL ATTRACTION? THE UNEASY COURTSHIP
OF BRADY AND PLEA BARGAINING
John G. Douglass*
Let me not to the marriage of true minds admit impediments.

1

INTRODUCTION

At first glance, Brady v. Maryland2 and plea bargaining seem a perfect
match. After all, Brady is the frrst principle of disclosure in criminal cases: a

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Richmond. J.D., Harvard Law School (1980); A.B.,
Dartmouth College (1977). I gratefully acknowledge the support of the law firm of Hunton & Williams, which
provided research grants to make this project possible. I also thank my able research assistants, Rob Bryden
and Jennifer Wilson, for their many contributions. In addition, I offer a word of thanks to Corinna Barrett
Lain, who generously provided the good ideas that got this paper started. In addition, I want to thank my many
former colleagues in the United States Attorney's Offices for the District of Maryland, where I served from
1983 through 1986, and for the Eastern District of Virginia, where I served from 1992 through 1996. Their
training, patience, good example, and shared experiences have added immeasurably to my own understanding
of the process of crimnal justice. In some small measure, I hope their collective wisdom is reflected in the
pages that follow.
1 WIWAM SHAKESPEARE, Sonnet 116, in THE RIVERSIDE SHAKESPEARE 1770 (G. Blakemore Evans ed.,
1997).
2 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Court overturned a death penalty verdict in a murder case in which
the prosecutor had failed to disclose an extrajudicial statement in which Brady's accomplice had admitted the
ac!Ual killing. In a passage that has become the foundation for Due Process doctrine on disclosure by
prosecutors, the Court held that, "[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective
of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87. For most applications, the key words in the Brady
opinion are "favorable" and "material." Brady does not compel disclosure of a prosecutor's inculpatory
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constitutional rule that turns prosecutors from poker players into stewards of an
3
honest system. Plea bargains resolve the vast majority of cases in that
4
system. Despite an unenthusiastic reception from academics,5 plea bargaining
has emerged from the shadows to gain explicit judicial endorsement as an

evidence, only the evidence "favorable" to the accused. Evidence is material "only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
3 In the eyes of many, Brady marked the birth of discovery in criminal cases. The Court's 1963 opinion
came in an age in which the very notion of discovery in criminal cases was subject to vigorous debate. See
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. I, 4 (1990) ("Brennan, Progress Report") ("When I gave this lecture in 1963 the prevailing
view was still that there were good reasons not to allow discovery in criminal cases."). For some of the flavor
of that early debate, compare William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting E1•ent or Quest for
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279 (1963) (''Brennan, Sporting Evenf'), with State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881 (N.J.
1953).
4 In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.IO (1970), the Supreme Court noted that 90 to 95% of
all criminal convictions, and about 70 to 85% of felony convictions were by guilty plea. /d. The Court's
observations still hold true. In recent years, about 92% of convictions in federal cases have come by guilty
plea. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRThfiNAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 448 (1996). In 1996, for
example, out of a total of 52,270 defendants convicted, 48,196 (or 92%) were convicted by guilty plea. See id.
The percentage has remained relatively consistent since at least 1945. See id.
5 Many academics have opposed plea bargaining on the grounds that it is unfairly coercive of
defendants, both the innocent and the guilty alike. See, e.g., Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining: A Critic's
Rejoinder, 13 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 555 (1979); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L.
REv. 3 (1978). The most prominent academic critics of plea bargaining argue that the practice is inaccurate in
separating the guilty from the innocent, that it allows for unfair, informal dispositions in the absence of
meaningful investigation or neutral fact finding, and that its unfairness is visited most severely upon poor and
unsophisticated defendants. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CAL.
L. REV. 652 (1981); John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the Bazaar with
the Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215 (1977); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128
U. PA. L. REv. 733 (1980); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1037
(1984); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining As Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979 (1992) ("Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining As Disaster").
On the other side of the debate, Judge Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has defended plea
bargaining as an efficient process for resolving criminal cases through choices based upon mutual advantage,
arguing that the flaws in plea bargaining simply reflect flaws in the process of adjudication through trial. See
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure As a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 308-22 (1983).
Professors Robert Scott and William Stuntz have offered a detailed proposal both defending, and seeking to
regulate, plea bargaining as a matter of contract law. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As
Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) ("Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract); Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J.
2011 (1992) ("Scott & Stuntz, Imperfect Bargains").
Ironically, while academics criticize plea bargaining as unfair to defendants, the public generally views
plea bargaining as a system that treats defendants too leniently. Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract,
supra, at 1909 n.4 (citing Stanley A. Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public Attitudes to Plea Bargaining, 32
CRTh1. L.Q. 85, 97 (1989-90)).
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acceptable method6-some would argue the preferred method-of dispensing
American justice.7 Thus, the marriage of Brady's rule of disclosure to the
process of plea bargaining seems like a natural, almost inevitable event. If due
process forbids a prosecutor to sit silent through trial without disclosing
exculpatory information to the defense, then surely she8 cannot induce the
defendant to forego his right to trial by withholding the same information.
Brady allows a convicted defendant to overturn a jury's guilty verdict when he
discovers, after-the-fact, that a prosecutor has withheld critical, exculpatory
evidence. Shouldn't the same principle invalidate a guilty plea?9
6 In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Court defended plea bargaining, principally on
grounds of efficiency:
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused,
sometimes loosely called "plea bargaining," is an essential component of the administration of
justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a
full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the
number of judges and court facilities. Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an
essential part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to prompt and
largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of enforced
idleness during pre-trial confinement for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the
public from those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even while on
pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever
may be the rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.
!d. at 260-61. The previous year, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Court had justified plea-

bargaining on the grounds that the practice offers choices-a "mutuality of advantage"-that both prosecution
and defense may prefer to the burdens and uncertainties of trial. See id. at 752.
Santobe/lo marks the beginning of the Court's explicit embrace of plea bargaining. It was not until that
opinion that "lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the practice were finally dispelled." Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977). See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 40 (1979).
7 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining As Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992) ("[P]lea
bargaining [is] at least as effective as trial at separating the guilty from the innocent. To the extent there is a
difference, negotiation between sophisticated persons unencumbered by the rules of evidence is superior.").
!d. at 1972.
8 Throughout this paper, I will use the female pronoun to refer to prosecutors and the male pronoun in
reference to defendants or defense counsel. The use of this gender-related convention has no significance
other than as a tool for making sentences clearer and shorter.
9 Banks l'. United States, 920 F. Supp. 688 (E. D. Va. 1996), offers an example of the manner in which
Brady claims arise and are litigated following a guilty plea. There, the defendant was convicted upon a plea of
guilty to attempted possession of heroin. At the time he entered his plea, the defendant knew that the evidence
at trial would include tape-recorded conversations with Gary Weathers, an alleged co-conspirator turned
government informant. Several years after his guilty plea, Banks and his codefendants learned that
government agents had allowed Weathers, who was in custody, conjugal visits with his wife and a girlfriend in
government offices. Banks then filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction on the grounds
that the government violated Brady by failing to disclose evHience that would potentially impeach Weathers.
Following an evidentiary hearing at which Banks's defense counsel testified regarding the importance of
Weathers's anticipated testimony to Banks's decision to plead guilty, the court granted the motion. The court
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Given the preeminence of Brady and the frequency of plea bargains, one
might expect that their union would have been solidified long before now. 10
But concluding the courtship has not proved so simple. Four federal courts of
appeals have endorsed the marriage, holding that prosecutors have a
constitutional obligation to reveal material, exculpatory evidence to defendants
before a guilty plea. 11 Most recently, however, the Fifth Circuit has dissented,
arguing that Brady is a trial right and that a defendant who pleads guilty
waives that right, just as he waives his right to a jury trial and his right to
confront witnesses. 12 Despite the obvious significance of this debate, the

first held that Banks's Brady claim was not waived by his guilty plea, and further held that the withheld
evidence was "material" because there was a ''reasonable probability that but for the failure to disclose the
Brody/Giglio evidence, the defendant would have refused to plead and would have opted for trial." /d. at 69193.
10 As a practical matter, questions of disclosure arise during many-perhaps most-plea negotiations.
Given the frequency with which the problem arises, it is "striking," as one commentator has noted, that no
clear rules exist to define a prosecutor's obligation to disclose exculpatory information in plea bargaining.
Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HAsTINGS L.J. 957, 958 (1989).
Neither Brady nor any subsequent Supreme Court opinion has addressed the question. Perhaps more
surprising, even apart from questions of constitutional doctrine, neither the rules of ethics nor the internal
policies of most prosecutors' offices offer much guidance on the issue. Rule 3.8(d) of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct states that a prosecutor shall "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) ("Model Rules"). However, neither the Rule nor the
accompanying commentary makes reference to plea bargaining. In large measure, the ambiguity of the Rule
reflects the more general lack of ethical standards governing disclosure by lawyers during negotiation. See
McMunigal, supra, at 1023-25 (noting the absence of any "firm professional consensus regarding the standard
of openness that should govern lawyers' dealings" in negotiation). The Department of Justice has no
published policy regarding disclosure and plea bargaining. The United States Attorneys' Manual contains
detailed provisions on plea agreements, but fails to address whether the prosecutor's Brady obligations must be
fulfilled before negotiating a plea. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL§§ 927.330-27.750 (Sept. 1997).
II See United States v. Avellino, 136 F. 3d 249,254-62 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d
1448 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 495-96 (lOth Cir. 1994); White v. United States,
858 F.2d 416,422 (8th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1988). Similarly, the
Sixth Circuit allowed a defendant to reach the merits of a post-plea Brady claim, even while remarking,
"[T]here is no authority within our knowledge holding that suppression of Brady material prior to trial
amounts to a deprivation of due process." Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 1985).
12
Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000). In Matthew, the Fifth Circuit did not rule directly
that a guilty plea foreclosed any subsequent challenge based on Brady v. Maryland. Instead, under Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), the Fifth Circuit held that it was precluded from addressing Matthew's Brady
claim because the application of Brady to a guilty plea would, at best, constitute a "new constitutional rule of
criminal procedure" not cognizable on habeas corpus review. See Matthew, 201 F.3d at 353. The court's
opinion, however, leaves little doubt regarding its view that Brady is a trial right rather than a rule which
"seeks to protect a defendant's own decision making regarding the costs and benefits of pleading and of going
to trial." /d. at 362. Further, the Fifth Circuit noted, the opinions of other federal circuits which hold that a
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Supreme Court has never granted certiorari in a post-guilty-plea Brady
13
challenge, nor directly addressed the issue even in dictum.
Scholars have devoted surprisingly little attention to the issue, perhaps
because the academic debate has focused so single-mindedly on justifying or
condemning plea bargaining as an institution, rather than on appropriate means
to regulate its practice. 14 As a consequence, in the vast literature on plea
bargaining, the problem of prosecutorial disclosure has been recognized far
more often than it has been analyzed. 15 A handful of articles have argued that
16
rules compelling disclosure would enhance the accuracy and fairness of plea
bargaining. Those scholars suggest that pre-plea disclosure under a Brady-like
rule would neutralize coercive tactics, equalize bargaining power, reduce
bluffing by prosecutors, and insure meaningful consent by defendants who
enter plea agreements. 17 So far, there is little academic counterweight to those
guilty plea is not voluntary and intelligent in the face of an antecedent Brady violation are "at odds with
Supreme Court opinions" on the finality of guilty pleas. /d. at 367.
13 See United States v. McCleary, 112 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished) ("[T]he Supreme Court has
never applied Brady, or its progeny, to a guilty plea."); McMunigal, supra note 10, at 962 ("Since all of the
cases in which the Supreme Court has applied and developed the Brady doctrine involved convictions obtained
by means of a trial, the Supreme Court has never confronted the issue directly and has never adverted to it in
dicta.").
14 See Scott & Stuntz, Imperfect Bargains, supra note 5, at 2014 (suggesting that it is time for academics
to focus on reforms to plea bargaining and to "abandon the ali-or-nothing debate that has so preoccupied us
all").
15 See McMunigal, supra note 10, at 958 ('The frequency with which leading scholars in criminal
procedure and ethics raise the question of prosecutorial disclosure in the guilty plea process indicates the
issue's provocative nature. Yet few have attempted to analyze or answer the question of disclosure of Brady
material in the guilty plea process."). References to disclosure issues are scattered throughout the extensive
literature that is more generally aimed at justifying or condemning plea bargaining. See, e.g., Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining As Disaster, supra note 5, at 1998 (noting that expanded discovery would "directly address the
flaws of plea bargaining," though perhaps not effectively given other limitations on effective representation of
defendants); Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1936 & 1936 n.lOO (noting how
constraints on criminal discovery limit the defendant's access to information useful in assessing a plea
bargain); Mark Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Procedure, 35 CATH. U. L. REV.
361, 371 (1986) (criticizing plea agreements based on asymmetrical knowledge of prosecutors and
defendants). But few scholars have treated problems of disclosure in detail. See infra note 17.
16 "Accuracy," in relation to plea bargaining, means the ability of the bargaining process to separate the
guilty from the innocent. The problem of"inaccurate" pleas has received considerable attention from critics of
plea bargaining, who argue that the incentives of a plea bargain can induce the innocent, as well as the guilty,
to accept the safe result of a predictably lower sentence rather than the risk of trial and a higher sentence. See,
e.g., McMunigal, supra note 10, at 985-90.
17 See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss,
Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 2011, 2040-42 (2000) (arguing that Brady disclosure
insures the voluntariness of guilty pleas, promotes factual accuracy and encourages meaningful consent);
McMunigal, supra note 10, at 968-97 (arguing that Brady disclosure would enhance the accuracy of plea
bargaining as a means of separating the guilty from the innocent); Eleanor J. Ostrow, The Case for Preplea
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arguments. Like most courts, scholars seem content to let the union of Brady
and plea bargaining take its apparently natural course.
This Article offers a more skeptical view: a word of caution about the
potential marriage of Brady and plea bargaining. I do not suggest that disclosure in plea bargaining is a bad idea. To the contrary, I agree that justice is
better served by fully informed pleas and that prosecutors should put fairness
18
ahead of the thrill of victory. I simply do not think that judicial efforts to
mold Brady into a rule of pre-plea disclosure will help to achieve those
objectives.
The initial problem is Brady itself. As a rule to promote informed guilty
pleas, Brady faces serious limitations from the start. In the context of a trial,
Brady is not a rule re~uiring disclosure of all--or even most-information
helpful to a defendant. 1 Brady requires disclosure only of information that is
2
both "favorable" to the defense and "material" to guilt or punishment. For
advocates of broad discovery in criminal cases, the Court's narrow view of
"materiality" under Brady has been one of the largest disappointments of the
last quarter century? 1 Because Brady does not insure that defendants are well-

°

Disclosure, 90 YALEL.J. 1581 (1981) (arguing that mandatory pre-plea disclosure increases the likelihood of
meaningful consent by defendants, reduces bluffing and equalizes bargaining power in a system marked by
unequal access to information); Stephen L. Friedman, Note, Preplea Discovery: Guilty Pleas and the
Likelihood of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 531 (1971) (noting that pre-plea Brady disclosure
protects against coerced pleas by innocent defendants); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose to Defendants
Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1012-14 (1986) (arguing that Brady combats inaccurate pleas by
equalizing bargaining power between prosecution and defense).
18 I would go a step farther and argue that, perhaps even more important than better informed guilty
pleas, a principal benefit of full disclosure in plea bargaining is that it requires the prosecutor to be more
circumspect in bringing criminal charges in the first place. A prosecutor who knows she will have to lay out
the details of her case before she can dispose of it is likely to be more careful in assembling and assessing
those details than one who expects to "bluff' a quick plea based on limited information.
19 Brady, of course, has no application to inculpatory evidence: the evidence that the government will
rely upon to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Even when it comes to "favorable" evidence, disclosure
under Brady's standard of "materiality" is more limited than that required of prosecutors by rules of ethics.
Unlike Brady, which applies only to favorable "evidence," the Model Rules require disclosure of "evidence"
and "information," thus encompassing a wider variety of material which might assist trial preparation or lead
to the discovery of other helpful evidence. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 3.8(d). Moreover, the
ethical rule requires disclosure of all information that "tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense." !d. The prosecutor's ethical obligation, therefore, extends well beyiond the narrow class of
exculpatory evidence that a reviewing court may find "material" under Brady.
20 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
21 See Brennan, Progress Report, supra note 3, at 8-9; Steven H. Goldberg. What Was Disco1•ered in the
Quest for Truth?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 51, 56 (1990); Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckermann, Presumed
Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie This Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REv.
1089, 1103-05 (1991).
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informed at trial, we fool ourselves if we expect the same approach to produce
well-informed guilty pleas.
Of course, even a limited rule of disclosure may be better than none. But
the problem is more complicated than that. Courts and scholars who so readily
attach Brady to plea bargaining have failed to account for Brady's fundamental
weakness: the Brady doctrine suffers from a severe case of "bad timing."
Brady governs disclosure before a trial or plea; but courts almost always
enforce Brady after-the-fact, when a defendant tries to overturn a conviction
obtained without full disclosure by the prosecutor.22 In other words, Brady is a
prospective rule, enforced only retrospectively.
Brady's "bad timing" accounts in large measure for the rule's limited reach
in cases that go to trial. A guilty plea only magnifies that problem. Of
necessity, courts faced with motions to withdraw guilty pleas based on Brady
violations face an unpleasant choice between disclosure, on the one hand, and
the finality of guilty pleas on the other?3 In the end, neither choice is
4
satisfactory? On the one hand, it is impossible to ignore the guilty plea itself.
An open-court confession of guilt should matter.25 On the other hand, a rule
that validates pleas obtained by official deception is troubling, even where an
obviously guilty defendant seeks to take back an obviously accurate guilty
22
Except in those few cases in which prosecutors submit potential Brady material for pre-trial in camera
review, Brady issues arise after conviction when the defendant belatedly discovers that some piece of
exculpatory evidence has been withheld by the government. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189,
199 (3rd Cir. 1981) (Seitz, CJ., concurring) (''In the ordinary Brady case, it is only after a judgment of
conviction that a court reviews the failure of the prosecution to disclose material the defendant argues should
have been admitted into evidence.").
23
"An analysis of the small body of law dealing with the validity of guilty pleas preceded by Brady
violations reveals a judicial attempt to resolve questions presented by the overlap of two areas of the law: the
prosecutorial duty to disclose and the waiver of constitutional rights by a guilty plea." Lee Sheppard,
Comment, Disclosure to the Guilty Pleading Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy, 72 J.
CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 165, 167 (1981). At heart, it is this choice between finality and disclosure that
has split the federal circuits in their decisions applying, or refusing to apply, Brady following a guilty plea.
See supra notes II, 12 and accompanying text.
24
The core problem in any post-plea Brady challenge is that the criminal justice system suffers a black
eye no matter which result we choose. Public confidence in the administration of justice may suffer when
prosecutors are allowed to induce guilty pleas-even of guilty defendants-by holding back exculpatory
information. But it is also true that the integrity of the system is threatened when we allow defendants, who
have already confessed their guilt in open court, to ''take it back" and ''try their luck" with a fact finder who
knows nothing of their confession. On balance, of course, we may be more comfortable with a system that
tolerates disreputable behavior by defendants than one which endorses fraud by prosecutors.
25
The Supreme Court has noted that "a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so
rdiable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case."
Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam).
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plea?6 The result of this unpleasant choice, in most courts, has been to
develop an illusory rule of disclosure, while protecting finality as a matter of
27
substance. With the Fifth Circuit as a notable exception, the majority of
28
courts now seem willing to entertain post-plea Brady challenges despite
government arguments that the guilty plea waives such claims.Z9 The same
courts, however, seem equally anxious to deny post-plea Brady claims on their
merits, fmding that the previously undisclosed evidence, when viewed in
0
retrospect, was not "material" to the plea?
Part of the problem, of course, is that Brady's retrospective standards are
weak in all cases, whether defendants plead or go to trial. But the guilty plea
makes matters worse. Courts change Brady in an effort to apply it to guilty
pleas, with unsatisfying results. When Brady challenges arise after trial, courts
assess the "materiality" of evidence by asking whether nondisclosure tainted
the outcome of trial. 31 After a guilty plea, by contrast, courts consider whether
32
pre-plea nondisclosure tainted the defendant's decision to plead guilty. This
mutant post-plea Brady, I suggest, is at best a faint shadow of the post-trial
Brady standard. One of its problems is obvious. A trial at least creates a
record of the government's case. That is the mark against which a reviewing
26 Though the courts have paid it surprisingly little attention, there is another, even more important,
reason to be concerned with disclosure at the plea bargaining stage. Rare as the phenomenon may be, we
cannot ignore the possibility that the inducements of a plea bargain may lead some innocent defendants to
plead guilty, especially where the prosecutor's nondisclosures may have made the government's case appear
more formidable than it really is. See McMunigal, supra note 10, at 985-89.
27 See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
28 See supra note 11. In addition to the five federal circuits that have entertained post-plea Brady claims
on their merits, an increasing number of lower courts have moved beyond waiver arguments to reach such
claims. See infra note 117.
29 I make no attempt here to resolve the complex doctrinal debate over guilty pleas as waivers of
constitutional rights. Others have considered those issues in significant detail in the context of Brady claims.
See Blank, supra note 17 (arguing that guilty pleas do not waive claims of antecedent Brady violations and that
such claims are not waivable even by explicit provisions in a plea agreement); Sheppard, supra note 23
(arguing that a guilty plea does not waive Brady claims and that a more generous standard of materiality
should apply where guilty pleas are induced by withholding of exculpatory evidence). For comprehensive
treatment of the doctrine of criminal waiver outside of the context of Brady claims, see Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Pleas ofGuilty and the Loss of Constitutional Rights: The Current Price ofPleading Guilty, 16 MICH. L. REV.
1265 (1978); William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 15 VA. L. REv. 761 (1989); Michael
E. Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1970).
30 Of the increasing number of reported post-plea Brady opinions, only a small handful have resulted in
decisions favorable to the defendant. See infra note 184.
31 Nondisclosure is material if it is sufficient to "undermine confidence in the outcome" of trial. United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
32 See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995) (withholding of favorable
evidence is material where "there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to disclose the Brady
material, the defendant would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial").
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court measures the "materiality" of evidence withheld by the prosecutor. A
guilty plea seldom offers that kind of road map, leaving a reviewing court to
reconstruct, or merely to hypothesize, the factors that led the defendant to
choose a plea bargain in the first place.
The problem is more than procedural. After a guilty plea, the Brady
calculus changes as a matter of substance, in at least two important ways.
First, a court cannot realistically assess the impact of missing "Brady material"
on a defendant's decision to plead guilty without taking into account the
benefits of the plea bargain itself. 33 The reason is simple: an especially "good
deal" will lead a rational defendant to plead guilty despite a weak case against
him. As a result, defendants who enter pleas to especially favorable deals may
be those who receive the least protection in post-plea Brady challenges.
Ironically, those are the cases in which-in the eyes of most critics-plea
bargaining poses the greatest dangers of coercing guilty pleas from defendants
who are factually innocent.34 Second, a court cannot assess the impact of
Brady material on a guilty plea without knowing what else the defendant knew
about the government's case at the time of the plea. A defendant who pleads
guilty with no knowledge of the identity or likely testimony of a government
witness, for example, would be hard pressed to claim that undisclosed impeachment evidence regarding that witness was "material" to his plea. In some
cases, then, defendants who plead guilty knowing the least about the
government's evidence will also get the least protection from Brady. 35

In short, despite a similar starting point, applying Brady after a plea bargain
is not the same as applying it after a trial, and the differences can be troubling.
Post-plea Brady involves more variables, more hypothetical inquiries, a more
skeptical decisionmaker, and less solid information on which to base a
decision. And post-plea Brady may offer the least protection to those who
need it the most. On balance, then, I conclude that courts, prosecutors, and
even-perhaps especially-criminal defendants would be better off if we left
Brady to its original purpose of assuring a fair trial, rather than torturing it to
fit the world of plea bargaining.
Part I of this Article discusses the natural attraction between Brady-a rule
requiring disclosure of evidence favorable to a defendant-and plea
bargaining-a practice where such information is at a premium for defendants.
33

See infra text accompanying notes 210-17.
34 See infra text accompanying notes 261-69.
35 See infra text accompanying notes 202.()9.
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Part II describes how an increasing number of courts have adapted Brady to fit
in the world of a plea bargain, in the process changing Brady's point of
reference from the jury's verdict to the defendant's tactical decision to plead
guilty. Part ill argues that this change in focus narrows Brady's substantive
coverage and renders the rule practically unenforceable following most guilty
pleas. Part IV then assesses the value of that diluted version of Brady in
relation to the principal goals that rules of disclosure should serve in plea
bargaining: the goals of insuring accuracy in guilty pleas and informed choices
in bargaining. Brady serves neither goal very well and, ironically, may even
stand in the way of disclosure in cases where it is most needed. Finally, Part V
considers the potential impact of "Brady waivers," explicit provisions in plea
agreements that purport to waive Brady disclosure as a condition of the
agreement. 36 The waiver process itself may offer more meaningful protection
for defendants than a doctrine allowing after-the-fact challenges based on
claims of before-the-plea Brady violations.
In my view, the unresolved debate over finality and disclosure-the debate
that has split the federal circuits-is largely an exercise in futility. I do not
believe that the accuracy or fairness of plea bargaining gains anything even if
Brady survives a guilty plea. When we allow post-plea Brady challenges, we
sacrifice finality to little effect; defendants receive only an illusion of protection in the exchange. We would do better to look for other approaches that
do not pit the defendant's interest in disclosure against the finality of a guilty
plea. If we are serious about informing defendants during plea bargaining,
then we should address the problem of disclosure when it matters most: before
the plea.

36
Brady waivers are the focus of an ongoing controversy in the Ninth Circuit In Sanchez, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that a defendant may challenge a guilty plea on the grounds that it was induced by nondisclosure
of Brady material. 50 F.3d at 1453. Prosecutors responded by inserting explicit "Brady waivers" into standard
form plea agreements. The validity of such waivers remains the subject of an active debate between United
States Attorneys and Federal Public Defenders in the California. See Blank, supra note 17, at 2042-45; Larry
Kupers & John T. Philipsborn, Feature: Mephistophelian Deals: The Newest in Standard Plea Agreemellts,
CHAMPION, August 1999, at 18; Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea
Process: A Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REV. 567, 573-75 (1999). That
California debate-along with the recently developed split in federal circuits over post-plea Brady
challenges-seems likely to spark a more wide-ranging, and long overdue debate over disclosure in plea
bargaining generally.
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I. THE URGE TO MERGE: PLEA BARGAINING AND
RULES GOVERNING DISCLOSURE

A. The Value of Information in Plea Bargaining

Most models of plea bargaining assume-accurately, I suspect-that
defense attorneys recommend and defendants enter into plea bargains because
they believe the result obtained in the bargain, a reduced sentence, is preferable
to the result that would follow a trial, conviction, and a higher sentence.37 The
prosecutor offers sentencing concessions principally because a guilty plea
saves her the time, effort, and expense of trial. The plea bargain, in effect,
allows the defendant to share in those "cost savings."38 Thus, even where both
the prosecution and defense are convinced that conviction is assured at trial-a
situation that probabl~ describes the majority of plea bargains-there is an
incentive to bargain.3 Moreover, in cases in which conviction is virtually
certain, there is often a standardized "price" for most bargains, a price which
represents a rough estimate of the costs saved by avoiding trial.40

37 See Ostrow, supra note 17, at 1582; Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining As Disaster, supra note 5, at 1980;
Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1909.
33 "For a large number of plea bargains ••• there is no mystery about what drives the bargain. Criminal
trials are costly for defendants, and even more so for prosecutors. These costs can be saved, and the gains split
between the parties, by reaching a bargain early in the criminal process." Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As
Contract, supra note 5, at 1935.
39

See

MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES AND

ATTORNEYS 60-61 (1977). Professor Heumann's book offers an invaluable first-hand account of
plea bargaining as described by its participants. According to Heumann, most experienced defense counsel
estimate that, of the approximately ninety percent of their clients who are factually guilty, only a few have
legal grounds to dispute the state's case. /d. Most cases, from the defense point of view, are ''born dead." /d.
The high rate of guilty pleas, Heumann suggests, has little to do with the pressures of case volume. /d. at 157.
Rather, he argues, it is the natural result of a system that processes a high percentage of defendants who are
factually guilty and who perceive there is some reward at sentencing for a guilty plea. /d. Of course, critics of
plea bargaining might challenge the view that so many cases are legally indefensible. Critics have argued that
defense attorneys too often, and too easily, reach that conclusion because they lack the information, the
resources, and sometimes the incentives to pursue potential avenues of defense. See, e.g., Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining As Disaster, supra note 5, at 1988-91.
40 Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2130 (1998).
DEFENSE

Many, perhaps most, cases are processed pursuant to fairly standard rules ... [t]he rules are more
like those of the supermarket than like those of the flea market: there is a fixed price tag on the
case, and you will get no farther 'bargaining' with the prosecutor than you will by making a
counteroffer on the price of a can of beans at the grocery.

Id. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines actually quantify the sentencing benefit attributable to such cost
savings, allowing a one-level decrease in the offense level to certain defendants for "timely notifying
authorities of [their] intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing
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If that basic model fit all plea agreements, then much of the debate over the
practice would be moot. In many cases, of course, the dynamics of plea
bargaining are more complex. The complexity arises because no one knows
for sure what will happen at trial. 41 So our model of plea bargaining must
account for an additional factor: likelihood of conviction. A defendant's
decision to plead guilty, and the terms of the bargain, will depend to some
degree on an assessment of the risks of conviction.42 If a rational defendant
could know for certain that his trial would result in acquittal, he would
(almostt3 never plead guilty. On the other hand, a defendant who feels
conviction at trial is extremely likely would be sensible to plead guilty in
exchange for even a small sentencing concession. For those many cases in
between, the defendant and his counsel must decide whether the sentencing
benefits offered in the bargain are sufficient to justify foregoing the
possibility-or sometimes even the probability-of an acquittal.44 The

for trial and pennitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 3El.l(b)(2) (2000).
41 One plea-bargaining study suggests that, when presented with the facts of a relatively "strong" case,
attorneys are quite consistent in their evaluation of the likely outcome at trial. WILLIAM F. McDONALD, PLEA
BARGAINING: CRITICAL ISSUES AND COMMON PRACfiCES 79-80 (1985). As the facts of a case become weaker,
however, there is a wide disparity in attorneys' estimates of the likelihood of conviction. See id.
42 See MCDONALD, supra note 41, at 75-76; HERBERT S. MILLER ET AL., PLEA BARGAINING IN TilE
UNITED STATES xvi-xviii, 81 (1978). Studies of plea bargaining routinely conclude that "strength of case" is
among the primary factors detennining (1) the nature of the bargain offered by a prosecutor and (2) defense
counsel's willingness to recommend a plea of guilty. See id.
43
Oddly enough, there are cases in which a plea bargain can be attractive to a defendant who is almost
certain to be acquitted at trial. An often-cited example is that of the "time-served" plea agreement. Imagine a
defendant charged with felony larceny, who faces two years in prison upon conviction, who has been held in
pretrial detention for thirty days awaiting trial, and whose trial will not take place for another thirty days.
Imagine that the prosecutor offers a plea to a misdemeanor with an agreed upon sentence of"time served," i.e.
thirty days, with plea and sentencing to take place the following day. If that defendant rejects the offer, he
faces another thirty days in jail before trial and some risk, albeit a slim one, of a felony conviction and years in
prison. If he accepts the offer, he will be released from jail the next day. For many defendants, especially
those with less concern about the record of conviction, such an offer will be too good to refuse even if the
prosecution's evidence is slim. For a similar example, see McMunigal, supra note 10, at 987.
44 Professor Schulhofer describes the typical plea-bargaining calculus from defendant's perspective:
"[T]he defendant, who seeks to minimize punishment, will be better off accepting a plea offer if the
contemplated punishment is lower than the anticipated posttrial sentence, discounted by the possibility of
acquittal." Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining As Disaster, supra note 5, at 1980.
Such models, of course, are no more than they purport to be: models. Actual cases can present a much
more varied set of factors that enter into the plea bargaining calculus. In many cases, for example, the most
important question may not be whether defendant is likely to be convicted, but of what offense, or what grade
of offense, he is most likely to be convicted. In sentencing guidelines jurisdictions, the bargaining calculus
must also take into account the likelihood that the evidence presented at trial, or that provided to the probation
officer and the court in connection with a guilty plea, will result in specific findings relating to offense
characteristics that may have a major impact at sentencing.
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prosecutor must make a similar risk assessment. The model suggests, and
experience confirms, that she will offer greater sentencing concessions in those
cases where conviction is less likely, and fewer concessions where she is more
46
confident of conviction.
If plea bargains tum on such risk assessments, then information regarding
the likelihood of conviction is obviously important to both parties to the plea
negotiation.47 Scholars of negotiation theory agree that access to and control
over information creates a bargaining advantage.48 Anyone who has ever
purchased a used car has tested that theory first hand. The same principle
applies in many plea bargains. A defendant will "pay" less, or choose not to
49
buy at all, if he can learn enough to see that the prosecution's case is a lemon.
45 Professors Scott and Stuntz describe the calculus from the prosecutor's perspective. The prosecutor's
plea offer, they suggest, typically is "based upon the prosecutor's estimate of the strength of the case at the
time of bargaining plus the expected savings in transaction costs from shifting prosecutorial efforts to pleas
rather than trials." Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1948.
46 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 42, at xxii ("Most prosecutors appear willing to plea bargain in [weak
cases), offering 'sweet deals' in very weak cases."). This characteristic of the bargaining process-the
tendency of prosecutor's to offer the best "deals" in the weakest cases-is at the heart of much of the academic
criticism of plea bargaining. Because weak cases presumably are those in which guilt is most questionable,
then the best deals are offered to those defendants most likely to be innocent. The result, as many critics have
argued, is that plea bargaining is a highly inaccurate means of separating the innocent from the guilty. In fact,
they argue, it exerts its greatest pressures on the innocent. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 60 (1968); McMunigal, supra note 10, at 990. Professors
Scott and Stuntz, while recognizing this "innocence problem," argue that the plight of innocent defendants
would be even worse if we abolished plea bargaining. As long as trials are less than perfect means for
determining guilt, then some innocent defendants who would have received lower sentences through
bargaining will be (inaccurately) convicted and serve longer sentences. See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining
As Contract, supra note 5, at 1949-51; Scott & Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargaining, Imperfect Trials, and
Innocent Defendants, supra note 5, at 2013-14.
47 See MILLER ET AL., supra note 42, at xvii (''In general the ability of a prosecutor to make a rational
decision stems from the information available at the decision making point."); Ostrow, supra note 17, at 158390 (discussing defendant's need for, and limited access to, information necessary for an accurate assessment of
the prosecution's case).
48 See ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND
NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECfiVE REPRESENTATION 406-08 (1990) (noting the value of information
regardless of whether one's bargaining strategy is "adversarial" or "problem-solving").
49 This model, of course, is a generalization that does not purport to cover every bargain. Some
prosecutors, for example, simply refuse to offer "discounts" for weak cases. They may make a single plea
proposal based on their view of an appropriate sentence. In some measure, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
aim to funnel bargaining into this mold. The Guidelines offer no "discounts" based on the strength of the
government's evidence, although a variety of tactics can circumvent that limitation in many cases. For
example, prosecutors and defense counsel can and do bargain over the charge itself ("charge bargaining"), or
the applicability of various sentence-enhancing or sentence-reducing factors ("guideline factor bargaining").
See Stephen J. Schulhofer & llene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Selltencing Guidelines: The
First Fifteen Molllhs, 21 Al\1. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 271-82 (1989). In any event, a policy forbidding "discounts"
for weak cases does not eliminate the defendant's desire for information regarding the likelihood of conviction
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Unlike the car buyer, however, he cannot walk down the street and purchase
from another seller. Faced with a take-it-or-leave-it offer, and no opportunity
to look under the hood, he may buy when a better informed customer would
not, or he may pass up a genuine bargain.50 In negotiation, information often is
the key to bargaining power. Plea negotiation is no exception to that rule.
B. Defendant's Infonnation Deficit

When a criminal charge is filed, however, the parties seldom have equal
access to the kind of information useful in assessing the likelihood of
conviction at trial. 5 1 The defendant, of course, typically possesses at least one
piece of information that the prosecutor does not. He knows whether he
committed the crime.52 Ironically, that piece of information is of comparatively little value to him in the bargaining process.53 Except where the
traditional model gives way to other considerations-as in cases where the
prosecutor offers sentencing concessions in exchange for information or
testimony54-a guilty defendant seldom gains a negotiating advantage from a
at trial. The defendant will still weigh the risks of conviction in deciding whether to accept the prosecutor's
offer.
50
Though the literature on plea bargaining deals at length with defendants who may be bluffed or
coerced into pleading guilty, there is scarcely a mention of those who, because of incomplete information,
make unwise choices in going to trial. But the issue does arise occasionally. In United States v. Kidding, 560
F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1977), a defendant convicted at trial argued that his due process rights were violated
because, had the government more fully disclosed inculpatory evidence, he would have pleaded guilty and
received a lighter sentence. The Seventh Circuit was not impressed with the claim. Id. at 1313-14.
51 See John G. Douglass, Balancing Hearsay and Criminal Discovery, 68 FORDHAML. REV. 2097,214650 (comparing the opportunities of prosecution and defense to acquire information relating to criminal
charges); Ostrow, supra note 17, at 1583-90 (discussing the "information imbalance" between prosecution and
defense).
52
Even this "advantage" may not exist in some cases. As Professor McMunigal points out, there are a
variety of cases where the defendant may not be sure whether he is guilty of the crime. McMunigal, supra
note 10, at 970-82. While most defendants will be fully aware of their own conduct and mental state, they may
not know for certain whether their actions caused the harm that may constitute an element of the crime, or
whether they acted under circumstances defined in a criminal statute. And some defendants, because of
intoxication or mental disease, may have only a limited understanding of their own conduct. See id.
53 '"The defendant has no credible way to disclose actual innocence, but he can and normally will disclose
evidence of innocence. Innocence by itseif(that is, apart from its link to particular evidence) can have only a
small impact on the odds of conviction." Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining As Disaster, supra note 5, at 1984.
54
In the process of plea bargaining, the potential "cooperator" may have an incentive to disclose his own
guilt-at least partially-to the prosecutor. Often it is his own participation in the crime that makes the
cooperator a potentially helpful government witness. Typically, prosecutors will insist on an offer of proofor "proffer"-from the potential cooperator before reaching any agreement. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.620(2) (1997). A defendant whose proffered testimony
conflicts with other evidence known to the government will have a difficult time striking a favorable deal.
Candor, therefore, may be to his advantage even where it means disclosing his own culpability. Plea bargains
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forthright admission of guilt. As for the innocent defendant, the prosecutor
will assign little or no value to his claims of innocence because-to put it
bluntly-she hears too many such claims that are false. 55 She may fmd
independent evidence of innocence highly persuasive, but the defendant's
uncorroborated protests of innocence mean little. Her risk assessment already
assumes that the defendant will deny guilt at trial.
A guilty defendant often can make some well-educated guesses about the
prosecution's case because he was a player in the original drama that will be
reenacted at trial. At least until the prosecution provides discovery, however,
even a guilty defendant cannot know for certain whether his fingerprints were
identifiable, whether the victim picked him in a photo spread, or whether the
witnesses have clear memories of the crime. He may not know which
witnesses have come forward, which are unwilling to testify, which have
disappeared, or which have lied. In other words, the guilty defendant may
know quite well what he did; but he may not know how well he got caught.
An innocent defendant, of course, suffers an even greater information deficit.
At the time a charge is filed, he often knows only what the police or
prosecutors have been willing to share during an investigation, which normally
. very l'ttl
IS
1 e.56
involving defendants who promise to cooperate and to testify against others raise a variety of problems of their
own, most of which relate to the accuracy of the resulting testimony. See generally United States v. Singleton,
144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998) ("Singleton f'), rev'd 165 F.3d 1297 (1999) (en bane) ("Singleton If'). For the
few brief days before it was summarily vacated by the en bane Tenth Circuit, Singleton I outlawed the practice
of o!Tering incentives-in the form of sentencing leniency-to defendants in exchange for their testimony
against others.
55 See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 194247. Professors Scott and
Stuntz aptly describe the predicament of most prosecutors, who have brought charges they believe to be
accurate, and who are faced with a defendant who continues to protest his innocence: "In the absence of
reliable signals that they can afford to take seriously, prosecutors have no viable option other than to ignore
claims of innocence." /d. at 1946. The problem is not a matter of callousness on the part of prosecutors. It
arises because all defendants, innocent and guilty alike, have the same incentive to claim innocence during
bargaining. Indeed, the problem is exacerbated because the prosecutor typically hears the claim through the
medium of the defense attorney, who often has not heard the truth from his own client. See id. at 1945 n.126
(citing HEUMANN, supra note 39, at 59-60). Professor Heumann interviewed one defense attorney who
summarized the problem like this: "[T]he first year you practice law you believe everything your client tells
you. The second year you practice, you believe everything that the other side tells you. The third year you
don't know who's telling the truth. Most people tend not to believe their clients that much, justifiably."
HEUMANN, supra note 39, at 59.
56 As a general rule, defendants have no right to be informed of the progress, or even the existence, of a
criminal investigation. Police and prosecutors often choose to conduct their investigations without the
knowledge of potential defendants in order to avoid destruction of evidence, witness tampering, and escape of
their targets. "Quiet" investigations also allow for the option of undercover tactics, monitored phone calls, and
wiretaps. Even where investigations have become more overt-through interviews, search warrants, or even
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By contrast, the prosecutor already possesses most information critical to
the plea bargaining risk assessment by the time an indictment is filed. She has
access to the fruits of a police investigation, the only substantial investigation
of the crime that has occurred or is likely to occur.57 In more complex cases,
she has probably participated in that investigation, often over a period of
months, and will have questioned the principal witnesses at length in her office
or before a grand jury.58 Even as the case progresses toward trial, the
prosecutor retains a significant information advantage. Most evidence in most
criminal cases is presented by the prosecutor.59 The parties' plea-bargaining
risk assessment, therefore, turns primarily on an evaluation of that evidence.
By definition, the prosecutor will know more about her own case than will the
defense because, from within the universe of available evidence, the prosecutor
chooses what that case will be.
C. Pretrial Discovery and Plea Bargaining

For defendants considering a plea bargain, the rules of pretrial discovery
offer only partial relief from this information deficit. Limitations on both the
subject matter and the timing of discovery can leave a defendant in the dark
when he faces the decision whether to accept the terms of a plea agreement.
Unlike the rules of civil discovery, criminal discovery rules are not designed to
arrests-prosecutors often guard the identity of their sources and decline to disclose details of their case until
after a charge has been filed. In some instances, the law may even prohibit them from releasing the fruits of an
investigation. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (relating to grand jury secrecy). For an analysis of the intricacies of
Rule 6(e), see Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 AM. CRIJ\1.
L. REV. 339 (1999).
57
Any significant investigation on behalf of the defendant is the exception rather than the rule. Most
criminal defense counsel are court-appointed. Many lack the time or resources to pursue detailed factual
investigation of most cases. One study of court-appointed counsel in New York found that appointed attorneys
visited the crime scene in only 12% of homicide cases and only 4% of other felony cases. See William J.
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. I, 42
(1997) (citing Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, IS
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581, 762 (1986-1987)). Counsel interviewed witnesses in only 21% of
homicide cases and only 4% of other felony cases. See id.
58 See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate
Pursuit, 68 FORDHAML. REV. 1695, 1705-06 (2000).
59 See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1941 n.llO. The prosecutor must
bear the burden of proof at trial. While some defense witnesses are called in most cases, it is not uncommon
for the defendant to present no evidence at all, and simply to rely on arguments that the prosecution has failed
to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, the case will never get to a jury if the prosecutor's
evidence is insufficient to survive a motion for judgment of acquittal. And in the plea bargaining risk
assessment, any case that will be submitted to the jury is a case where defendant knows he will face a
significant risk of conviction. For a risk averse defendant, the uncertainty surrounding jury verdicts is a
powerful inducement to plead guilty.
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inform a defendant fully of the case against him. 60 No constitutional principle
provides defendants a comprehensive right to learn the government's case
before trial. 61 Brady itself applies only to "evidence favorable to an
accused." 62 In most cases, therefore, Brady provides only a small portion of
the information critical to defendant's risk assessment. 63 Brady may suggest
some "melting" around the edges of the government's case, but it will not
expose the iceberg that the defendant may face at trial.
In federal courts, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides some measure of relief, requiring disclosure of scientific test results
and of all documents and tangible objects which the government will offer in
evidence or "which are material to the preparation of the defendant's
defense." 64 Still, Rule 16 leaves major gaps. For one thing, it exempts police
reports, 65 often the items most valuable to defense counsel seeking an efficient
means to learn the government's case. 66 Further, Rule 16 and similar state
provisions exempt prosecution witness statements from pretrial discovery.67
to See Douglass, supra note 51, at 2142-46 (contrasting civil and criminal discovery procedures); Sarokin
& Zuckennann, supra note 21, at 1089 ("It is an astonishing anomaly that in federal courts virtually
unrestricted discovery is granted in civil cases, whereas discovery is severely limited in criminal matters.");
Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1121, 1129-32 (1998) (contrasting
civil settlement models which assume infonnation generally available to both parties with the criminal plea
bargaining setting where infonnation typically is not accessible to both parties).
61
See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
62
Bradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963).
63 See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 369 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Brady infonnation would provide only
part of the picture. Without all of the state's inculpatory evidence, the defendant could not realistically assess
the ~ate's case against him.").
FED. R. CRThl. P. 16(a)(l)(C).
65 FED. R. CRTh!. P. 16(a)(2). Rule 16(a)(2) provides:
[T]his rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal
government documents made by the attorney for the government or any other government agent
investigating or prosecuting the case. Nor does the rule authorize the discovery or inspection of
statements made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses ••..

/d.

66 Prosecutors, by contrast, typically receive police reports early in the case, often before charges are
t11ed, and use them in making charging decisions and in preparing for trial.
67 FED. R. CRThl. P. 16(a)(2). Restrictions on pretrial discovery of the identity and prior statements of
government witnesses have been the subject of intense debate. Commentators have attacked the limitations,
arguing that they leave defendants with little opportunity to investigate the most critical aspects of the
government's case or to prepare for cross-examination of government witnesses. See, e.g., Brennan, Progress
Report, supra note 3, at 6, 13-14; Sarokin & Zuckennann, supra note 21, at 1095-1100. In 1974, the debate
led to a proposed amendment to Rule 16 that would have required the government to identify its witnesses
before trial. See FED. R. CRTh!. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendments. The Justice Department
vigorously opposed the amendment, citing concerns over witness tampering and intimidation. For a summary
of the Justice Department's position, see Brennan, Progress Report, supra note 3, at 6; EdwardS. G. Dennis,
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Under the Jencks Act, witness statements in federal cases are protected from
disclosure until the government witness actually testifies at trial.68 Indeed, in
federal courts and in roughly half the states, no rule grants defendants a right to
know in advance of trial even the names of the witnesses who will testify
against them. 69
The timing of pretrial discovery-or, more precisely, the unregulated
sequencing of discovery and plea discussions-further contributes to the
information deficit that confronts defendants considering a proposed plea
agreement. Brady is not a rule of fixed time limits.70 Brady disclosures may
occur early or late in the pretrial process, or even after trial has begun. It is
quite typical, for example, for prosecutors to delay disclosure of Brady
material relating to the impeachment of government witnesses-so-called
"Giglio material"71-until the eve of trial.72 Especially in complex cases, some
Jr., The Discovery Process in Criminal Prosecutions: Toward Fair Trials and Just Verdicts, 68 WASH. U. L.Q.
63, 65-69 (1990). Congress ultimately struck the provision from the 1974 amendments. H.R. REP. No. 94414, at 12 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 713, 716.
68 The Jencks Act provides:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or report in the possession
of the United States which was made by a government witness or prospective government witness
(other than the defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said
witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994).
As a practical matter, prosecutors often disclose witness statements earlier than the Jencks Act requires,
partly out of a sense of fairness and partly out of a desire to expedite defendant's decision to plead guilty. See
Douglass, supra note 51, at 2140; Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 554 (1999).
69 See Cary Clennon, Pre-Trial Disco1•ery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to lmpro\'e the
Administration of Criminal Justice in the Superior Coun of the District of Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. REV.
641, 659 (1989) (noting that twenty-eight states require pretrial disclosure of government witness lists). In
federal courts, only defendants facing the death penalty are entitled to a list of government witnesses before
trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1994).
70 The Supreme Court "has never pinpointed the time at which the disclosure [under Brady] must be
made." United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780,785 (E.D. Va. 1997) (quoting United States v. Anderson,
481 F.2d 685 (4th Cir. 1973)). The lower courts have taken a pragmatic approach, holding that no due process
violation occurs as long as the evidence is disclosed in time for its effective use at trial. See United States v.
Smith Grading and Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527,531 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964,
973 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Brady itself called for disclosure of exculpatory evidence "upon demand." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963). The significance of the "demand," however, has been largely eliminated by subsequent
decisions. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,433 (1995) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976),
for the proposition that the defendant's failure to request favorable evidence does not free government of all
obligation to disclose).
71
In Giglio v. United States, the Court held that nondisclosure of evidence affecting the credibility of a
government witness falls within the Brady rule. 405 U.S. 150 (1972). As a result, broad categories of
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courts may enter pretrial orders specifying the timing and sequence of some
categories of discovery. 73 But such orders are probably the exception rather
than the rule. Few if any courts have rules regulating the timing of plea
bargaining discussions, or the sequence of guilty pleas in relation to the
discovery process. At present, there is little authority that would permit
defendants to demand an advantageous sequence.74 For practical purposes,
there is no such thing as a "Motion for Pre-Plea Discovery."
The sequencing of plea and discovery is really a matter controlled by the
bargaining process itself. Either party may bargain, or refuse to bargain, based
on the information available at any given point. As a result, defendants plead
guilty at varying stages in the discovery process. Some plead after all
discovery is complete, but many plead after little or no formal discovery?5

impeachment evidence-witnesses' prior inconsistent statements, their criminal records, prior dishonest acts,
and any inducements that may motivate a witness to testify favorably to the government-are subject to
disclosure. Today, most Brady litigation addresses nondisclosure of "Giglio material," rather than evidence
that directly negates the guilt of the defendant. Strickler v. Greene is a good example. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
There the Court considered, and ultimately denied, a Brady claim that stemmed from the prosecutor's failure
to disclose a detective's notes and a witness's letters showing that a principal prosecution witness had been
inconsistent and uncertain in her accounts of key events, in contrast to her more polished, confident trial
testimony. See id. at 273-75.
72 Concerns for witness safety generally account for the government's position that witness-related
disclosure should be delayed until the eve of trial in many cases. Where the exculpatory evidence consists of
prior inconsistent statements by a government witness, there is a potential conflict between the Jencks Act,
which prohibits compelled disclosure of witness statements before trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994), and the
due process requirement that evidence be disclosed in time for defendant to make effective use of the
information disclosed. The federal circuits have split in their efforts to resolve that conflict. Several circuits
have held that the Jencks Act controls the timing of such disclosures and, accordingly, that the government
cannot be compelled to disclose even exculpatory witness statements before trial. See United States v. Presser,
844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Jones, 612 F.2d 453,455 (9th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Scott, 524 F.2d 465, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1975). At least two circuits have concluded that Brady's
constitutional rule trumps the Jencks Act, requiring pretrial disclosure where necessary to allow defendants to
make effective use of witness statements in preparing to impeach government witnesses. See United States v.
Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1414-15 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 263 (3rd
Cir. 1984).
73 See, e.g., United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Va. 1997) (ordering government to
disclose specitied categories of Giglio material and certain other evidence three days before trial, while
delaying disclosure of Jencks material until trial).
74
Rule 16likewise sets no time limits on discovery. The advisory committee notes to Rule 16 state that
"discovery contributes to the fair and efficient administration of criminal justice by providing the defendant
with enough information to make an informed decision as to plea .•••" FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory
committee note to 1974 amendment. While the comment implies that prosecutors should comply with Rule 16
at an early stage in order to foster informed plea discussions, the Rule does not require that they provide Rule
16 discovery before discussing, or even before completing, a plea agreement. See id.
75 Because the "price" of a plea to the defendant depends in part upon the "costs" saved by the
prosecutor, defendants may receive more favorable plea proposals at early stages in the litigation, before the
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Indeed, it is not unusual for a defendant to enter into a plea agreement even
before formal charges have been filed? 6
Moreover, the guilty plea process itself does little to address defendant's
need for information. In the typical guilty plea proceeding, the court will quiz
the defendant at length regarding the nature of the char~e, the potential
penalties, and the rights which he waives by pleading guilty.7 But few courts
will ask the simple question, "What do you know about the government's
case?"78

prosecutor has devoted significant time and effort to trial preparation. Scholars of plea bargaining argue,
accurately, that an early plea is often a relatively uninformed plea, entered before either the prosecutor or the
defense has completed its investigation of the case. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 29, at 1282 (suggesting
rules requiring complete investigations prior to plea bargaining). Of course, that fact does not necessarily
favor one party over the other in all cases. The unregulated sequencing of disclosure and bargaining can lead
to strategic bargaining by either or both parties. A prosecutor may seek to induce a plea before rules of pretrial
discovery would require her to disclose how weak her case really is. Conversely, a defendant might seek a
quick plea agreement out of fear that further investigation by the prosecutor will only make matters worse.
One defense attorney colorfully described that tactic as "sneaking the sun past the rooster." MILLER ET AL.,
supra note 42, at 72.
76 In such cases, defendants typically waive the process of grand jury indictment and consent to the filing
of a criminal information. Pre-indictment pleas have become more common since the advent of sentencing
guidelines. By bargaining before the charges are filed, defendants sometimes can influence the nature of the
formal charge itself which, in tum, can have a major impact on sentencing. In federal courts, neither the
guidelines themselves nor Justice Department policy absolutely forbids the practice of "charge bargaining,"
see Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 49, at 278, although the practice is somewhat constrained by Justice
Department directives stating that prosecutors should not drop the most serious ''readily" provable charge, see
id. at 255 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTOR'S HANDBOOK ON SENTENCING GUIDEUNES AND OTHER
PROVISIONS OF THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984 (Nov. 1, 1987)). More recently, those directives have
been incorporated into the United States Attorneys' Manual. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' OFFICE MANUAL§ 9-27.430 (Sept 1997).
77 See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c). Ru1e 11 requires a court, before accepting a guilty plea, to address the
defendant personally and "determine that the defendant understands," among other things, the nature of the
charge, the applicable penalties, his right to counsel, his rights to trial by jury and to confront and crossexamine witnesses. ld. Further, Rule 11 requires the court to ascertain that the plea is voluntary. See id.
Nothing in Rule 11, however, requires the court to inquire regarding the status of discovery or the defendant's
factual understanding of the case against him.
In large measure, Rule ll(c) is desigued to codify the constitutional requirements for the entry of a valid
guilty plea, as outlined by the Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
78 In most Rule 11 proceedings, the closest that the court will get to probing the defendant's knowledge
about the government's case will come when inquiring about the assistance of counsel. Many courts will
inquire whether defendant is satisfied with the assistance of his attorney and whether he has had an opportunity
to discuss the charge and any potential defenses. But defendant's answer-typically a simple "yes" or a nod of
the head-seldom will convey the substance of those discussions. A few courts may inquire about the status
of discovery, but again those questions are typically perfunctory. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 920 F.
Supp. 688 (E.D. Va. 1996). There the court merely inquired of defense counsel, "[H]as the government turned
over to you everything that you would be entitled to under the rules of discovery?" Id. at 690.
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In sum, as far as formal rules provide, plea bargaining and discovery are
essentially separate procedures. Neither the subject matter nor the timing of
criminal discovery is presently designed to insure fully informed guilty pleas.
D. lnfonnal Discovery

In the absence of rules requiring more complete disclosure, one might
conclude that plea bargaining must always be unfair to defendants. 79 The risks
of uninformed and ill-advised guilty pleas-like the risks of buying a lemon
from the only car dealer in town-are self-evident. But the rules do not tell the
whole story. Most discovery occurs outside of the rules, in informal exchanges
between prosecutors and defense counsel.80 By contrast to the formal rules of
discovery which are not "sequenced" to account for plea bargaining, informal
discovery takes place largely to support the plea bargaining process.
Prosecutors usually disclose most of their evidence early in the pretrial
81
sequence because they expect disclosure will induce a guilty plea. And early
82
On the
pleas are more convenient for prosecutors than eve-of-trial pleas.
For an interesting contrast, consider the more elaborate guilty plea procedures required under the Rules
for Courts-Martial under military Jaw. See Terry L. Elling, Guilty Plea Inquiries: Do We Care Too Much?,
134 MIL. L. REv. 195 (1991).
79 Indeed, some critics call for abolition of plea bargaining in part because they fear that most defendants
are poorly informed about their chances at trial and most defense attorneys are unable, or unmotivated, to
pursue an independent investigation of the facts. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective Assistance on the
Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 137, 142 (1986) (arguing that counsel's failure to
investigate undermines defendant's ability to make intelligent choices in plea bargaining); Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining As Disaster, supra note 5, at 1988-89. Whether the prevalence of overworked, or undermotivated
defense counsel is reason to abolish plea bargaining is, of course, subject to debate. As Professors Scott and
Stuntz point out, ineffective counsel may negotiate less than optimum plea agreements. Indeed, most
tragically, they may occasionally negotiate them on behalf of innocent defendants. But abolishing plea
bargaining does not save those unfortunate innocents. It just puts them in the hands of the same ineffective
attorneys at trial, where the stakes-in terms of sentencing-are higher. Abolishing plea bargaining,
Professors Scott and Stuntz argue, is not a panacea for protecting innocents from unjust conviction. See id. It
is merely a trade-off. See id. Plea bargains may convict more innocents than trials, but at lower sentences.
See id. Trials may convict fewer innocents, but will compound the injustice in their cases with higher
sentences. See Scott & Stuntz, Imperfect Bargains, supra note 5, at 2013.
80 See Douglass, supra note 51, at 2140-41; Levenson, supra note 68, at 562-63.
81 See Brennan, Progress Report, supra note 3, at 2-3; Douglass, supra note 51, at 2140-41 and 2140
n.191; H. Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW & CONTa1P. PROBS. 102,
113-14 (1977). Justice Department policy encourages prosecutors to consider informal pretrial disclosures in
part to "enhance the prospects that the defendant will plead guilty." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATIORNEYS' MANUAL§ 9-6.200 (Sept 1997).
82 The Department of Justice cautions federal prosecutors: "A plea offer by a defendant on the eve of trial
after the case has been fully prepared is hardly as advantageous from the standpoint of reducing public expense
as one offered months or weeks earlier." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATIORNEYS' MANUAL§ 927.420(B)(5) (Sept 1997). The Federal Sentencing Guidelines themselves offer a sentencing benefit to
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other side of the table, defense counsel recognizes that a guilty plea, especially
an early plea, may carry important sentencing benefits for his client. He needs
enough information to convince himself and his client that a trial would be a
bad idea. Before signaling a willingness to recommend a plea, therefore, he
asks to see what he is up against.83
For the most part, the process works effectively.84 The defendant learns the
basic contours of the government's case, and that is usually enough to suggest
a high risk of conviction at trial. The plea follows in short order. In most
cases, the process also works accurately; prosecutors provide a reasonably
complete account of their evidence, both good and bad. The~ have an obvious
incentive to disclose inculpatory material to induce the plea.8 Their incentives
to disclose exculpatory material are less obvious but still present. There is no
doubt ethical rules play some role in promoting disclosure. The rules require
prosecutors to disclose exculpatory information in a "timely" fashion, though
they are ambiguous as to whether that means in time for trial or in time for an
informed plea.86 A wise prosecutor may disclose simply to avoid even the
defendants who plead early enough to avoid trial preparation by the government. U.S. SENTE!'ICING
GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 3El.l(b)(2) (2000).
83 Often, defense counsel's request for disclosure may be phrased as a need for information sufficient to
convince the client that trial is a futile act. "Give me something that will convince my client to plead," is a
typical refrain.
84 In fact, informal discovery in criminal cases probably works more efficiently than discovery in most
civil cases. In civil cases, "lawyers ordinarily would not consider disclosing items not legally required to be
disclosed." Zacharias, supra note 60, at 1159 n.115.
85 Of course, that incentive will not lead to full disclosure of inculpatory details in every case.
Prosecutors may see strategic advantages in keeping &orne evidence to themselves. See Uviller, The Nelltral
Prosecutor, supra note 58, at 1700 n.11. "I still recall the sense that even inculpatory details, served up to wily
counsel in advance of trial, might well stimulate the artful construction of an evasive defense." I d. And the
rules of discovery do not require full disclosure of inculpatory evidence. See supra text accompanying notes
61-69.
86 The Model Rules require a prosecutor to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or
information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr Rule 3.8(d). The Model Code of Professional Responsibility includes a
similar provision. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L REsPONSffiiLITY DR 7-103(B) (1983). Neither the Model
Rules nor the Model Code nor the related comments, however, suggest whether the requirement of"timely"
disclosure applies in relation to plea negotiations. While one commentator suggests that the rules require
disclosure in plea bargaining, see JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUcr 435-36 (2d ed. 1999),
others contend that the rules simply fail to resolve the problem, see McMunigal, supra note 10, at 1025 &
1025 n.207. My own research has uncovered no legal ethics opinion applying a Brady-like obligation to
prosecutors in plea bargaining, and no reported case of a prosecutor subjected to disciplinary action for failing
to disclose exculpatory information in advance of a plea.
Studies of plea bargaining suggest that prosecutors themselves are divided in their views regarding
disclosure in plea bargaining. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 42, at xxiii. As Professor McMunigal points out,
the ambiguity in ethical rules for disclosure in plea bargaining reflects the more general lack of consensus
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potential of an ethical breach. Equally important, a prosecutor's enlightened
self-interest provides an incentive for disclosure in many cases. As a general
rule, prosecutors are more interested in disposing of a case by conviction than
they are in insisting on the toughest possible sentence. 87 Most pre-plea
disclosure of favorable evidence is unlikely to induce a risk-averse defendant
to choose trial in any event. 88 And, a candid disclosure of the limitations in the
government's case is often the predicate for offering-and justifying-an
attractively low sentencing recommendation as an inducement to plead.
Indeed, under sentencing guidelines regimes, prosecutors can have a
significant incentive to identify and disclose information favorable to the
defense. Without it, they may have no means to justify a bargain that would
otherwise dispose of the case.89 Finally, perhaps the greatest incentive for
among lawyers regarding the ethics of disclosure in any form of negotiation. McMunigal, supra note 10, at
1024; see also Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (1988).
87 See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 49, at 283. "Prosecutors focused upon maximizing their
conviction rate, but were not oriented toward ma:ximizing the severity of the sentences they obtained." /d.
HEUMANN, supra note 39, at 107, 110-14 (noting that "certainty of time" matters more to experienced
prosecutors than "amount of time").
8
~ The accuracy of this assertion becomes evident when we consider the substantial number of defendants
who plead guilty on the eve of trial, even after receiving full Brady and Giglio disclosure from the prosecutor.
8
~ In non-guidelines systems, stipulations that are contrary to fact, entered into solely for purposes of
arriving at an agreed-upon sentence and with no intention of misleading the court, often are regarded as
~tandard operating procedure. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 49, at 248. For example, the radar may
have clocked defendant traveling 75 mph in a 50 mph zone, but the parties might agree to a conviction for
speeding no more than 10 mph over the speed limit. Guideline sentencing, in theory at least, removes the
option of stipulations contrary to fact. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, in order to determine the
actual sentence, the court must make factual findings with regard to a variety of sentencing factors. In plea
bargaining, the parties may stipulate to facts with the intention of affecting those findings. Nevertheless, in
order to prevent manipulation, the Guidelines provide that such stipulations shall "not contain misleading
facts." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 6B 1.4 (2000). Probation officers reach their own factual
determinations during the pre-sentence investigation and, on occasion, will dispute the stipulations of the
parties. The court is not bound by the stipulation, and may make findings resulting in a sentence higher than
the parties anticipated. See id. In order to avoid that eventuality, a prosecutor interested in securing a plea
may have an incentive to disclose favorable facts during plea bargaining in an effort to convince defense
counsel that the court's ultimate sentencing findings will be consistent with the parties' expectations. By the
time of sentencing, in effect, both prosecutor and defense counsel may have become advocates for the same
"mitigated" view of the facts. The prosecutor may be generous in her disclosures of favorable information,
and in her characterization of inculpatory evidence, in an effort to keep the sentence within the range
contemplated during plea negotiations.
Explicit "fact bargaining," if it results in counter-factual stipulations, is inconsistent with the
Guidelines' aim of ''truth in sentencing." But in most cases, there are enough factual ambiguities to leave the
parties some leeway for creativity. See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 49, at 276. ''Far more common as a
means of fact manipulation was the use of ambiguities of proof. More so than in the past, Assistant U.S.
Attorneys ("AUSAs") were likely in guilty plea cases to limit their "Government Version" to unambiguous
facts on which the opposing counsel had agreed. Other potentially aggravating circumstances were not
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disclosure is that informal discovery carries its own informal sanctions for
deceptive behavior. Defense attorneys are not shy about sharing their
experiences with one another. A prosecutor with a reputation for tactical
nondisclosure will fmd it hard to sell her version of informal discovery to a
wary defense bar. Without some level of trust, plea discussions become more
difficult, more time-consuming, and more reliant upon the processes of formal
pretrial discovery.90 In short, a prosecutor's principal incentive to disclose
exculpatory information in today's plea discussions is her knowledge that she
will have another case tomorrow. 91
E. The Pitfalls of an Unregulated System: Why an "Open File" is Not Enough

Informal discovery works well enough in most cases. But that is small
comfort to the defendant who discovers, after his guilty plea, that the
prosecutor never told his counsel about the witness who identified someone
else in the lineup. Informal discovery is far from perfect, and one of its
greatest imperfections is that it tends to work best in cases where it matters
least.92 Prosecutors seeking guilty pleas have the strongest incentive to make
voluntary disclosures in their strongest cases. A quick plea is likely, and even
disclosure of a few tidbits of Brady material is unlikely to rock an otherwise
stable boat. In the weaker cases, even the honest prosecutor may choose to
limit disclosure to the letter of the pretrial discovery rules in order to maintain
a tactical advantage at trial. 93 A misguided few will be tempted to disclose
only the inculpatory part in the hopes that defendant will accept it as the full
picture and agree to a negotiated plea.94

affirmatively hidden or misrepresented; they were just not mentioned if they fell outside the scope of the
negotiated deal." !d.
90 See Rebecca Hollander-Biumhoff, Getting to 'Guilty': Plea Bargaining As Negotiation, 2 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REv. 115, 135-45 (1997); David Aaron, Note, Ethics, Law Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A
Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3005, 3033 (1999).
91 See Easterbrook, supra note 7, at 1971 ("Reputations are valuable in markets characterized by repeat
dealing.")
92 See Brennan, Progress Report, supra note 3, at 2 ("[V]oluntary discovery is unusual when the
defendant might benefit most from it, that is, where the government's case is weak."); see also Douglass,
supra note 51, at 2141; Uviller, supra note 81, at 113-14 ("[T]he process [of informal discovery] is necessarily
selective. Even the most scrupulous and conscientious counsel are in some degree responsive to their purposes
in the negotiation.").
93 See Uviller, supra note 58, at 1700 n.ll. "Another former [prosecutor] remembers that plea-inducing
inculpatory information was more readily imparted than potentially damaging exculpatory data." !d.
94 This kind of practice might charitably be described as "puffing" or "bluffing" to induce a plea. The
attitudes of prosecutors toward "bluffing" appear to vary widely, with some condemning the practice and
others viewing it as appropriate "gamesmanship" in an adversary system. See William F. McDonald,
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Informal discovery carries other imperfections as well. Without clear rules,
sometimes informal communication becomes miscommunication. Different
prosecutors may offer "open file discovery'' and have vastly different ideas of
what that means. 95 Seeing the prosecutor's file offers no guarantee that the
defendant has seen all exculpatory information in government hands. 96 In
some cases, that file may consist of whatever a police officer happened to
photocopy for the prosecutor in a few hurried moments between late-night
arrest and early-morning arraignment. The Brady case law is filled with
examples of defendants who received "open file" discovery from wellmeaning, but negligent prosecutors. 97 Without rules requiring the effort, there
is little incentive for a prosecutor to undertake a thorough review of
investigative files if she already has "enough" evidence to induce a plea.98
In sum, risk assessment is at the heart of most plea bargaining and
information is at the heart of that risk assessment.99 At present, however, our
system has few, if any, clear rules regarding disclosure of information to a
defendant before he pleads guilty. A system that relies so heavily on
voluntary, informal disclosure carries significant opportunities for abuse, not to
Prosecutorial Bluffing and the Case Against Plea Bargaining, in PLEA BARGAINING l, 3 (William F.
McDonald & James Cramer eds., 1980); MILLER ET AL., supra note 42, at xxiii-xxiv.
95 See Uviller, supra note 81, at 113. "[T]he informal method is a capricious device, varying in character
with local tradition, the attitudes of individual prosecutors, and the "old boy" status or personal reputation of a
particular defense attorney." /d.
96
In Miller\'. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988), for example, the defendant received "open file"
discovery in a case involving multiple homicides, all committed in the same neighborhood, all by the
strangling of black, female victims. That "open file," however, did not include information regarding the
arrest of another suspect who was caught while attempting to strangle a black, female victim in the same
neighborhood during the same time period as the other assaults. See id. at 1317. In effect, prosecutors
produced a complete "open file." But, for Brady purposes, it was the wrong file.
97 Strickler \'. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), offers a prime example of a case where the "open file"
turned out to be a trap for the unwary. Defense counsel did not pursue a formal motion for discovery because
he relied on the prosecutor's "open file" discovery policy. See id. at 276 & n.l3. The prosecutor's file,
however, did not contain a detective's notes and a witness's letters, both of which reflected that a key
prosecution witness had changed her story. See id. The apparent reason for the omission was that the case
was investigated by authorities in one county, but tried by a prosecutor from an adjoining county. See id. at
275 n.l2.
93 If the case goes to trial, then Brady-as a trial-related right to disclosure-would require a prosecutor
to disclose exculpatory material not only from her own file, but from police and other investigatory files as
well. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding the prosecutor responsible for "any favorable
evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police"). But that
trial-related obligation may not solve the disclosure problem in all, or even most, plea bargains. Often, the
prosecutor will focus more intently on the full range of evidence only in the fmal days of trial preparation in
those cases not disposed of by an early guilty plea. Her Brady or Giglio search may not be completed until a
relatively late stage in the pretrial process.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 38-50.
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mention simple misunderstanding and honest mistake. Hence, there is a
natural attraction between the process of plea bargaining, on the one hand, and
some kind of rule governing pre-plea disclosure, on the other.
For many commentators, defense attorneys, and courts, the solution also
seems natural enough: apply traditional Brady doctrine to guilty pleas just as
we do to trials. 100 But, Brady is not the right rule-or even a marginally
effective rule-for the job. To understand Brady's inherent weakness as a rule
for governing disclosure in plea bargaining, we need first to understand how
Brady applies when a case goes to trial. Then we can explore how courtseven the courts most receptive to Brady in the context of a guilty plea-have
modified and diluted Brady to fit the world of plea bargaining. Part IT
addresses those issues.

ll. A DOCTRINE THAT "ALTERS WHEN IT ALTERATION F!NDS": 101
HOW A GUILTY PLEA CHANGES BRADY

Unfortunately, Brady doctrine is not the "ever fixed mark" of the poet's
imagination. A guilty plea changes Brady, and not for the better. To assess
what happens to Brady in the context of plea bargaining, this Part begins with
the plea itself. Section A will describe how, in the eyes of a majority of courts,
a Brady challenge may survive a guilty plea. Section B turns to Brady. That
Section outlines the basic Brady doctrine, a rule that was substantially
weakened when the Court tied its standard of "materiality" to the outcome of
trial. Section C shows how courts have modified that standard when a guilty
plea resolves the case without a trial.

100
See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. United States, 50
F.3d 1448, 1453 (91h Cir. 1995); McMunigal, supra note 10, at 962-68.
101 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1770. The reference is to Shakespeare's familiar lines on !he
constancy of true love:

Let me not to !he marriage of true minds
Admit impediments; love is not love
Which alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends wilh !he remover to remove.
0 no, it is an ever-fixed mark
That looks on tempests and is never shaken;
It is !he star to every wand'ring bark,
Whose worih's unknown, al!hough his highlh be taken.

!d.
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A. Getting Past the Guilty Plea
1. The Court's Doctrine on the Finality of Guilty Pleas

Prosecutors routinely disclose "Brady material" 102 before trial, 103 often in
104
Courts seldom get involved at
the absence of any request by the defendant.
105
Brady litigation, however, occurs almost exclusively after
that juncture.
trial, when a defendant learns that the prosecutor failed to tell him something
that may have made a difference at trial or sentencing. 106 The same pattern
follows in guilty plea cases, 107 but it is decidedly more awkward for the
defendant. One day, defendant stands in open court and admits his guilt. 108
Months or even years later, he demands to take it all back because, he argues,
102 Any reference to "Brady material" before trial is, in a technical sense, a misnomer. Because the Court
detines "materiality" in relation to the outcome of trial, it is literally impossible to define what is and what is
not "Brady material" until one knows what evidence is presented at trial. In the course of pretrial discovery,
prosecutors often disclose a significant volume of favorable and impeaching evidence which, in light of the
evidence ultimately presented at trial, would not be regarded as "material" under the Court's retrospective
standard. As a matter of convention, however, prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts often use the term
"Brady material," in its nontechnical sense, to mean any favorable evidence known to the government before
trial.
103 Though Brady sets no specific time limits for disclosure, courts have held that due process requires
disclosure of favorable evidence in time for its effective use at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Smith Grading
and Paving, Inc., 760 F.2d 527, 532 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
104 No defense request is required to give rise to the prosecutor's obligations under Brady. See Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,433 (1995).
105 On occasion, disputes arise before trial regarding whether particular evidence is, or is not, "Brady
material." In those cases, courts may hear pretrial arguments on the issue and may review the questioned
evidence in camera in order to determine whether Brady requires its disclosure. See United States v.
Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780,785 (E.D. Va. 1997).
106 Brady itself, and all subsequent Brady cases which have reached the Supreme Court, are cases in
which the exculpatory evidence came to light after trial. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999);
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 419; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97
(1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). That is the typical pattern for almost all Brady litigation.
See United States v. Cuthbertson, 651 F.2d 189, 199 (3rd Cir. 1981) (Seitz, CJ., concurring) ("In the ordinary
Brady case, it is only after a judgment of conviction that a court reviews the failure of the prosecution to
disclose material the defendant argues should have been admitted into evidence.").
107 My own research has not disclosed a reported case in which the parties litigated a motion for "pre-plea
Brady disclosure." All of the growing number of plea-related Brady cases involve post-plea litigation, arising
when the defense learns of nondisclosure after the plea has been entered. See, e.g., United States v. Avellino,
136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995); Banks v.
United States, 920 F.Supp. 688, 691 (E.D. Va. 1996).
103 Post-plea Brady claims occasionally have followed pleas of nolo contendere, where, at least, the
defendant is not faced with the prospect of withdrawing a plea in the face of a prior open-court confession of
guilt. See, e.g., Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2000). One of the more influential post-plea
Brady opinions actually arose out of the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Miller v.
Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1317 (2d Cir. 1988).
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he would never have pled guilty in the first place had the prosecution only told
him what he has belatedly discovered on his own. 109 Given that typical
litigation posture, it is hardly surprising that the biggest impediment to Brady
as a rule of pre-plea disclosure is the guilty plea itself.
Courts treat a guilty plea as the basis for a finn and fmal judgment of
guilt.uo Of course, in order to carry such weight, the plea itself must be
valid.lll The Court's standard for judging a guilty plea has remained largely
unchanged for most of a century, though its basic fonnulation is typically
attributed to a trilogy of 1970 cases labeled-somewhat ironically for our
purposes-the "Brady trilogy."l1 2 In Brady v. United States, the Court upheld
a guilty plea that had been entered to avoid the death penalty where the
governing statute made that penalty applicable only in the event of trial by
jury. "Guilty pleas are valid," the Court said, "if both 'intelligent' and
109
Normally, the demand to ''take back'' the guilty plea comes in the form of a post-trial motion or a
habeas corpus petition filed by counsel. In some instances, the claims are supported by the defendant's own
testimony or affidavit, asserting what he "would have done" had he been aware of the previously nondisclosed
information. See, e.g., United States v. Millan-Colon, 829 F. Supp. 620, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting
aftidavits in which defendants asserted, "If I had known that members of the Drug Enforcement Task Force
... were themselves under investigation ... I would not have agreed to waive any constitutional rights and to
plead guilty.").
110
The Court has held, for example, that a valid guilty plea bars habeas review of most non-jurisdictional
claims of constitutional violations that preceded the plea. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 ( 1973 ).
Exceptions to that general rule arise where the claim challenges the "very power of the State to bring the
defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him," Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21,30 (1974),
and where the claim asserts that the guilty plea is itself invalid, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). The
Court's decisions regarding collateral challenges following guilty pleas have been the subject of extensive
commentary. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 17, at 2024-28; Peter Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for
the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977).
111 See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58 (permitting defendant to challenge guilty plea on the grounds that the plea was
invalid where entered into without effective assistance of counsel).
112 The "Brady trilogy'' consists of Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann l'.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). All three cases involved
challenges to guilty pleas.
In Brady v. United States, the defendant pled guilty in order to avoid the risk of a death sentence under a
federal kidnapping statute which allowed imposition of the death penalty only upon a trial by jury. 397 U.S. at
742. Brady argued that his plea was invalid because it was, in effect, coerced by his fear of the death penalty.
In rejecting Brady's claim, the Court held that a plea is not "involuntary'' merely because it is motivated by a
desire to avoid the risk of higher punishment, including the ultimate punishment of death. /d. at 751 ("We
decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth Amendment whenever
motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a
wider range of possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for
the crime charged."). Similarly, in Parker v. North Carolina, the Court rejected a challenge by a defendant
who claimed his guilty plea to burglary was motivated by a desire to avoid a possible death sentence following
trial. 397 U.S. at 790. Finally, in McMann v. Richardson, the Court declined to permit a collateral attack on a
guilty plea on the grounds that it was motivated by a coerced confession. 397 U.S. at 759.
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'voluntary."' 113 A defendant's fear of the death penalty, and his corresponding
desire to seek a lesser penalty, did not render the plea involuntary. Hard
choices of that sort are "inherent" in a system where guilty pleas, including
bargained-for pleas, are permitted. 114
Guilty pleas are valid if "voluntary" and "intelligent." Further, the Court
tells us, a valid plea of guilty precludes any subsequent claims attacking
constitutional violations that may have preceded the plea. 115 In the words of
the Court, after "a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that
he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional
rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." 116

2. Overcoming Finality: An "Uninfonned" Plea
Is Not an "Intelligent" Plea

These parallel doctrines-(1) that voluntary and intelligent guilty pleas are
valid, and (2) that valid pleas foreclose claims of earlier constitutional
violations-stand as formidable barriers to the marriage of Brady and plea
bargaining. Absent some theory that surmounts or avoids those barriers, our
discussion of Brady and plea bargaining would come to an abrupt end right
here.
But, a number of courts have proved themselves willing to address the
merits of post-plea Brady claims despite these barriers. 117 Two theories are at

113 397 U.S. at 747 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)).
114 See id. at 751-52.
115 Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).
116

/d.

117 Though the Supreme Court has yet to reach the issue, at least four federal circuits have held that a

guilty plea may be challenged on the grounds of an antecedent Brady violation. See United States v. Avellino,
136 F. 3d 249, 254-62 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491,495-96 (lOth Cir. 1994); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416,421-22 (8th Cir.
1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1988). Federal district courts in at least three other
circuits have entertained such claims. See Indelicato v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 2d 151, 155-59 (E.D.
Mass. 2000); United States v. Brown, No. 99-5084,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6656, at *10511 (E.D. Pa. May 5,
2000); Banks v. United States, 920 F. Supp. 688, 691 (E.D. Va. 1996). And, several state appellate courts
have likewise permitted defendants to raise Brady claims after a guilty plea. See, e.g., Ex Parte Lewis, 587
S.W.2d 697,700-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
The Sixth Circuit's position is not so easy to characterize. In Campbell v. Morris, 769 F.2d 314 (6th
Cir. 1985), the court apparently considered the relevance and siguificance of alleged Brady material in relation
to defendant's plea, suggesting in theory at least that some Brady violations might result in pleas that were not
'"intelligent and voluntary." ld. at 321-22. Nevertheless, the court noted, '"[T]here is no authority within our
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the heart of those rulings. Though the theories may be doctrinally distinct,
they typically merge in judicial opinions and, in any event, lead to the same
conclusion.
The first argument flows easily-perhaps too easily-from the requirement
of a voluntary and intelligent plea. It takes no stretch of the English language
to suggest that an uninformed plea is not an "intelligent" one. The defendant's
decision to plead guilty rests largely upon his appraisal of the prosecution's
case: his risk assessment. A plea entered in the face of a Brady violation, by
definition, is entered without knowledge of a substantial weakness in the
prosecution's case. Such a plea, the argument goes, is not "intelligent" and
may be withdrawn. Courts endorsing the marriage of Brady and plea
bargaining typically have taken this route. 118
A second, closely related argument flows from an exception to the Court's
waiver doctrine. One claim that survives a guilty plea is a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in the guilty plea process itself. 119 Where counsel's
performance in advising a plea of guilty has fallen below the minimal standard
20
established in Strickland v. Washington/ the Court permits withdrawal of the
plea if "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the
defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." 121 By analogy to the ineffective assistance of counsel cases, therefore,
one can argue that a guilty plea does not, and logically should not, result in
waiver of other constitutional deficiencies that infect the defendant's decision
to plead guilty. A pre-plea Brady violation, just like ineffective assistance of
counsel, taints that decision because it deprives the defendant of a fair chance
122
to make a reasonable calculation of his chances at trial.
knowledge holding that suppression of Brady material prior to trial amounts to a deprivation of due process."
/d. at322.
118 See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453 ("A waiver cannot be deemed 'intelligent and voluntary' if 'entered
without knowledge of material information withheld by the prosecution.") (quoting Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320);
see also White, 858 F.2d at 422; Campbell, 169 F.2d at 321. Interestingly, although the Ninth Circuit quotes
Miller as authority for the notion that a plea in the face of a Brady violation is not "intelligent and voluntary,"
the quotation is actually taken out of context. The Miller Court took a different approach to arrive at the
conclusion that a Brady violation may taint a guilty plea. See infra note 168.
119 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
120
466 u.s. 668 (1984).
121
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
122 Indeed, the Court itself has inadvertently contributed to the link between post-plea Brady claims and
post-plea Strickland claims. In Hill, the Court offered an example of the kind of ineffectiveness that might
taint a guilty plea. Its example was counsel's "failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory
evidence ...." /d. at 59. The Court then set a standard for plea withdrawal that explicitly recognizes the
significance of the risk assessment that typically leads to a gnilty plea:
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Several federal appellate opinions have adopted, and sometimes merged,
these two approaches in holding that a Brady claim survives the guilty plea. 123
Whether the Supreme Court would agree, however, seems open to question.
Either approach rests on the premise that a valid plea, or a valid waiver,
requires some level of information regarding the strength of the government's
evidence. There is ample reason to doubt that this premise is consistent with
the Court's existing doctrine on guilty pleas. For one thing, despite their
semantic similarity, it is a stretch to turn the Court's decisions on "intelligent"
pleas into the requirement of an "informed" plea. 124 In the past, the Court has
found pleas "intelligent" whenever they were entered with a general
appreciation of the criminal charge and of the legal consequences of the
plea. 125 The Court has never required that defendants pass a quiz' about the

[\V]hether the error "prejudiced" the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to
trial will depend on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change
his recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a
prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.

/d.
123 The Ninth, Eighth, and Sixth Circuits have all entertained post-plea Brady challenges under the theory
that a plea may not be ''voluntary and intelligent" in the face of a Brady violation. See supra note 117. The
Second Circuit used the Lockhart analogy to develop a standard of "materiality" for post-plea Brady claims,
see Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1321-22 (2d Cir. 1988), and the Ninth Circuit followed suit, see
Sanclwz, 50 F.3d at 1454 (citing Miller, 848 F.2d at 1321-22).
124
See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353,367 (5th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that courts that allow post-plea
Brady challenges are "at odds with Supreme Court opinions").
125 The Court has never held that an "intelligent" plea is one entered with an accurate understanding of the
government's evidence. The Court's standard for an ''voluntary and intelligent" plea, to the contrary, requires
only that the defendant understand the "consequences" of his plea, including the nature of the constitutional
rights he is waiving, see Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976), that he be represented by
competent counsel, see Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267-68 (1973), and that he be free from physical
harm or mental coercion sufficient to overbear his will, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
Unlike the other circuit courts which have entertained post-plea Brady challenges, the Second Circuit does not
attempt to expand the notion of an "intelligent and voluntary" plea beyond the limited terms set by the Court.
In Angliker, the Second Circuit wrote:

As a general matter, a plea is deemed "intelligent'' if the accused had the advice of counsel and
understood the consequences of the plea, even if only in a fairly rudimentary way; it is deemed
''voluntary" if it is not the product of actual or threatened physical harm, mental coercion
overbearing the defendant's will, or the defendant's sheer inability to weigh his options rationally.
848 F.2d at 1320. Instead of concluding that a guilty plea is ''unintelligent" when entered without knowledge
of material exculpatory information, the Second Circuit chose a slightly different route, in effect adding a new
requirement for valid pleas. Quoting Brady, the Angliker Court concluded that a ''voluntary and intelligent"
plea is valid only in the "absen[ce of] misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents." ld.
(quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 757). Accordingly, the Angliker Court held that "even a· guilty plea that was
'knowing' and 'intelligent' may be vulnerable to challenge if it was entered without knowledge of material
evidence withheld by the prosecution." !d.
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government's evidence as a prerequisite to a valid guilty plea. 126 Moreover, a
rule premised on a defendant's right to make an "informed" pre-plea risk
assessment may prove too much.
Brady addresses only "favorable"
127
information, not the typically greater bulk of "unfavorable" information that
is critical to an accurate pre-plea risk assessment. If a guilty plea is invalid
where a defendant is deprived of material exculpatory information, then a plea
would suffer the same infirmity where a defendant pled guilty without
knowing that there was precious little inculpatory evidence. 128 The same logic
would entitle a defendant who rejected a plea bargain and was then convicted
at trial to attack his sentence on the grounds that, had he been fully informed,
he would have pled guilty and received the benefits of the bargain. 129 In short,
a right to make a fully informed plea would encompass discovery rights which
do not presently exist, even for defendants who go to trial.
The ultimate resolution of this doctrinal clash between Brady and the
finality of guilty pleas must await the attention of the Supreme Court. 13 For
the moment at least, several federal courts seem inclined to entertain Brady

°

In sum, the Angliker Court appears to treat the pre-plea withholding of exculpatory evidence as
"misrepresentation" or "other impermissible conduct" by the state. That kind of misconduct, then, invalidates
even a guilty plea that meets the typical standards for "voluntary and intelligent" pleas.
126 To the contrary, the Court has explicitly noted that guilty pleas often come at a time at which the
defendant has only limited information about the case against him. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759,769
(I 970) ("[f]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently involves the making of difficult
judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and crossexamined in court. Even then the truth will often be in dispute."). Miscalculation about the government's
case, the Court has stated, is no grounds for later withdrawal of a plea. Brady, 397 U.S. at 757 ("A defendant
is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his
calculus misapprehended the quality of the State's case •.•.").
Likewise, nothing in Rule 11 requires a federal court to quiz a defendant about his knowledge of the
government's evidence before accepting a guilty plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
127
Brady, 313 U.S. at 87.
128 The prosecution's case may be weak because of the existence of significant exculpatory or impeaching
evidence. But, even in a case in which there is no Brady evidence at all, the government may have a weak
case merely because it has so little inculpatory evidence. No rule of discovery, however, requires the
government to apprise a defendant that there is so little evidence; neither Brady nor any other constitutional
principle requires the government to disclose the bulk of its inculpatory evidence. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545, 559 (1977). Even if Brady applies at the plea bargaining stage, therefore, no rule of discovery
prevents the government from "bluffing" a plea in a case where the evidence is weak. See infra text
accompanying notes 246-57.
129 No court has overturned a conviction following trial based on defendant's claim that, had the
government disclosed more, he would have entered a guilty plea. See United States v. Kidding, 560 F.2d
1303, 1313 (7th Cir. 1977) (rejecting defendant's claim of Brady violation where defendant argued that, had
information been disclosed, he may have pled guilty).
130
See supra note 13.
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challenges even after a guilty plea. 131 But even in those courts, the clash with
tinality has an impact on Brady. To assess that impact, the remainder of this
Part turns first to traditional Brady doctrine, as it applies in the context of
trials, then considers how the guilty plea changes Brady.
B. Brady's Weaf..:ness: A Retrospective Rule for Governing
a Prospective Obligation

Before Brady v. Maryland, little in our constitutional doctrine suggested
that criminal trials were anything other than pure contests between
adversaries. 132 While the Court had forbidden prosecutors from obtaining
convictions through the knowing use of perjured testimony, 133 as of 1963, it
had yet to consider whether prosecutors had the constitutional duty to disclose
anything at all before trial. 134 In the view of the many critics of limited
discovery, American trials were too much like sporting events, and too little
like dispassionate and deliberate searches for truth. 135
Brady took a major stride away from that purely adversarial model. In
overturning a death sentence where the prosecutor failed to disclose an
accomplice's statement admitting to the actual killing, the Court held, "[T]he
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 136
131 See supra note 117.
132 See Brennan, Progress Report, supra note 3, at 3-4; Douglass, supra note 51, at 2134-35; Sarokin &
Zuckermann, supra note 21, at 1100-02 (discussing early history of discovery in federal courts).
m See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935). Based on its supervisory powers, the Court
also had required federal prosecutors to disclose prior statements of key government witnesses. Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). Congress, however, quickly clamped tight limits on Jencks, narrowly
limiting the "statements" that had to be produced, and delaying production until after the witness testified at
trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994).
134 See Brennan, Progress Repon, supra note 3, at 4.
135 See Brennan, Sporting El'ent, supra note 3, at 3-4. Earlier, in the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials,
American prosecutors had faced the embarrassment of a Soviet protest that American rules of discovery were
unfair to defendants. See Hon. Robert H. Jackson, Some Problems in Developing an International Legal
System, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 147, 150-52 (1948).
136 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Aside from its reference to the Due Process Clause,
however, the doctrinal contours of Brady were far from clear. Because the Brady opinion is not concerned
with plea bargaining, attempting to discern a pre-plea rule of disclosure from its language is an exercise in
frustration. Read broadly, Brady supports the notion that due process makes prosecutors into more than
adversaries. Id. at 88. Withholding exculpatory evidence, in the words of the Court, "casts the prosecutor in
the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice." Id. It takes only a
short step to extend that obligation of fairness, and Brady's obligation of disclosure, to plea bargaining. On the
other hand, the explicit aim of the Brady decision is "avoidance of an unfair trial," not "punishment of society
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The Brady Court made no attempt to define what sort of evidence may be
"material" to guilt or punishment. The Court may have used that term as it is
used in the law of evidence, where "material" means "relevant," "pertinent," or
"germane to the points at issue." 137 Given that interpretation, Brady would
encompass all favorable evidence that would be admissible at trial, and
perhaps any information useful to a defendant in preparing his case. If
proponents of liberalized discovery expected Brady to have such a reach,
however, their expectations were dashed in the decades that followed. As one
commentator has noted, Brady was "both the beginning and the zenith" of the
Court's development of a defendant's constitutional right to discovery. 138 In
subsequent opinions, "materiality" became the rock on which most defense
claims to disclosure have foundered. 139
The timing of Brady litigation has molded, and limited, the Court's view of
materiality. The Court always sees Brady claims after-the-fact. 140 Months, or
sometimes years, after conviction, defendants raise Brady claims regarding
evidence that surfaced for the first time after trial. Given that procedural
context, perhaps it is not surprising that the Court has come to measure
"materiality" by reference to the outcome of trial. 141 In United States v.
Bagley, the plurality wrote that evidence that the prosecutor fails to disclose
before or during trial is material "only if there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding

for the misdeeds of a prosecutor." /d. at 87. If Brady grants a trial right, and a guilty plea avoids trial
altogether, one can just as easily argue that Brady has no application at all to a plea bargain. The Fifth Circuit
has argued exactly that. See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 361 (5th Cir. 2000) ("The Brady rule's focus
on protecting the integrity of trials suggests that where no trial is to occur, there may be no constitutional
violation.").
137 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 703 n.5 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his vigorous
dissent in Bagley, Justice Marshall argued that Brady used the term "material" in "its evidentiary sense." /d.
In Justice Marshall's view, the "original theory and promise of Brady" was to establish a prosecutor's duty to
disclose any evidence "that might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's case." /d. at 702.
138 Goldberg, supra note 21, at 56.
139 See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,296 (1999); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683·84
(1985).
140
See supra note I 06.
141
For a while, the Court seemed inclined to allow defendants to participate in defining materiality for
themselves. In United States v. Agurs, the Court established a sliding scale of materiality based upon the
specificity of defendant's demand for exculpatory evidence. 427 U.S. 97, I 03-07 (1976). The Bagley plurality
later abandoned that approach in favor of a single &tandard of materiality, regardless of the defendant's
demand. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). As a result, under prevailing Brady
doctrine, the prosecution must produce favorable, material evidence whether or not the defense makes a
demand for it. See id. (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). Conversely, a defendant cannot make evidence
"material" merely by making a specific demand for it before trial, however. See id.
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would have been different." 142 Further, the plurality stated that "A 'reasonable
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."143 Cases after Bagley have refined and applied that standard of
materiality, but the basic "outcome-based" standard seems firmly entrenched.144
145
Critics have attacked the Bagley standard as both unfair and illogical.
It
is, after all, a retrospective standard that attempts to govern a prospective
obligation. It seems curious, to say the least, that a prosecutor has a constitutional obligation before trial to disclose a category of information that
cannot be defined until after trial. By definition, Brady's retrospective
standard requires a prosecutor to speculate about events that she cannot fully
anticipate before trial. 146 And it gives broad leeway-even broader than
traditional harmless error formulations 147-for courts to find reasons why a
jury would have reached a verdict of guilt even if the information had been
available.
The Court has defended its approach by arguing that prudent prosecutors
will give the rule a wide berth by disclosing all arguably material information
148
in order to avoid a post-trial challenge.
That may be true of most
prosecutors, especially because ethical rules governing pretrial disclosure do
not carry Brady's narrow definition of materiality. 149 But if a prosecutor is
inclined to win by playing close to the vest-an inclination that no doubt is
heightened when disclosure is most likely to matter- the Court's retrospective
approach may be flexible enough to make the risk worthwhile in all but the
most egregious cases.

142

473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (Biackmun, J., plurality opinion).

143 /d.
144

See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).

145 The most prominent critic was Justice Marshall, whose dissent argued that Bagley's outcome-based

definition of materiality created a standard that, in the pretrial context, "virtually defies definition." Bagley,
See also Sarokin and Zuckermann, supra note 21, at 1105-07.
146 Equally curious, the prosecutor's pretrial obligation is defined in relation to all of the evidence later
produced at trial by both prosecution and defense. Before trial, of course, the prosecutor may know little or
nothing of the evidence a defendant expects to present.
147 Brady materiality was deliberately designed to be a tougher standard for defendants than typical
harmless error analysis. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680-81. A defendant who can meet Brady's exacting
standard of materiality has, by definition, identified an error that is not harmless. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.
148 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 ("[A] prosecutor anxious about tacking too close to the wind will disclose a
favorable piece of evidence.").
149 See id. at 437 (noting that ABA Standards for Criminal Justice require broader disclosure than the
Brady-Bagley outcome-based standard).

473 U.S. at 700 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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In theory, of course, even a standard applied in retrospect could have teeth.
As a practical matter, however, review after-the-fact will almost never be as
generous to a defendant as judicial consideration of a disclosure issue before
trial. After conviction, a Brady issue is no longer just about disclosure.
Instead, post-conviction Brady claims pose a conflict between defendant's
right to disclosure on the one hand, and the powerful systemic interest in the
finality of a jury's verdict on the other. In other words, the question before the
court in a Brady challenge is seldom, "Should the exculpatory information
have been disclosed?" Instead the question becomes, "Is the exculpatory
information so important that we should ignore the jury's verdict and start all
over?" As a long series of post-Brady cases has demonstrated, it has become
150
And the
relatively easy for courts to answer "no" in the post-trial context.
collective responses of courts to that post-trial question now set the standard
for a prosecutor's pretrial disclosure obligations. Therein lies Brady's greatest
weakness as a rule for promoting meaningful disclosure: it is a rule seriously
limited by the bad timing of its enforcement. As a result, despite its early
promise, Brady has lost much of its force as a deterrent to prosecutors tempted
by nondisclosure.
C. How Brady's Materiality Standard Applies to Guilty Pleas

Information is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the
information been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." 151 After a trial, that test requires second-guessing the fact
finder based on the full trial record. That task has proved troublesome
152
Translating the standard into the world of plea bargaining,
enough.
however, is even more problematic.
For starters, what is the "result of the proceeding" in a plea bargain? Plea
bargaining, of course, is an extra-judicial event. The only "proceeding" that
takes place comes after the bargain has been reached, and consists only of the
court's plea colloquy with defendant. 153 The "result" of that proceeding is the
150 It would take pages to catalogue the cases in which courts have denied post-trial Brady challenges on
their merits, holding that previously undisclosed evidence was not "material." For a selection of such cases,
see Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 88 GEo. L.J. 799, 1180-83 nn.1048-56 (2000). A
close look at the facts of such cases should be enough to convince most readers that, had the issue of disclosure
arisen in the pretrial context, the court readily would have ordered disclosure in many. See, e.g., Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
151 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
152 See supra note 150.
153 For the basic elements of a guilty plea colloquy in federal courts, see FED. R. CR1M. P. 11.
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court's acceptance of a guilty plea. If we apply the Brady-Bagley standard
literally to that proceeding and that result, then information is material if there
is a reasonable probability that, had it been disclosed, the court would not have
accepted the plea. That literal approach, however, would lead courts in a
meaningless circle. To accept the plea, the only constitutionally required
finding is a determination that the defendant's counseled plea is voluntary and
intelligent. 154 As we have already seen, the doctrinal basis that allows courts to
consider a post-plea Brady challenge in the first place is the notion that a plea
is not voluntary and intelligent, if Brady information-i.e. "material"
information-has been withheld. 155 Hence, we have the circle. A plea is not
voluntary and intelligent if "material" information has been withheld. And we
define "material" information as information that, if disclosed, likely would
result in a finding that the plea was not voluntary and intelligent.
We might escape this circle by looking at a different part of the "result" in
a guilty plea proceeding. Most courts take an additional step before accepting
a guilty plea. They make a fmding that there is a "factual basis" for the plea. 156
The Brady-Bagley standard would make a good deal more sense if we applied
it to that step in the guilty-plea proceeding. Under that approach, evidence
would be material if, had it been disclosed at the time of the plea colloquy,
there is a reasonable likelihood the court would not have found a factual basis
for the plea. Such an approach offers some obvious benefits, not the least of
which would be to encourage a more complete presentation of the
prosecution's evidence when a plea is entered. At least in the current world of
guilty plea proceedings, however, this approach faces a handful of apparently
insurmountable hurdles. One problem is the lack of any clear standard for
assessing the factual basis for a guilty plea. 157 Another is the nature of the
"evidence" that courts consider in making that fmding. 158 Some accept a
154
See Brady, 391 U.S. at 749-58; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241-42 (1969).
155 See supra text accompanying notes ll7-18.
156 FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(f). In federal courts, Rule ll(f) provides:

"(f) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court
should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that
there is a factual basis for the plea."

Many states have similar guilty-plea procedures. See Ostrow, supra note 17, at 1596.
157 In federal courts, Rule 1l(t) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure offers no standard for
determining when there is sufficient "factual basis" for the plea. The Court has never defined any such
standard by case law. See generally Ostrow, supra note 17, at 1596-97 (discussing the lack of standards for
assessing the factual basis of guilty pleas).
153 The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure suggest how
tlcxible the process can be: "An inquiry might be made of the defendant, of the attorneys for the government
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159

prosecutor's summary.
Many allow the defendant's own statements to
160
suffice for that factual basis.
Except where the defendant equivocates about
his own guilt, courts seldom require the government to present live testimony
161
to establish a factual basis.
The biggest hurdle, however, is one of
constitutional doctrine. The Court has never imposed a constitutional duty
upon courts to find a factual basis in support of a guilty plea. 162 Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and similar state rules impose such a
requirement. But, except perhaps for "Alford'' pleas, 163 the Court has never
Without a
found a "factual basis" requirement in the Constitution.
constitutionally grounded starting point, it would make little sense to tie the
Brady-Bagley standard of materiality to the finding of a factual basis for the
plea. Legislators and rule makers would remain free to modify, or eliminate
altogether, the "factual basis" requirement, thus nullifying any constitutional
standards.
In order to apply the Brady-Bagley standard of materiality to plea
bargaining, courts have been forced to modify the standard in a subtle but
significant way. Instead of assessing materiality in relation to the adjudicated
"outcome" of the guilty plea "proceeding"-that is, the court's acceptance of
the plea-courts have shifted the focus to defendant's tactical decision to plead
guilty. Under that modified standard, evidence is material if "'there is a
reasonable probability that but for the failure to produce such information the

and the defense, of the presentence report when one is available, or by whatever means is appropriate in a
specific case." FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f) advisory committee notes, 1974 amend.
159
In my own experience as a prosecutor in two federal jurisdictions, most Rule 11 proceedings have
involved only a prosecutor's summary of evidence. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee notes,
1974 amend. (inquiry may be made of attorneys for the government).
160
See Ostrow, supra note 17, at 1597 (noting that a defendant's admission typically constitutes the
principal evidence supporting plea's factual basis).
161 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1970).
162 See Ostrow, supra note 17, at 1596 n.65 (stating that it remains an "open question" whether the
Constitution requires courts to find a factual basis for a guilty plea); see also Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d
353, 368 (5th Cir. 2000) ("In general, state courts are not required by the Constitution to ensure that a factual
basis for a guilty plea even exists."); Higgason v. Clark, 984 F.2d 203, 207-08 (7th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the
petitioner's contention that unless the record contains "strong evidence" of factual guilt, the constitution
forbids the court to accept the plea).
163 In North Carolina v. Alford, the defendant pled guilty while denying the factual elements of the
offense. 400 U.S. 25, 28 (1970). The Court held that the defendant's admission of facts constituting the
offense was not required for a valid plea. Id. at 37. Still, in upholding the plea, the Court relied heavily on the
state's factual showing demonstrating guilt. Id. at 38.
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defendant would not have entered the plea but instead would have insisted on
going to trial."' 164
This approach, which has been adopted in most courts that entertain postplea Brady challenges, 165 was derived from the Court's opinion in Bagley
itself. In searching for a single materiality standard to govern all Brady claims,
the Bagley Court seized upon the standard applied by Strickland v. Washington
to determine when claims of ineffective assistance of counsel result in
"prejudice." 166 In cases of ineffective assistance regarding guilty pleas, the
Court focuses on the impact that counsel's poor performance may have had on
a defendant's decision to plead. The Court allows withdrawal of the plea
where "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the
defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." 167 Because the Bagley and Strickland standards are consistent after a
trial, courts have simply maintained that consistency in applying the standards
168
after a plea.
For post-plea Brady challenges, then, the result is a standard of
materiality that appears deceptively simple: information is material if, had it
been disclosed before the plea, there is a reasonable probability defendant
would have taken his chances at trial instead of agreeing to a plea.

164 United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 24
(2d Cir. 1992)); see also Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 ((9th Cir. 1995).
165 See Avellino, 136 F.3d at 256; Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454; White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 424
(8th Cir. 1988) ("The remaining question is whether White's knowledge of the undisclosed material would
have affected his decision to forego trial."). The Sixth Circuit's inquiry in Campbell v. Marshall appears more
flexible, taking into account, for example, the potential impact of the withheld information on the factual basis
for the plea. 769 F.2d 314, 321 (6th Cir. 1985).
166 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 681-82 (1985). The Strickland standard, in turn, had been
derived with reference to Brady. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312,
1322-23 (2d Cir. 1988).
167 Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
168 The most comprehensive effort to derive, and justify, this post-plea Brady standard appears in the
Second Circuit's opinion in Angliker, 848 F.2d at 1321-22. Ironically, Angliker presented the Brady issue in a
context that differs in an important way from most post-plea Brady challenges, and that could have allowed the
court to adopt a different standard. Angliker involved a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, not a ''true"
guilty plea. /d. at 1313. Under Connecticut law, the trial court had to make an independent finding that the
evidence established Miller's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecution presented a prima facie
case to support that finding. /d. at 1317. Therefore, in the federal habeas proceeding, which was later heard
by the Second Circuit, the court could have assessed the "materiality" of undisclosed information with relation
to that fact finding, rather than with reference to defendant's tactical choice to enter the insanity plea.
Apparently, the Second Circuit found the analogy to the Strickland line of cases more convincing, so the court
derived a post-plea Brady standard that made no reference to the court's fact finding, but relied instead on the
defendant's tactical decision to enter a plea. See id. at 1322.
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Of course, few things in law are as simple as they appear. The pleabargaining Brady standard is no exception. Like so many other criminal law
standards, it requires courts to assess a defendant's state of mind. 169 In fact, it
is even a bit more complex because the tactical decision to plead guilty
typically begins with defense counsel's advice. So, the post-plea Brady
inquiry has two steps. First, it requires a court to determine whether the
undisclosed information likely would have changed counsel's advice. Second,
the court must decide whether the new information, coupled with the new
advice, if any, likely would have changed defendant's mind about the plea. 170

In considering a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, courts will inevitably
regard a defendant's after-the-fact account of his thought process with a heavy
dose of skepticism. Defendant's post-plea protest-"! would never have
pleaded guilty if I had only known"-is likely to be regarded as more
opportunistic than sincere. Likewise, without disparaging the credibility of
counsel, courts are reluctant to engage in after-the-fact probing of otherwise
privileged conversations in order to establish which factors actually went into
defense counsel's plea recommendation. 171 For both of these reasons, courts
have been quick to note that the post-plea materiality test is an "objective"
one. 172 Courts do not attempt to answer the historical question of what actually
influenced a particular defendant to plead guilty. Instead, the test for Brady
materiality in plea bargaining becomes a matter of two hypothetical judgments.
The court must assess the likely impact of information on the judgment of a
hypothetical "reasonable" defense attorney, and on his hypothetically reasonable client.

169 For a discussion of the shifting "objective" and "subjective" standards applied by the Court in
assessing state of mind in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment context, see Ronald J. Bacigal, Choosing
Perspectives in Criminal Procedure, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 677 (1998).
170 In Angliker, the Second Circuit made this two-step process explicit. 848 F.2d at 1322-23. Other courts
have simply merged the two inquiries into one, but clearly have considered counsel's advice as an integral
factor in defendant's decision. See, e.g., Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 1985).
171 See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1998) (denying evidentiary hearing on
defendant's motion to withdraw plea).
172 See, e.g., Avellino, 136 F.3d at 256 (materiality involves an "objective inquiry that asks not what a
particular defendant would do but rather what is 'the likely persuasiveness of the withheld information"');
Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995), 50 F.3d at 1454 (noting that the test is "an
objective standard"); Angliker, 848 F.2d at 1322 ("In assessing the likelihood that either the recommendation
of counsel or the decision by the accused would have been different if the prosecution had not withheld the
exculpatory evidence, the test is an objective one, depending largely on the likely persuasiveness of the
withheld information.").
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In part, this inquiry looks like the same question a reviewing court must
pursue in a post-trial Brady challenge. The inquiry, as several courts have
defined it, de-Rends "largely on the likely persuasiveness of the withheld
information." 1 3 But the similarity to post-trial Brady ends there. After a trial,
a reviewing court assesses the "likely persuasiveness" of evidence in relation
to the full record of the trial. 174 After a guilty plea, however, it must assess the
"persuasiveness of the withheld information" in relation to all other
175
Further, it must
information known to the defendant when he pled guilty.
assess the likelihood that the new information would have convinced the
176
These
defendant to pass up the benefits offered in the plea agreement.
inquiries raise a host of difficult problems that are not present in the post-trial
Brady context.

III.

BRADY'S WEAKNESS GETS WEAKER:

A CRITICAL LOOK AT MATERIALITY

AFTER A GUILTY PLEA

If the Court's retrospective standard of materiality creates headaches after a
trial, it creates nightmares for cases disposed of by guilty plea. The post-plea
Brady standard is so hypothetical, so flexible, and so diluted that it offers little
177
What follows is a
more than an illusion of protection for most defendants.
discussion of the reasons why a Brady-based rule for plea bargaining is so
often doomed to futility when courts are called upon to enforce it after a guilty
plea.t7s

173
174

Angliker, 848 F.2d at 1322; see also Avellino, 136 F.3d at 256; Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454.
See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999) ("[T]he question is whether 'the favorable evidence

could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the
verdict.'") (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995)).
175 See infra text accompanying notes 202-09.
176 See infra text accompanying notes 210-17.
177 A survey of reported decisions in post-plea Brady cases bears out that assessment. Even where courts
reach the merits in such Brady cases, they rarely allow withdrawal of a plea. See Stuntz, supra note 57, at 61
n.204 (''Cases overturning guilty pleas based on Brady violations are almost nonexistent."); infra note 184.
178 One might argue that even a virtually unenforceable rule would have an impact on the behavior of
prosecutors during the course of plea bargaining. After all, most prosecutors are honorable people, committed
to following the law. See Uviller, supra note 58, at 1702 ("[N]otwithstanding the sporadic wimps and whiners,
the occasional Batmen and blockheads, from what I have known of prosecutors and former prosecutors, I
consider them by and large the flower of the bar."). If courts impose a Brady obligation on plea bargainers,
then most prosecutors will do what the law requires, whether or not practical or doctrinal problems might
inhibit enforcement of the rule in a plea-withdrawal proceeding. In this respect, the precatory value of a pleabargaining Brady rule is worth considering. See infra text accompanying note 242.
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For ease of organization, this critique is divided into two segments.
Section A discusses the practical hurdles of: (1) presenting a post-plea Brady
claim to a court which has already heard the defendant confess his guilt, and
(2) presenting such a claim in the absence of any record that would establish
the facts which influenced the plea in the first place. Section B addresses the
substance of "materiality" after a plea. Materiality in relation to many guilty
pleas is a narrower concept than the already-narrow notion of materiality in
relation to trial. In the context of a plea, I will argue that materiality of
withheld evidence is defined, and confined, (1) by the other evidence available
to defendant when he pled guilty, and (2) by the relative size of the benefit
offered defendant in the plea bargain. As a result, Brady may offer the least to
those who need it the most: those relatively uninformed defendants who enter
quick pleas in response to "sweetheart" bargains.
A. Practical Deficiencies: Convincing a Skeptical Court
in the Absence of a Record

1. The Problem of a Skeptical Court

The biggest obstacle to a post-plea Brady claim is the guilty plea itself. As
we have seen, one part of that hurdle is purely doctrinal: a few courts hold that
179
the plea is fmal and waives any claim of an antecedent Brady violation.
Even in courts that are willing to set aside that doctrinal hurdle in the name of
"voluntary and intelligent" pleas, however, the guilty plea is like a gorilla in
the kitchen. As a practical matter, it is simply impossible to ignore. Volumes
of Brady opinions demonstrate that reviewing courts are reluctant to find
180
It is not
nondisclosures "material" when it means upsetting a jury verdict.
hard to imagine, then, how skeptical judges will be when a defendant demands
to take back his own open-court confession of guilt. While attempting to
follow the prescribed formula of assessing the "likely persuasiveness" of the
newly disclosed information, even the most open-minded of jurists will fmd
181
themselves engaged in an almost superhuman task of ignoring the obvious.

179 See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 368-69 (5th Cir. 2000); Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655,
657 (8th Cir. 1989).
180 See supra note 150.
181 Indeed, because its post-plea Brady analysis focuses in part on the factual basis for the plea, the Sixth
Circuit's approach explicitly takes the defendant's admissions into account, noting they are entitled to "great
weight" when the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea. Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314,321-22 (6th Cir.
1985).
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Moreover, judicial fears of opening floodgates of post-conviction Brady
litigation will only be heightened in the guilty plea context. Around ninety
percent of convictions come by way of guilty plea. 182 It is hardly surprising,
therefore, that courts would be wary of developing precedent that might
encourage post-plea Brady claims. In comparison to post-trial claims, the
numbers could be daunting. 183
In the last decade, as more courts have proved willing to reach the merits of
post-plea Brady challenges, we begin to see how tightly courts grasp the reigns
of materialifti Post-plea Brady challenges are an exercise in futility for most
defendants.'
While such cases occasionally give rise to judicial sermons
185
directed at wayward prosecutors, they seldom accomplish more than that. In
182

See supra note 4.
Even though post-plea Brady claims are rarely successful, they are no longer uncommon. A decade
ago, there were only a handful of reported cases of post-plea Brady claims. See McMunigal, supra note 10, at
963 & n.24 (collecting cases). The number has multiplied in the last few years. See infra note 184.
1
~ In several dozen post-plea Brady opinions, even among those courts that consider such claims on the
merits, the vast majority have declined to allow withdrawal, almost always on the grounds that the withheld
evidence was not "material" to the plea. See, e.g., United States v. Abrams, No. 98-1268, 1999 U.S. App.
LE.XIS 38370, at "'10-11 (2d Cir. Dec. 30, 1999); United States v. Nagra, 147 F.3d 875, 891 (9th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 259 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. McCleary, No. 95-6922, 1997
U.S. App. LE.XIS 9391, at *11-12 (4th Cir. May 1, 1997); Murr v. Turner, No. 95-4013, 1996 U.S. App.
LE.XIS 30870, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 22, 1996); United States v. Kellett, No. 94-1920, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
20214, at *4-5 (1st Cir. Jul. 31, 1995); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 497 (lOth Cir. 1994); Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20, 25-26 (2d Cir. 1992); White
v. United States, 858 F.2d 416,424 (8th Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314,322 (6th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Brown, No. 99-508-4, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6656, at *13 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2000); Indelicato
v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D. Mass. 2000); United States v. Patel, No. 99 C 2155, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13341, at *19-20 (N.D.lil. Aug. 19, 1999); Mannino v. United States, No. 98 Civ. 416-18, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1784, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1998).
In contrast, a search revealed only four opinions allowing withdrawal. See Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d
1312, 1324 (2d Cir. 1998); Banks v. United States, 920 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Va. 1996); United States v. MillanColon, 829 F. Supp. 620, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Wisconsin v. Sturgeon., 60 N.W. 2d 589 (Wis. 1999).
Significantly, Miller was not a guilty-plea case at all, but one in which the defendant pled not guilty by reason
of insanity. 848 F.2d at 1314. As a result, the trial court had heard extensive evidence at the time of the plea
and had actually made a finding that the state proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 1319.
Accordingly, the reviewing court was not faced with the typical post-plea Brady situation in which a
competent defendant has acknowledged guilt and there is no record against which to assess the materiality of
withheld information. Similarly, the plea withdrawal motion in Mi/lan-Colon followed a partial trial of
codefendants which created a factual record more complete than would normally be available following a
guilty plea. 829 F. Supp. at 627-28.
185
In post-plea Brady cases, as in post-trial Brady cases, courts seem far more willing to castigate the
prosecutor than to overturn a conviction. See, e.g., Avellino, 136 F.3d at 256 (affirming convictions despite
''troublesome questions" regarding government's conduct); Campbell, 769 F.2d at 318, 323 (affirming
conviction while suggesting that nondisclosure was "at best ..• 'cute', at worst ... reprehensible," and
"subject to censure as a bargaining tactic" (citing Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd 565
F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977))).
183
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short, even among jurists willing to set aside doctrinal concerns with finality of
guilty pleas, few have found reason to permit withdrawal of pleas based on
alleged Brady violations.
2. The Absence of a Record

In a post-plea Brady challenge, the court must assess the likely impact of
newly disclosed evidence on a defendant's decision to plead guilty. That plea
decision presumably rested in part on an assessment of the strength of the
prosecution's case. 186 Even under an "objective" standard, it is impossible to
evaluate the impact of previously undisclosed "Brady material" without
knowing what other information the defendant possessed at the time he made
that assessment. 187 After all, the decision to plead guilty involves an
assessment of all the evidence, not just a piece of it. The same piece of
favorable evidence might be material in one context, but not in another,
depending upon its relation to other evidence known to the pleading defendant.
For example, a defendant who knew the prosecution had only one
eyewitnesses to a crime may fmd it quite material that the witness had a
serious vision problem. Disclosure of evidence that "Smith is a pathological
liar," by contrast, would mean little when a defendant decided to plead guilty
without even knowing that Smith existed, was a witness to the crime, and
would testify for the govemment. 188 Similarly, information suggesting that a
fmgerprint identification was in error might seem highly material to a
defendant considering a guilty plea, unless of course he knew that DNA
evidence and a videotape nevertheless proved his presence at the scene of the
crime. In order to make its post-plea determination of materiality under Brady,
therefore, a reviewing court will need to know what other information was
available to the defendant at the time he made the decision to plead guilty. 189
186 See supra text accompanying notes 41-46.
187 The use of an "objective" standard does not imply the use of an objective standard in a factual vacuum.

Even the decisionmaking process of an "objectively reasonable" defendant must be evaluated in relation to the
information available for a reasonable person to assess.
188 Of course, the defendant in the example might contend that, ''I would never have pleaded guilty, if I
had known that Smith, a convicted perjurer, was the government's best witness." But that argument would
stretch Brady beyond its existing limits, requiring disclosure of the government's inculpatory evidence (the
anticipated testimony of Smith) as a predicate to any claim that the exculpatory evidence (Smith's perjury
conviction) was material.
189 Most post-plea Brady cases simply ignore this aspect of the materiality inquiry, perhaps because they
have found most such claims easy enough to reject without reaching that level of detail. See, e.g., United
States v. Sanchez, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit has noted that evidence that the
government might have presented at trial, and that was unknown to defendant at the time he decided to plead,
is irrelevant in the post-plea Brady analysis. Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1323 (2d Cir. 1988) ("We
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When a court considers a motion to withdraw a guilty plea--or a habeas
petition predicated on denial of such a motion-the task of determining the
defendant's knowledge at the time he entered the plea puts a court in a difficult
position. The typical guilty plea colloquy creates little record regarding the
prosecution's evidence, and often no record at all regarding the range of
information available to the defendant when he decided to plead. 190 Moreover,
even formal discovery requests and written responses often provide an
191
And because most discovery occurs
incomplete record of that information.
informally in the majority of cases, the problem can be compounded.
Meticulous attorneys may maintain clear records of their discovery exchanges.
But the reality of a busy criminal docket means that many attorneys,
prosecutors and defense counsel alike, are not that meticulous. A few weeks or
months after a guilty plea, the status of informal discovery may be a faded
memory for most. 192 By contrast, when Brady claims arise after trial, courts
have much more solid information. True, in the typical post-trial Brady case,
courts must make a difficult hypothetical judgment about the likely impact of
new information on a jury's verdict. But at least such courts have the full trial
record to analyze. The details in that record often are critical. Courts can and
do decide post-trial Brady claims when they see that the undisclosed evidence
was cumulative, or that the issues raised in a Brady claim have little to do with

believe the State is not entitled to seek to minimize the materiality of the withheld information by arguing that
it could have produced additional evidence at a fuller trial."). Logically, of course, the converse would also be
true; information known to the defendant at the time of the plea would be relevant to the post-plea Brady
analysis.
The Second Circuit's statement in Angliker points out another peculiarity of a post-plea materiality
standard that focuses on the defendant's decisionmaking, rather than on the result of any proceeding, whether
actual or hypothetical. The outcome of a post-plea Brady motion may bear little relation to the outcome of the
trial that would have occurred absent the guilty plea.
19° See supra text accompanying notes 77-78.
191
For one thing, discovery pleadings often say nothing about information the defendant may have
obtained through his own investigation or facts of which he became aware during commission of the offense.
For another, discovery pleadings themselves often refer to other, less clearly specified information as, for
example, 'The government has produced all Giglio material," or "All documents seized in the search have
been made available." See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 920 F. Supp. 688,690 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that
the defendant's discovery motion requested "all Brady material in the government's possession that would
serve to exculpate Banks or impeach the government's witnesses" and recounting plea colloquy in which
court asked whether the government had turned over "everything that you would be entitled to under the rules
of discovery").
192
Strickler v. Greene offers a good example of the problem in a post-trial context. There, the prosecutor
and defense counsel disagreed in their recollections of what was in the "open file" at the time the prosecutor
showed it to defense counsel. 527 U.S. 263, 275 & n.ll (1999).
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the central issues emphasized by the parties in closing argument.
After a
guilty plea, however, a reviewing court has none of those opportunities.
Faced with a post-plea materiality question and no trial record, a court has
194
One would be to
two options, neither of which is especially appealing.
assess the newly disclosed information only in relation to the other evidence
disclosed at the guilty plea proceeding. Under current practice, however,
courts typically hear only a brief summary of prosecution evidence or rely
solely on a defendant's admission of guilt to establish a factual basis for the
plea. Accordingly, that option often would present the impossible task of
assessing the new Brady information in a vacuum, or the largely futile taskfrom a defendant's point of view-of assessing it only in relation to a
defendant's own in-court confession of guilt. The second option would be to
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine what the defendant and his
counsel knew and when they knew it. 195 Such a hearing, of course, not only
would be tainted by the distance and perspective of hindsight, but also would
confront the court with the prospect of turning counsel into witnesses and
delving into otherwise privileged conversations between a defendant and his
attorney. For good reason, courts are less than enthusiastic about that kind of
196
approach.
In sum, current guilty-plea practice leaves courts without the tools
necessary to evaluate a post-plea Brady challenge in most cases. At guilty plea
proceedings, courts typically do not require the prosecutor to outline her
evidence in detail, nor do they ask the defendant what he knows about the
government's case. 197 Yet such information is critical under even the
193 See, e.g. id. at 290 (relying on details of prosecutor's closing argument to assess materiality of
previously undisclosed information).
194 A third possibility might be to rely on information available from other proceedings such as the trial of
a codefendant. See, e.g., United States v. Millan-Colon, 829 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Aside from the
fact that such an approach would not be available in all cases, it would not really serve the purpose of the postplea Brady inquiry, i.e., to determine how new information would have affected a defendant's decision to
plead. Presumably, though it might accurately duplicate much of the evidence that a defendant would have
faced at trial, the record of a codefendant's trial would not tell us what a defendant knew weeks or months
before trial about the strength of the government's case.
195
Some information about the status of the defendant's knowledge at the time of the plea might be
available from other sources. Search warrant affidavits, complaints, and transcripts of preliminary hearings
may have provided the defendant a summary of evidence before he entered a plea. Of course, such sources
would not exist in every case and, in any event, may provide only a sketchy version of the evidence.
196
See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 260-61 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's
denial of evidentiary hearing on motion to withdraw plea).
197 In federal cases, Rule II sets no standard for the type of evidence, degree of detail, or standard of
proof necessary to establish a factual basis. See FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(f) advisory committee notes, 1974
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"objective" materiality standard that most courts now apply to post-plea Brady
challenges. 198 Courts that entertain post-plea Brady claims have created a
standard of materiality that requires a detailed evaluation of the defendant's
decision to plead guilty. 199 At least in the current world of criminal procedure,
however, there is seldom a factual foundation for applying that doctrine. 200
Without changes to the guilty plea proceeding itself, those courts have
succeeded only in building "castles in the air."201
B. Substantive Weakness: How Brady Shrinks in the Plea Bargaining Context

1. "Materiality" in Relation to Defendant's Knowledge
When courts shift the focus of their materiality inquiry to a defendant's
decision whether to plead guilty, the resulting standard can produce some
troubling outcomes. Sometimes, the less a defendant knows about the
prosecution's case, the less protection he will get from Brady in the course of
plea bargaining. In essence, this is because exculpatory information is, or is
not, material only when viewed in relation to other information known to the
defendant.

In considering a post-trial Brady claim, courts cannot assess the materiality
of evidence in a vacuum. An item of exculpatory or impeaching evidence may
be more or less material depending upon its relation to other evidence
presented at trial. Cumulative evidence, for example, is not material under
02
Brady?
Evidence impeaching a minor witness likewise is not material?03
Similarly, in the plea bargaining context, the likely impact of a piece of
exculpatory evidence on a defendant's decision to plead guilty will depend in

amend. Nor does the Rule 11 inquiry require a court to ask about the status of discovery. See FED. R. CRThl.
P. II(c), (d), and (t).
193 See supra text accompanying notes 164-73.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 164-73.
200
See supra text accompanying notes 190-93.
21)1 Henry David Thoreau, Walden, in THE VARIORUM WALDEN AND THE VARIORUM CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
245 (Walter Harding ed., 1968).
202 See, e.g., Unied States v. Arnie!, 95 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding no Brady violation where
undisclosed impeachment evidence was merely cumulative).
203 See, e.g., United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200, 1210 (2d Cir. 1995)(finding no Brady violation where
impeachment evidence related to witness whose testimony was only a function of the evidence linking the
defendant to crime).
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large measure on "what else" the defendant knows about the government's
case. 204
We can see the effects of this dependence by contrasting two cases. At the
extreme, consider the case of a defendant who accepts a highly favorable plea
bargain early in a case, knowing very little about the prosecution's evidence,
and having asked for and received no discovery at all. A defendant who
accepted such a deal would be hard-pressed to raise a successful post-plea
Brady challenge upon belated discovery of exculpatory evidence. For one
thing, because he pled without knowing the identity or likely testimony of
prosecution witnesses, that defendant could scarcely claim that undisclosed
impeachment evidence was material. 205 Even with respect to more directly
exculpatory information, such a defendant would have a difficult Brady claim.
He has already signaled that he was willing to plead guilty knowing little about
the case. It would be difficult to establish how new information would have
affected a "risk assessment" that he apparently never made in the first place.
Critics of plea bargaining would suggest that this "extreme" case is, in fact,
206
far from unusual.
Indeed, it may be the most typical case of all. 207 Plea
bargains often result from a quick phone call or hallway conversation between
prosecutor and defense counsel. Both calculate the "market price" of a plea
based on similar cases, the sentencing habits of the judge, and a variety of
ballpark estimates that collectively amount to "experience." The prosecutor
applies a little pressure by setting a deadline and suggesting that defendants
2().1 Given the narrow limits of formal discovery, most of that "what else" will have been supplied by the
government through informal discovery. See supra text accompanying notes 79-91. As a result, the
application of Brady's materiality standard in many plea bargains is subject to manipulation by the very
prosecutor it is supposed to govern. See infra text accompanying notes 252-57.
205
The example is more than a hypothetical. Many, perhaps even most, defendants enter guilty pleas
early in the pretrial process, with little or no discovery. Even where discovery occurs, it often is far from
complete when the plea is entered. In many jurisdictions, for example, prosecutors delay disclosure of
witnesses, witness statements, and Giglio material until shortly before trial. See, e.g., United States v.
Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780, 789-95 (E.D. Va. 1997) (ordering government to disclose Giglio material three
days before trial). Plea discussions nevertheless occur quite often, and often result in guilty pleas, at a much
earlier stage in the case, and well before any witness-related discovery has been produced by the government.
See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1160-66 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing "Fast Track" program
wherein defendants plead guilty before receiving Giglio disclosure). In such cases, defendants may plead
guilty without ever seeing the Giglio material showing that the government's principal witnesses are truly
despicable, and highly unreliable, characters.
206
See Alschuler, supra note 5, at 677-78; Kaplan, supra note 5, at 218.
207
See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1911-12 ("Most cases are disposed
of by means that seem scandalously casual: a quick conversation in a prosecutor's office or a courthouse
hallway between attorneys familiar with only the basics of the case, with no witnesses present, leading to a
proposed resolution that is then 'sold' to both the defendant and the judge.").
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who "plead early" get better deals, a fact of which defense counsel is probably
already aware. The message-and the favorable bargain-are communicated
to the defendant, and the deal is struck with little or no attention to discovery.
In contrast, consider the case of a defendant whose counsel has filed formal
discovery motions, requiring the prosecutor to respond by identifying what has
and what has not been disclosed. Imagine that the same defendant has
declined the invitation to an early plea but instead has "held out" to await the
end of pretrial discovery, ultimately learning much of the government's
evidence and the anticipated testimony of key prosecution witnesses before
tinally capitulating. Should undisclosed exculpatory evidence later come to
light, that defendant likely will have a stronger post-plea Brady claim than our
tirst, and less well-informed, defendant?08 The second defendant can show
that the expected testimony of key witnesses may have influenced his decision
to plead. Unlike the first defendant, he stands at least a chance of
demonstrating that impeachment evidence was material to his decision. The
same may be true with respect to other types of Brady material. Because he
has shown that the government's inculpatory evidence played a role in his
decision, the defendant can challenge the withholding of anfofing that may
09
have put those inculpatory disclosures in a less favorable light.
In sum, because materiality in plea bargaining depends upon the scope of a
defendant's knowledge, some relatively well-informed defendants may have
stronger post-plea Brady claims than others who plead in relative ignorance.
Brady may offer the least protection to those who need it the most. Indeed, as
is outlined in the following section, this imbalance may be exacerbated by
another factor. Defendants who eschew discovery in exchange for favorable
bargains may face a tougher standard in post-plea Brady claims because of the
benefits of the bargain itself.

20
~ A1•ellino is such a case. United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998). Though the Avellino
defendants ultimately failed in their Brady claim, their claim was at least plausible only because they were
aware, at the time of their pleas, of the identity and anticipated testimony of D' Arco, the government's
principal witness. See id. at 251-53, 262.
209 Of course, it is not always the case that a defendant who receives more pre-plea discovery will
ultimately fare better in a post-plea Brady claim. Where, for example, the government disclosed some Brady
or Giglio material but failed to disclose other, similar evidence, defendant's subsequent Brady claim might fail
because the undisclosed portion was merely cumulative, or would serve to impeach a witness whose testimony
was already subject to question anyway. Avellino was ultimately decided on that basis. 136 F.3d at 257.
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2. Accounting for the Benefit of the Bargain

Under the prevailing standard for post-plea Brady challenges, favorable
evidence becomes "material" when it would make the risk of conviction at trial
seem low enough that an objectively reasonable defendant would reject the
210
In its initial stage, at least, that
plea bargain and choose to go to trial.
approach parallels the assessment a court must make in reviewing a Brady
211
claim after a trial.
Both questions turn largely on "the likely persuasiveness
of the ... information" that the prosecutor had previously failed to disclose. 212
Courts assessing post-plea Brady claims, however, must consider an
additional factor not present in a post-trial Brady case. The risk of conviction
at trial is only part of a defendant's plea bargaining calculus. On the other side
of the equation, we must consider the benefits offered in the plea bargain.
Those benefits generally come in the form of dismissed charges and favorable
sentencing recommendations for the defendant by the prosecutor. From the
defendant's point of view, these are the reasons for bargaining in the frrst
place. A defendant's willingness to plead guilty, therefore, turns not only on
the persuasiveness of the government's evidence, but also on the benefit
offered in the bargain.213 Plea bargaining theory suggests, and experience
confrrms, that a minimal benefit typically induces a plea only where the
government's case appears strong.214 More significant benefits are more likely
to induce pleas where the evidence appears less persuasive. Put more bluntly,
many defendants will plead even to a weak case if offered a good enough deal.
This additional variable-the benefit of the bargain-makes post-plea
Brady analysis even more complex than post-trial analysis. On a motion to
withdraw a plea on Brady grounds, it is not enough for courts to fmd that the
newly discovered evidence threatens our "confidence" that trial would have
resulted in conviction. In some cases, it may not be enough even to fmd that
the favorable evidence would make acquittal probable. The benefits offered in
the plea bargain may have been so significant that a reasonable defendant
would have taken the deal even had he believed the case against him was
weak.215
210

See supra text accompanying notes 164-72.
See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
212
Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1322 (2d Cir. 1988).
213 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
21 4 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
215 As critics of plea bargaining have emphasized repeatedly, some bargains are simply too good to refuse,
even for innocent defendants with a high probability of acquittal. See infra text accompanying notes 261-69.
211
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In effect, by tying materiality to the defendant's tactical decision to plead
guilty, courts have created a sliding scale of materiality for post-plea Brady
claims?16 Exculpatory information becomes more or less material depending
upon the benefits offered in the plea bargain. And that sliding scale brings
with it a troublesome anomaly: defendants who receive the greatest benefits in
a plea bargain will have to meet the most stringent test of materiality in any
post-plea Brady challenge. If we accept the theory that prosecutors offer the
best deals in their weakest cases then, once again, our post-plea Brady rule
217
provides the least protection for defendants who need it the most.
IV. ACCURACY AND INFORMED CHOICE: DOES BRADY REALLY SATISFY
THE GOALS OF DISCLOSURE IN PLEA BARGAINING?

We have seen how Brady's already limited rule of disclosure shrinks even
more following a guilty plea. But even a weak rule of disclosure may be better
than none. We should consider, then, whether on balance Brady brings some
value to plea bargaining despite its weakness. That assessment depends upon
the goals we hope to achieve through disclosure. Of course, in the

216 White v. United States is one of the few reported cases in which the court explicitly considered the
"benet1t of the bargain" in its post-plea Brady calculus. 858 F.2d 416, 424 (8th Cir. 1988).
217 Another peculiarity of plea bargaining further complicates the application of Brady. Quite typically, as
part of the consideration for a guilty plea, prosecutors agree to dismiss or reduce charges. As a result, a
defendant's plea to one charge may be induced largely by his fear of conviction on a different charge carrying
a higher penalty. In those situations, the information that may mean the most to a defendant may have little to
do with the charge to which he ultimately pleads guilty. Instead, that information may relate to the more
serious charge that is dismissed as part of the bargain, or even to a threatened charge that the prosecutor agrees
not to file. This pattern of strategic bargaining is not unusual among American prosecutors. Indeed, in many
cases, prosecutors make initially aggressive charging decision in order to increase their leverage in bargaining.
See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Colllract, supra note 5, at 1962-65.
In theory at least, a defendant could bring a post-plea Brady challenge if his plea was induced by the
withholding of material, exculpatory information that related to a dismissed charge, or even to a charge that
was never filed. In theory, this aspect of post-plea Brady offers some interesting prospects. It could help
address one of plea bargaining's most objectionable sore spots: the unchecked use of "overcharging" as a
strategic tool to induce guilty pleas. Prosecutors who knew they might be called upon to disclose the warts on
their most aggressive charges might be more circumspect in bringing those charges in the first place. Their
choice of "bargaining chips" might become more realistic, and the bargaining process might become less
coercive as a result.
Still, for all its theoretical promise, the notion that Brady might provide a realistic check on
overcharging and the resulting strategic bargaining by prosecutors is unrealistic as a practical matter, at least
without other systemic reforms. There is, as far as I can determine, no reported case in which a court has even
entertained a post-plea Brady challenge regarding exculpatory information that related to a dismissed charge.
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controversy-plagued world of plea bargaining, those goals themselves are
subject to debate. 218

A. Defining Goals of Disclosure in Plea Bargaining
In its opinions justifying plea bargaining, the Supreme Court starts with the
premise that guilty-pleading defendants are in fact guilty.Z 19 From that
premise, the Court has little trouble justifying plea bargaining as a fair and
efficient way to speed up justice.Z20 Since defendant saves the system the cost
of his trial, he gets to share in those savings through a reduced sentence.221
If we begin with this simple model of plea bargaining, then any rule of
disclosure is immediately suspect. For one thing, a disclosure obligation
reduces the cost savings of plea bargaining. It requires more of the
prosecutor's time and attention in pre-plea discovery and, presumably, more of
the court's time in enforcing the rule. Moreover, if we accept this model, one
could debate whether disclosure contributes anything to the fairness of plea
bargaining. After all, a guilty defendant knows what he did, one might argue,
so why does disclosure really matter? 222 Indeed, if defendant is willing to
make a true confession of his guilt and to accept the consequences, then

218

The literature is filled with theories alternately justifying and condemning plea bargaining on a variety
of grounds. See supra note 5. This Article makes no attempt to extend that debate. Rather, this Article
presupposes the practical reality that plea bargaining is a firmly entrenched part of our system for resolving
criminal cases. For most defendants, it is the only part of the system they will ever experience. See Scott &
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1912 ("[P]lea bargaining ... is not some adjunct to the
criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system."). The only question this Article addresses is whether
the Brady doctrine, as it has been applied by courts in the context of plea bargaining, makes that system any
better.
219 "[A] counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and
intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case." Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61,
62 n.2 (1975) (per curiam). Critics assail this approach on the grounds that it begins with an assumption that
only guilty defendants plead guilty, an assumption that is not factually accurate. See infra text accompanying
notes 261-69. Perhaps a more charitable characterization of the Court's approach is that it simply takes a
defendant at his word. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) ("Solemn declarations in open
court carry a strong presumption of verity."); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970) ("Brady If')
("We find no requirement in the Constitution that a defendant must be permitted to disown his solemn
admissions in open court that he committed the act with which he is charged simply because it later develops
that the State would have had a weaker case than the defendant had thought ....").
220
See Brady 11, 397 U.S. at 752 (noting that prompt disposition by plea bargaining offers advantages to
prosecution and defense).
221
Cf. id. (noting "materiality of advantage" in plea bargaining); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
261 (1971) (suggesting that plea bargaining "is to be encouraged because of efficiency and cost-savings).
222
"Knowing what he did," of course, is not always equivalent to knowing that he has committed a crime.
See McMunigal, supra note 10, at 970·84.
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compelling the prosecutor to disclose weaknesses in her case merely offers a
windfall that may obstruct the search for truth. 223 For guilty defendants lucky
enough to face a weak case, disclosure would allow them to press for a
sentence lower than they deserve, 224 or perhaps to risk trial and escape justice
altogether. From this perspective, it is easy enough to view bargaining as a
purely adversarial process where bluffmg is a legitimate prosecutorial tool for
inducing a guilty defendant to do the right thing. At a minimum, this view
suggests that we would do well enough to leave the exchange of information to
the bargaining process itself, without imposing external rules compelling
disclosure. 225
There are, however, at least two good reasons for choosing a different
model as our basis for assessing the value of Brady in plea bargaining. First,
the assumption that only guilty defendants plead guilty is a suspect starting
point. Some bargains may be too attractive for even innocents to pass up. 226
Theorists and practitioners differ over the frequency of guilty pleas by innocent
227
28
defendants, and documented cases are hard to come by.Z In truth, no one
really knows how often innocent defendants plead guilty. But even if cases of
false self-condenmation are relatively rare, a system that disregards their
existence is callous to say the least. If rules of pre-plea disclosure might

223 If [the litigation process] is (as we are fond of declaiming) a 'search for the truth,' then all

matters affecting the persuasiveness of the prosecutions case should be irrelevant. A guilty plea is,
after all, a confession of culpability, or at least a voluntary consent to suffer judgment. And the
conviction founded on that basis is not impaired by any weakness in the trial evidence which the
prosecutor could have adduced had the issue of guilt been contested.
Uviller, supra note 81, at 114.
224 Indeed, the likely result of a successful post-conviction Brady claim is a guilty plea by the same
defendant with an agreement for a reduced sentence. Cf. Banks v. United States, 920 F. Supp. 688, 690 n.2
(E.D. Va. 1996) (noting government's agreement to resentencing of defendants convicted at trial following
Brady violation).
225 This view accords generally with the "free market" view of plea bargaining which suggests that, as a
general rule, less regulation leaves the parties with maximum freedom to arrive at optimal bargains. Cf.
Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining As Compromise, supra note 7, at 1973 ("If there is to be reform, let us make
changes that reduce regulation of sentence negotiation and bring it more into line with contractual premises.").
226
See infra text accompanying notes 261-69.
227 Compare MILLER ET AL., supra note 42, at xix ("Most prosecutors and defense attorneys believe
factually innocent people do not plead guilty."), with Ostrow, supra note 17, at 1597 ("[P]leas by legally
innocent defendants are common •.••") (citing Michael 0. Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea
Practices in Federal Courts, 89 HARv. L. REv. 293, 309 (1975)).
228
Cases of false confessions, on the other hand, are being documented with increasing frequency now
that forensic science offers more reliable means to establish innocence in some cases. For example, among the
DNA exonerations studied by The Innocence Project, twenty-three percent were based on false confessions.
See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., AcruAL INNOCENCE 92 (2000).
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reduce the number of innocents who are induced to plead guilty, then such
rules deserve our careful attention. In assessing Brady, then, we should
consider whether it is likely to contribute to the accuracy of guilty pleas.
Second, we need not make assumptions about innocence and guilt in order
to justify plea bargaining. Innocent defendants may sometimes plead guilty. 229
But the same innocent defendants may also be convicted at trial?30 Plea
bargaining may be a good thing simply because it offers all defendants, both
innocent and guilty, a choice. Both the Supreme Court and a number of
contemporary scholars have defended plea bargaining as a means to allow
defendants and prosecutors to make choices for their "mutual advantage,"
choices that a system without bargaining would not permit.231 Put simply,
even hard choices are better than no choice.232 If choices based on "mutual
advantage" justify a system of plea bargaining, then that system makes more
sense where the defendant has at least enough information to choose which
course is to his best advantage. Not surprisingly, therefore, the most
229
230

See supra text accompanying notes 226-28.
See Scott & Stuntz, Imperfect Bargains, supra note 5, at 2013.

The choice is not between innocent defendants pleading guilty and the same defendants winning
acquittals at trial-again, if trials are perfect, innocent defendants will not plead, and the problem
disappears altogether. Rather, the choice is between permitting innocents to plead under the most
favorable circumstances possible and forcing them to trial, where they risk vastly greater
punishment.

/d.
231

See Brady II, 397 U.S. at 752; Easterbrook. supra note 7, at 1975-76; Scott & Stuntz. Plea Bargaining
As Contract, supra note 5, at 1913-17. Free choice or "autonomy" theories justify plea bargaining as a matter
of individual freedom of choice or freedom of contract. Individual defendants are better off, autonomy
theorists contend, if they remain free to choose whether to stand on their right to trial or to sell it for something
they prefer, i.e., a guarantee of a lower sentence. See Easterbrook. supra note 7, at 1975 ("Rights that may be
sold are more valuable than rights that must be consumed ...•"). From a systemic perspective, autonomy
theorists argue that, if left free to make their own choices, bargaining parties can and will reach mutually
advanlageous agreements which, in the long run, will create a net gain for the system of justice as a whole.
See, e.g., Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1915 ("[T]he gains the participants
realize from the exchange presumably have social value, not just value to the bargaining parties.").
Critics of such theories argue that the defendant's plea bargaining choices are seldom really free, but
instead are encumbered by such serious bargaining disadvanlages that defendants as a group would be better
off without such ''freedom." Perhaps the most serious of those disadvanlages are the "agency costs" associated
with represenlation by appointed counsel with neither the resources nor the incentives to bargain effectively
for their clients. See Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining As Disaster, supra note 5, at I 987-90. From a systemic
perspective, critics argue that plea bargains, which are designed to satisfy the mutual interests of prosecutors
and defendants, often disregard more imporlant socieial interests. The principal public criticism of plea
bargaining comes from that perspective. A majority of the public thinks that plea bargains result in sentences
that are too lenient. See Cohen & Doob, supra note 5, at 97.
232 Judge Easterbrook put it more colorfully: "Black markets are better than no markets." Easterbrook,
supra note 7, at 1975.
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frequent-and perhaps the most convincing-argument in favor of pre-plea
disclosure rules is simply that they promote the goal of informed choice.233
The following sections, then, will assess the benefits and costs of Brady in
relation to these two goals: (1) the goal of insuring informed choice in plea
bargaining, and (2) the goal of insuring accuracy-that is, accuracy in
separating the innocent from the guilty.
B. Brady and the Goal of Informed Choice
1. A Theoretical Mismatch

The notion of informed choice provides the theoretical basis by which most
courts have applied Brady to plea bargains in the first place. A valid guilty
plea must be "voluntary and intelligent."234 Absent material, exculpatory
evidence withheld by a prosecutor, a number of courts have held defendants'
uninformed-or misinformed-choice is not voluntary and intelligent.235
Given that theoretical starting point, one might expect a plea-bargaining Brady
rule to provide at least most defendants with sufficient information about the
government's case to allow for an informed choice whether to plead guilty.
But Brady does not work that way. As a doctrine aimed to insure informed
guilty pleas, Brady is a mismatch from the start. The reason is that Brady
encompasses only a small part of the information that is relevant to most
defendants considering a plea bargain.Z36 Brady requires disclosure only of
evidence "favorable" to the accused.237 Evidence "unfavorable" to the accused
is just as important to an informed guilty plea. Indeed, in most cases, it may be
more important. But a Brady-based rule of disclosure does nothing to provide
it. 233 As a result, the defendant can receive all the information Brady provides,
yet still have no idea what he may be up against at trial.239
233 See, e.g., Ostrow, supra note 17, at 1602-06; Blank, supra note 17, at 2041-42; Zacharias, supra note
60, at 1145-47.
234 Brady II, 397 U.S. at 747 (emphasis omitted).
235 See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995); see also White v. United
States, 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988).
236 See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 369 (5th Cir. 2000) ("If it were the case that defendants
assessing whether to plead guilty must be given the opportunity to weigh the state's case in order to make a
voluntary and intelligent decision, requiring that 'material' exculpatory information be provided prior to entry
of a guilty plea would not achieve the objective. . . . Brady information would provide only part of the
picture.").
131 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (I 963).
23
~ Other proponents of pre-plea disclosure have recognized this weakness in Brady, see Ostrow, supra
note 17, at 1615 ('"In the guilty plea context, disclosure of exculpatory evidence is not enough."), and have
argued that disclosure should extend to the state's exculpatory evidence as well. Such proposals, admirable as
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Of course, this deficiency in Brady's coverage applies generally, whether a
case goes to trial or is resolved by a guilty plea. In the trial context, however,
at least the limitation is consistent with the theory supporting the rule. If, as
the Court's post-Brady cases suggest, the aim of due process is a "fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence,"240 then a rule
limited to favorable evidence is arguably sufficient to meet that purpose.Z41
After all, the trial itself will require the prosecution to "show its cards": to
disclose its inculpatory evidence in order to get a conviction. In that context,
Brady merely insures that the fact fmder gets the rest of the picture. By
contrast, if the goal in applying Brady to plea bargaining is to insure informed
decisionmaking by defendants, then the rule will necessarily miss its mark in
most cases. By definition, the Brady rule can only provide a small portion of
the information needed for an informed plea.

they may be, really amount to a call for more general reform of the criminal discovery process as a whole. It is
simply unrealistic to believe that courts would, or even could, effectively mandate broader discovery for pleabargaining defendants than for those who go to trial. If that were the rule, then every well-represented
defendant would circumvent the limits on pretrial discovery simply by claiming an interest in pleading guilty.
After the defendant received his pre-plea discovery, of course, he could not be required to plead guilty. In
effect, if we create discovery rules for plea bargaining that are broader than our pretrial discovery rules, then
the plea bargaining discovery "tail" will wag the pretrial discovery "dog."
For present purposes, those proposals for more comprehensive pre-plea discovery merely reinforce the
point that Brady was not conceived or designed as a tool for addressing nondisclosure in plea bargaining. If
our aim is informed decisionmaking in plea bargaining, then Brady is, at best, an inadequate answer.
239 Brady also leaves out other information that may be critical to an "informed" choice to plead guilty.
There are many "nonevidentiary'' facts which can affect a defendant's decision to plead guilty. See generally
Aaron, supra note 90. For example, a defendant may choose to take his chances at trial if he learns the
important, but "nonevidentiary'' fact that the government's principal witness has died or disappeared.
The Brady doctrine, however, does not extend to such nonevidentiary information. Brady itself uses the
term "evidence" rather than the broader term, "information." 373 U.S. at 87. Though the Supreme Court has
never considered a Brady-like case involving such nonevidentiary information, its reluctance to extend Brady
to such cases may be predictable. Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458-62 (1996) (declining to
extend Rule 16 discovery of items "material to the preparation of defendant's defense" to include items not
''respon[sive] to the Government's case in chief'). Other courts have sho\•m little inclination to extend Brady
to nonevidentiary information. In the only reported appellate case directly on point, the New York Court of
Appeals held that Brady did not require a prosecutor, before entering into a plea agreement, to disclose the fact
that a key witness had died:
[T]o the extent that proof of the fact of the death of this witness might have been admissible on
trial, it would not have constituted exculpatory evidence,-i.e., evidence favorable to an accused
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. Accordingly, it does not fall within
the doctrine enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Brady v. Maryland ...."
People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41,43 (N.Y. 1978).
24
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995).
241 Of course, even this assertion is debatable. Disclosure of inculpatory evidence in advance of trial may
be critical to important strategic decisions and may allow a defendant to pursue his own pre-trial investigation.

°
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Still, on balance, some information is better than none. One could argue
that prosecutors are likely to provide the inculpatory pieces to the puzzle out of
their own self-interest. As long as they do so, then arguably Brady functions in
plea bargaining much as it does for trials. Unfortunately, for reasons I explain
below, even this limited benefit is subject to doubt.
2. Perverse Incentives-How Brady May Inhibit Disclosure
in Plea Bargaining

So far, we have looked at Brady from the same perspective as most courts:
in retrospect. We have considered how severely limited Brady's standard of
materiality will become when courts are called upon to enforce the rule after a
violation has been discovered. But that may be an unfairly restrictive view.
Even a hard-to-enforce rule may have an important precatory influence on the
decisions of prosecutors. After all, if courts announce a disclosure rule for plea
bargaining, we would expect most prosecutors to follow it, even if it is largely
unenforceable after-the-fact. 242 We cannot dismiss Brady as useless without
considering how it may affect the behavior of prosecutors in making
prospective decisions about disclosure and guilty pleas.
Unfortunately, in the world of plea bargaining, even Brady's prospective
effect on disclosure decisions is problematic.
One problem is that
materiality-from the prosecutor's point of view-is sometimes difficult to
define. As long as materiality under Brady is linked to the defendant's tactical
decision to plead guilty, even well-meaninf prosecutors will not always know
what the rule requires in a given case.24 For example, identifying Brady
material relating to an affirmative defense may be impossible unless the
defendant reveals his defense. To know for sure what is material, a prosecutor
would need to know what the defendant is thinking. And defendants are
seldom explicit in defining the factors which motivate them to consider a plea.
Of course, in many cases a prosecutor who voluntarily outlines her
inculpatory evidence to defense counsel should have a reasonable idea of those
elements which will prove most material in the defendant's risk assessment.
242
This may be one Jesson of the California Brady-waiver debate. See infra text accompanying notes
306.08. Presumably, California AUSAs would not bother with waivers unless they took the Sanchez rule
seriously in the first place. Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995).
243
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 701 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("At best, this
standard places on the prosecutor a responsibility to speculate, at times without foundation, since the
prosecutor will not normally know what strategy the defense will pursue or what evidence the defense will find
useful.").
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Identifying exculpatory evidence material to those elements may be simple
enough in many cases. A prosecutor can avoid subsequent Brady controversies merely by interpreting her obligation broadly, disclosing anything
that might affect a defendant's calculus. If Brady has any positive impact in
plea bargaining, this is where we will find it. The rule can motivate wellmeaning or highly cautious prosecutors to disclose more than the rule actually
requires. Indeed, this is :Erobably Brady's most important contribution where
cases go to trial as well. 44 In the pretrial context, many careful prosecutors
conceive of Brady material as "anything favorable to the defendant," even
though in a post-trial review the vast majority of that evidence would not fall
within the Court's definition of material evidence that is reasonably likely to
245
affect the outcome of a trial.
There is, however, an important difference between the disclosure
incentives created by Brady as a rule of pretrial discovery and the incentives it
may create in the context of plea bargaining. Ironically, Brady can create an
incentive for prosecutors to withhold information in bargaining. Even more
disturbing, that incentive can be strongest in weak cases in which disclosure
can make the most difference. To understand this apparently anomalous result,
we must return to the fundamental notion that evidence is "material" to a
defendant's plea bargaining decision only in relation to other information
known to the defendant: the "what else" he has learned through discovery or
through other sources.246 I will refer to this notion as Brady's "matching"
phenomenon. Here is how it can impact plea bargaining in such a perverse
way.
Some Brady material is directly exculpatory: for example, another suspect
confessed to the crime, or DNA analysis reflects that the defendant could not
have been the rapist. 247 In most instances, however, Brady evidence takes on
244
Courts seldom reverse convictions on Brady grounds, but most prosecutors still probably disclose
more than Brady requires. In any event, that is apparently how the Supreme Court expects its rule to work.
See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439.
245
See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 202-09.
247
Most commentators who argue for Brady disclosure in plea bargaining seem to focus on such cases of
directly "exculpatory" evidence. See, e.g., McMunigal, supra note 10, at 973 (discussing hypothetical where
prosecutor fails to disclose physical evidence negating an element of the crime). While those are obviously
important, and often egregious, cases of nondisclosure, it is important to recognize that they represent only a
small minority of Brady cases. The vast majority of Brady evidence disclosed by prosecutors-as well as
most Brady evidence which becomes the focus of post-trial challenges-does not directly demonstrate
defendant's innocence. If it did, few prosecutors would bring such cases in the first place. Instead, most
Brady material serves to negate or contradict some evidence in the prosecutor's case. To a fact-finder at trial,
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its "exculpatory" character only when the evidence is "matched" against other
"inculpatory" evidence.248 Though not directly exculpatory, the evidence
negates or minimizes the impact of inculpatory evidence. Evidence of the
forensic laboratory's error rate, for example, is exculpatory only where the
prosecution makes use of the inculpatory results of the laboratory's ballistics
tests. The clearest and most frequent example of this "matching" phenomenon
is impeachment evidence, so-called "Giglio material."249 Evidence that impeaches the credibility of a witness is exculpatory only if the witness has
something inculpatory to say. Further, under Brady standards, that impeachment evidence is only material if the witness has something to say that is both
inculpatory and critically important to the prosecution's case.250 At trial, the
impeaching evidence never becomes "material" if the witness never testifies to
something both important and inculpatory. Obviously, such evidence is not
material if the witness never testifies at all. Likewise in the context of a plea
bargain, the impeaching evidence never becomes material to a defendant's
decision unless the defendant (1) is aware of the witness, (2) has some idea of
the likely inculpatory testimony of the witness, and (3) views that testimony as
important in proving guilt.
This matching phenomenon creates little difficulty for prosecutors in
deciding which items of exculpatory evidence they must disclose in
anticipation of trial. In fact, it makes the prosecutor's chore easier. If the
government must prove its case through the mouth of a given witness, then
sooner or later the prosecutor knows she must disclose Giglio material relating
to that witness. 251 If the prosecutor uses the results of the laboratory tests, then
she cannot go through trial without disclosing information reflecting a serious
rate of laboratory error.
Plea bargaining, however, gives the prosecutor a different set of choices
when it comes to disclosure under Brady. As we have already seen, the rules

the difference often may be insignificant. But in plea bargaining, because of the "matching" phenomenon
described in the text, the difference has a significant impact on materiality.
248 See supra text accompanying! notes 202-09.
249
See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
250 See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999). Though the evidence withheld in Strickler was
obviously important in impeaching a prosecution witness, the Court ultimately denied the Brady claim after
noting that other, unimpeached evidence was more important to Strickler's conviction and death sentence. Id.
at294-95.
251
In fact, with regard to Giglio material, many prosecutors should have at least a mental checklist of
standard sources to check to make sure they comply with their disclosure obligations. Typical Giglio materials
would include a witness's criminal record, plea or cooperation agreement, and prior inconsistent statements.
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of pretrial discovery seldom require disclosure of all inculpatory evidence
before trial. 252 Because those rules are not sequenced in relation to plea
bargaining, the prosecutor retains the option of seeking an early plea while
some, or all, of her evidence stays in the closet. She can bargain before
disclosing anything at all about her inculpatory evidence. Here is where
Brady's "matching" phenomenon comes into play. Until she discloses the
inculpatory evidence, the "matching" exculpatory evidence remains immaterial
to the defendant's decisionmaking. If the defendant never sees the laboratory
results, then the error rate means nothing. If the defendant has no idea who
will testify for the government, or what they will say, then impeachment
evidence is meaningless. In many cases, the prosecutor has the option to keep
much of her inculpatory case in the closet until the moment of trial.253 If she
does that, and the defendant nevertheless chooses to plead guilty, then much of
what might become "Brady material" in the event of trial will not be "material"
under the Brady standard applied to plea bargaining. In short, not all "trialrelated" Brady material will be "plea-related" Brady material.
As a rule for governing the prosecutor's disclosures in plea bargaining,
then, Brady suffers from a perverse circularity. Brady requires a Erosecutor to
4
But quite
disclose favorable evidence material to the defendant's decision.
often, the same prosecutor can control what is, and what is not, "material"
through her decisions regarding informal discovery of other, inculpatory
evidence. Once we understand this matching phenomenon, then we can
appreciate two serious flaws in applying Brady to the world of plea bargaining.
First, Brady may never come into play at all in many bargaining situations,
even though it would ultimately require some disclosures if the same case went
to trial. 255 Second, and much more troubling, the matching phenomenon can
create incentives for prosecutors to withhold inculpatory evidence in order to
avoid disclosing the "matching" Brady or Giglio material. Those incentives
would not exist in a plea bargaining world in which Brady did not apply.

252
253
254

See supra text accompanying notes 60-69.
See supra text accompanying notes 60-69.

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
Of course, one might argue that this is not a flaw at all, but really an advantage. It means that parties
retain the option of striking a relatively early bargain, with relatively little disclosure, without violating Brady.
That is a desirable option, or an undesirable one, depending upon one's philosophical preference for
unregulated freedom of choice, and one's faith in defendants and-especially-defense counsel to make
rational choices between the advantages of disclosure on the one hand, and the advantages of an early plea on
the other.
255
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256

An example illustrates the point.
Assume that a prosecutor is motivated
to obtain a guilty plea, and is willing to do so by any means permitted by the
rules of disclosure. Assume further that her case rests primarily on the
testimony of a few key witnesses whose identity and anticipated testimony is
not otherwise known to the defense. Finally, assume that the prosecutor
possesses substantial Giglio material suggesting that the witnesses are less than
exemplary folk. Our prosecutor will have an incentive to disclose the identity
and anticipated testimony of her witnesses, since such inculpatory evidence
may help convince the defendant that the government will win at trial. In a
world in which Brady does not apply to plea bargains, however, she need not
disclose the "matching" Giglio material. Her most advantageous course, then,
may be to disclose the inculpatory part of her case, and delay Giglio disclosure
while attempting to negotiate a deal.
By contrast, in a world in which Brady does govern her plea-bargaining
conduct, the same prosecutor has two options. First, she may choose to
disclose her inculpatory evidence, namely, the witness's statements. If she
chooses that option, however, she also must disclose her Giglio material in
advance of the plea. Her second option, which is permissible under Brady, is
to disclose nothing about her witnesses at the plea-bargaining stage and simply
leave the defendant to guess what he may face at trial. In other words, she can
bluff and invite the defendant to take his chances.
Consider which option she is likely to choose, if her aim is to get a guilty
plea. If her evidence is relatively strong and her Giglio material is relatively
insignificant, then disclosing both may be the best way to induce a plea. On
the other hand, the more significant her Giglio material, and the weaker her
inculpatory evidence, the stronger her incentive to bluff will become. She may
be better off inducing a plea out of the defendant's fear of the unknown than
risking a trial through full disclosure of a weak case. And Brady would not
stop her from making that choice. Indeed, Brady may encourage that choice,
because the less she chooses to disclose about her inculpatory evidence, the
less she must disclose in the way of "matching" exculpatory evidence. In other
words, by injecting Brady into the plea bargaining process, we may inhibit
256
If the hypothetical example sounds too hypothetical, I would encourage another look. In fact, this
scenario is quite t}'Pical in drug conspiracy cases, which are often built largely on the testimony of cooperating
witnesses who have criminal records, axes to grind against their former compatriots in crime, and plea
agreements that offer substantial incentives to testify. In many cases, the government jealously will guard the
identities of such witnesses, partly out of concern for their safety and the safety of their families. See, e.g.,
United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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disclosure in the very cases in which disclosure is most needed. Brady can
encourage a prosecutor to bluff in weak cases.
In adopting a rule permitting post-plea Brady claims, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned, "[I]f a defendant may not raise a Brady claim after a guilty plea,
prosecutors may be tempted to deliberately withhold exculpatory information
257
No doubt that is a troubling
as part of an attempt to elicit guilty pleas."
prospect. But the Ninth Circuit, like other courts and scholars that have
embraced Brady as the natural companion of plea bargaining, never considered
the flip side of its rule. If defendants are permitted to raise Brady claims after
a guilty plea, then prosecutors may be tempted to elicit pleas by withholding
both exculpatory and inculpatory information. In the weakest cases, Brady
may be an invitation for prosecutors to stonewall.

Of course, the notion that a prosecutor might choose a plea-bargaining
strategy aimed at limiting her exposure to post-plea Brady claims may sound a
bit Machiavellian. In practice, it is likely that other incentives, not to mention
a sense of fair play, would govern the conduct of prosecutors in most plea
bargains. The prospect of a plea itself already creates an incentive for
prosecutors to disclose much of their inculpatory evidence.258 In that
environment, as our earlier hypothetical demonstrates, a Brady-based rule of
disclosure has one clear benefit. It at least prohibits a prosecutor from
manipulating the process of informal discovery by providing deceptively
incomplete disclosures. Our hypothetical prosecutor would violate Brady if
she sought to induce a guilty plea by disclosing highly incriminating testimony
of an apparently reliable witness without disclosing the "matching" Giglio
material. At a minimum, then, Brady would protect defendants from pleas
induced through downright fraud or its functional equivalent-manipulative
partial disclosure.
Whether this is enough to salvage Brady as a rule for promoting informed
choice is a difficult proposition. If given the choice in our hypothetical case,
perhaps most defense counsel would rather learn the identities and anticipated
testimony of the government witnesses, even without disclosure of the
matching impeachment information. Defense counsel are, by professional
necessity, a skeptical lot. They would not easily assume that they had heard
the full story from the prosecutor. Disclosure of inculpatory evidence at least
257 Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995).
258

That is the primary motivating force behind most informal discovery in current practice. See supra
text accompanying note 81.
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gives counsel an opportunity to pursue impeachment evidence through their
own investigation. Moreover, if Brady boils down to a rule against using fraud
to induce a guilty plea, then perhaps courts would do better to apply such a rule
in a more direct fashion, rather than to strain a trial-related concept of
materiality to serve a purpose it was never designed to serve.259
C. Brady and the Accuracy of Guilty Pleas: The Innocence Problem

1. The The01)' of Coerced Innocents

A guilty plea is a process of self-selection. A defendant stands in open
court and identifies himself as guilty of a crime. At first blush, the notion that
an innocent defendant might do such a thing seems highly implausible,
especially because the consequence of the guilty plea is punishment, a
260
Therefore, it may seem
consequence most humans would prefer to avoid.
reasonable to assume that defendants who plead guilty are, in fact, guilty.
Because plea bargaining simply offers inducements to encourage such
defendants to identify themselves, one might argue that plea bargaining is the
perfect means of separating at least some of the guilty from the larger pool of
defendants. Plea bargaining, from that perspective, seems "accurate."
For decades, however, critics have argued that plea bargaininfc is a highly
inaccurate means for separating the innocent from the guilty; 61 no more
accurate some have said than the medieval practice of identifying the guilty
through torture?62 The reason is that plea bargains can offer inducements, or
threats, strong enough to offset the normal disinclination of anyone, including
an innocent person, to condemn himself?63 And, because the prosecutor
presumably cannot identify the few innocents she has inaccurately charged

2SY See, e.g., United States v. Wolczik, 480 F. Supp. 1205, 1211 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (rejecting notion that
Brady applies to plea bargaining, but suggesting a plea induced by affirmative misrepresentation would be

invalid).
260 The Supreme Court seems attracted to this logic. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363
(! 978) ('·Defendants advised by competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are .•.
unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation.").
201 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 46, at 60; McMunigal, supra note 10, at 989-94; Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining As Disaster, supra note 5, at 2000.
262 See generally Langbein, supra note 5.
lbJ See supra Part ill.B.2.
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those inducements are offered to

The problem is worse than that, critics say, because "the greatest pressures
to plead guilty are brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent." 266
The reason has nothing to do with malevolent prosecutors. Rather, it is an
unfortunate byproduct of the bargaining system. The "price" of a plea bargain
is determined in some measure by the parties' assessments of the likelihood of
267
conviction.
Therefore, the theory goes, the weaker her case, the more a
prosecutor must "pay," in terms of reducing charges or making sentencing
concessions, to obtain a plea. That means that she offers the most attractive
268
Assuming even a modicum of accuracy in police
deals in the weakest cases.
investigations, cases with weak evidence will be those in which innocent
defendants are over-represented. Finally, the theory continues, innocent
defendants are by nature more risk averse than guilty ones.269 The sum of
these factors makes for a highly coercive confluence of events. The prosecutor
is most likely to make her most attractive offers in weak cases that,
comparatively speaking, more often involve innocent defendants who, in turn,
are more likely to accept such offers and plead guilty. Thus, according to the
theory of coerced innocents, plea bargaining is a highly inaccurate means of
separating the innocent from the guilty.
2. How Disclosure Might Enhance Accuracy

Sunshine may be an effective medicine for the plea bargaining disease of
coerced innocents. In his study of disclosure and accuracy in plea bargaining,
Professor Kevin McMunigal identifies two principal means by which
disclosure rules in general, and Brady in particular, may offer some relief to
innocent defendants who might otherwise face coercive choices in plea

264

If she could make that distinction, of course, the prosecutor would presumably not have brought the
charge in the first place, or would have dismissed it as soon as the defendant's innocence became evident
265 See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1946-47. Professors Scott and
Stuntz refer to this problem as the "pooling" phenomenon, the tendency of plea bargaining to "pool" the guilty
and the innocent together and subject them both to the same incentives to plead guilty.
266 Alschuler, supra note 5, at 60.
267 See supra text accompanying notes 41-50.
268 Practice confirms the accuracy of the theory. See, e.g., Mlu.ER ET AL., supra note 42, at xxii ("Most
prosecutors appear willing to plea bargain [by] offering 'sweet deals' in very weak cases.").
269
See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1948; Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining
As Disaster, supra note 5, at 1984.
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bargaining.270 First, Professor McMunigal suggests, a system that applies
Brady to trials and not to plea bargains will inevitably encourage prosecutors
to dispose of "Brady cases,"271 those in which the prosecutor is aware of
significant exculpatory evidence, through plea bargaining rather than through
trial. 272 Second, he argues, disclosure of Brady material reduces coercion of
innocent defendants because it reduces the attractiveness of a plea bargain in
relation to trial.273 Simply put, a defendant who pleads in ignorance of Brady
material has overestimated his risk of conviction at trial, making the "bargain"
offered by the prosecutor seem unrealistically attractive by comparison.274
Brady disclosure, Professor McMunigal argues, reduces the "differential"
between that otherwise inflated risk assessment and the inducements offered
by the plea bargain.275 The deal therefore becomes less attractive. Fewer
innocents will accept it and plead guilty.
3. Brady and Accuracy: A More Skeptical View

The notion that Brady will enhance accuracy in plea bargaining, (1) by
changing the incentives of prosecutors, and (2) by limiting coercive pressures
on defendants, makes sense if we regard Brady as a fixed rule requiring
prosecutors to disclose all significant evidence favorable to a defendant,
270 McMunigal, supra note 10, at 985-97. Professor McMunigal identifies a third reason why Brady
disclosure might enhance the accuracy of guilty pleas. He points out that there are some "legally innocent"
defendants who mistakenly believe themselves to be guilty because they do not have personal knowledge of all
of the facts necessary to establish their guilt. Brady disclosure would correct those erroneous beliefs,
Professor Mcr.lunigal suggests, and therefore lead to fewer false guilty pleas. !d. at 971-84.
Professor McMunigals's view is correct, as long as we conclude that many defendants choose to plead
guilty primarily because they believe themselves to be guilty. But bargaining theory suggests otherwise. Even
those defendants who know they are guilty will normally choose trial if acquittal seems certain. The relevant
factor in the defendant's risk assessment is not the defendant's perception of his own guilt, but his perception
of the prosecution's ability to convince a jury that he is guilty. For that reason, the category of "confused
innocents" should not be set aside for separate analysis in considering the application of Brady to plea
bargaining.
271 The notion that we can conveniently label some prosecutions "Brady cases" at the plea bargaining
stage is itself subject to question, on two grounds. First, as a practical matter, bargains often are struck before
even the prosecutor knows enough about the case to identify what will or will not be Brady material. Second,
as a doctrinal matter, a case may or may not be a Brady case for plea bargaining purposes depending on the
prosecutor's choices about the disclosure of inculpatory evidence. See supra text accompanying notes 202-09,
246-51.
272 See McMunigal, supra note 10, at 997 ("A criminal justice system that condenms concealment of
Brady material as a due process violation at trial, but not in plea bargaining, essentially encourages prosecutors
to divert Brady cases into plea bargaining.").
273 !d. at 996-97.
274 ld. at 991-92.
215 !d. at 996-97.
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whether he pleads or goes to trial. But, as we have already seen, Brady
requires less than that at trial, and much less than that in the context of a plea
bargain.276
In light of the narrow limits of materiality under Brady, and a prosecutor's
power to control those limits through her other discovery choices, I do not
share Professor McMunigal's confidence that applying Brady to plea bargains
will reduce the incentives for prosecutors to offer "cheap" deals in an effort to
"bargain away" weak Brady cases without full disclosure. Brady offers little
deterrent to the gosecutor who prefers to "bluff' a plea by offering no
77
Except in rare cases of highly significant, directly
discovery at all.
exculpatory evidence, that kind of bluffing will not violate Brady. Indeed, in
the much more typical case in which most exculpatory evidence is "matched"
to inculpatory evidence-as with most Giglio material-Brady can create an
incentive to disclose little or nothing to defendants. And that incentive
increases for the weakest cases: the very cases in which innocent defendants
are over-represented. Far from enhancing accuracy in plea bargains, then,
Brady may have the opposite effect.

Further, though as a theoretical matter Brady disclosure reduces the
278
apparent "sentencing differential" that can coerce a plea, such reduction will
not make pleas more accurate. The reduction in that "sentencing differential,"
relatively speaking, would be the same for guilty defendants. Moreover,
because courts enforce plea-related Brady doctrine after-the-fact, guilty
defendants will profit from Brady in greater proportion than innocents, for two
reasons.
First, the "prize" for winning a plea withdrawal motion or a habeas petition
challenging a conviction obtained by guilty plea is not acquittal. Instead, the
"winning" defendant then faces prosecution not only on the charge to which he
pled guilty, but on all of the other (presumably more serious) charges that were
dismissed as part of the plea bargain, along with the full range of penalties
applicable to those charges.279 If the "coerced innocents" theory holds true,

276
277
278
279

See supra text accompanying notes 137-39, 202-09.
See supra text acccompanying notes 246-57.
See McMunigal, supra note 10, at 996.
See, e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1324 (2d Cir. 1988) ("The judgment should provide that

the writ will be granted unless within a reasonable time the State brings Miller to trial."); United States v.
Millan-Colan, 829 F. Supp. 620, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (confirming the court's order by scheduling trial of
defendant's whose plea-withdrawal motion was granted). In most cases, double jeopardy considerations
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few innocent defendants are likely to take advantage of that opportunity.
According to theory, they are the defendants who got the greatest sentencing
benefit from pleading guilty and who, accordingly, have the most to lose by
withdrawing a plea?80 And they are, as the theory tells us, the most risk
averse. The logic of the theory suggests that few innocents would take the risk
of pursuing a post-plea Brady motion.
The same logic suggests that even fewer innocents will win such a
challenge. To succeed, the defendant would have to show that the undisclosed
information was material to his decision to plead guilty?81 That decision was
one that presumably balanced the risks of conviction against the benefit offered
in the plea bargain.282 Exculpatory information becomes more or less
"material" depending upon the size of that benefit.283 Under Brady's "sliding
scale" of post-plea materiality, therefore, the pool of defendants who received
the greatest benefits will have to make the most convincing showing of
materiality?84 According to theory, coerced innocents will be over-represented
in that pool. The converse, of course, is equally true. Defendants who
received the least benefit from bargaining-the group that, according to the
theory, is least likely to include coerced innocents-will have an easier time
establishing that undisclosed Brady material would have changed their minds.
In sum, innocent defendants likely will be under-represented among
defendants who file post-plea Brady challenges and further under-represented
among those who succeed in such challenges. If that is true, then Brady makes
plea bargaining an even less accurate means for distinguishing the innocent
from the guilty.

would not preclude the government from reinitiating prosecution on all charges which the defendant originally
faced before the guilty plea.
2S0 See supra text accompanying notes 266-69.
2 1
~ See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995).
2 2
~ See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
2S3 See supra text accompanying notes 210-16.
284 The undisclosed evidence would have to be so significant that it would justify abandoning the
considerable benefits derived from the bargain. Cf. White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416,424 (8th Cir. 1998)
(noting that the district court focused on the benefits of the plea bargain in denying motion to set aside guilty
plea).
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D. Recapping Brady's Limited Benefits: Counting Some Costs
1. Limited-and Misdirected-Benefits
Despite the more optimistic assessments of other scholars,285 there is little
reason to believe Brady can be an effective-or even marginally useful-rule
for promoting informed choice or accuracy in plea bargaining. Because it is
enforced only after-the-fact, by skeptical courts, in the absence of a meaningful
record, Brady offers little deterrent to prosecutors who might choose
nondisclosure as a bargaining tactic. Certainly, there is little in existing case
law to suggest otherwise.286 Instead, Brady's value in plea bargaining may be
largely symbolic. It may encourage careful prosecutors to do more than the
rule requires. That may be no small benefit, but it probably comes where it is
needed the least. Most enlightened prosecutors already make such disclosures
87
in the interest of maintaining an efficient bargaining system?
On the other side of the scale, Brady can create perverse incentives for
288
prosecutors to bluff in order to achieve pleas in their weakest cases.
As a
result, Brady can actually stand in the way of more informed choices in some
plea bargains. And Brady's enforcement mechanism-weak as it may be-is
probably more accessible, and more useful, to the guilty than to the innocent.
Brady probably does little, therefore, to enhance accuracy in guilty pleas. In
fact, it may do the opposite.
2. Costs in Bargaining
The costs of Brady to plea bargainers obviously depend on the scope of the
obligations the rule creates. If materiality remains largely within the
prosecutor's control in most cases/89 then the rule's costs and benefits may be
inconsequential. Prosecutors would remain free under Brady to seek early,
290
On the other hand, to
cheap pleas with minimal disclosure in many cases.
the extent that the rule actually required disclosures that would not otherwise

285

See supra note 17.
Post-plea Brady challenges have proliferated in recent years, but the results are almost always the
same. The reviewing court may complain about the government's tactics, or its negligence, but the conviction
is nonetheless affirmed after a finding that the withheld evidence was not "material." For a collection of cases,
see supra note 184.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 87-91.
288 See supra text accompanying notes 242-57.
289 See supra text accompanying notes 252-54.
290 See supra text accompanying notes 256-57.
286
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occur, then compliance by prosecutors would necessarily entail increased
costs. Prosecutors would need to devote time and effort to disclosure in order
to comply with the rule. That might be a simple matter in many cases,
assuming the prosecutor could easily identify the evidence favorable to the
accused.
In some cases, however, Brady disclosure would be more
cumbersome. Brady applies to evidence in the hands of the police as well as
the prosecutor.291 To assure that she had complied with the rule, a careful
prosecutor would need to complete a review not only of her own files, but of
police files as well, in advance of the plea.
To some degree, this process would make plea bargaining less efficient
because on the whole pleas might be delayed to await disclosure. But it is hard
to regard that form of inefficiency as much of a cost at all. Many guilty pleas
are already too efficient. The prosecutor and defense counsel exchange a few
words in the hallway and the case is settled with little scrutiny of the
prosecutor's evidence.292 Indeed, slowing that process a bit might actually
increase the efficiency of justice. Not only would defendants have the
opportunity to make better informed plea decisions, but prosecutors would
have reason to pause over their initial charging decisions. A designedly more
cumbersome pre-plea disclosure process, therefore, could bring a net gain in
efficiency if it led prosecutors to weed out the weakest cases from the start.
The real costs of attaching a Brady-like obligation to plea bargaining,
however, are not efficiency costs, but rather opportunity costs. These probably
would burden defendants more than prosecutors. Unless the rule could be
waived by agreement of the parties,293 a Brady disclosure requirement in plea

291 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) ("[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to Jearn of
any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the
pollee.").
292 See Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining As Contract, supra note 5, at 1911-12.
293 Before counting the costs of a pre-plea Brady rule, however, we must pause over an additional
complication: the possibillty of a bargained-for waiver. If a disclosure obllgation stood in the way of an
opportunity for a quick, Jess-informed plea which both parties preferred, then that opportunity could be
preserved if defendant agreed to waive his Brady rights explicitly, right in the written plea agreement itself. In
fact, in some jurisdictions "Brady waivers" have become a standard term in plea agreements, as well as a
standard object of defense protests regarding their enforceabillty. See Blank, supra note 17, at 2042-43; see
infra text accompanying notes 306-08. The Brady-waiver controversy is important to our analysis, because
waivers have the practical potential of undoing what many courts have done by inserting Brady into the pleabargaining world. See infra Part V. For the purpose of considering the "opportunity costs" of applying Brady
to plea bargaining, however, assume for purposes of this discussion that such waivers are not enforceable. To
assume otherwise, of course, would negate many of these costs, just as waivers would negate the potential
b~nefits of disclosure.
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bargaining would reduce the range of options available to both defendants and
prosecutors. In many cases, for entirely legitimate reasons, the prosecutor may
be willing to agree to certain plea terms before thorough Brady compliance,
but not at a later stage in the case. For example, a prosecutor who desires to
protect the privacy or safety of a witness may be willing to offer favorable
terms as long as she can avoid any witness-related disclosures. Those terms
might change substantially, however, and agreement may be beyond reach, if
full "Giglio" disclosure were required. In other cases, a prosecutor's principal
motivation in offering an early plea might be to obtain one defendant's
94
cooperation in the prosecution of others? Often, delay can be fatal to that
kind of deal?95 A nonwaivable Brady rule may force such cases to trial against
296
the better interests of both defendant and prosecutor.
This assumption, as it turns out, is consistent with my conclusion in Part V. As long as courts find that
a plea is not voluntary and intelligent in the absence of Brady disclosure, it is hard to imagine the same court
upholding a waiver of access to the very information required to validate the plea. See infra text
accompanying note 321.
294
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have created powerful incentives for defendants to seek
"cooperation" deals as part of a plea agreement The Guidelines empower the prosecutor to bring a motion for
a downward departure on the grounds that a defendant has provided "substantial assistance" to the
government. U.S. SENTENCING GUJDELINES MANUAL§ 5Kl.l. (2000). Prosecutors typically enjoy broad
discretion in deciding when to file such motions. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992)
(holding that, in absence of a plea agreement requiring otherwise, prosecutor has virtually unfettered discretion
in choosing whether to file substantial assistance motion); compare United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1500
(I Ith Cir. 1993) (holding that court would not review prosecutor's choice not to file a substantial assistance
motion where plea agreement left that choice in "sole discretion" of prosecutor), with United States v. Isaac,
141 F.3d 477,481-83 (3rd Cir. 1998) (ruling that courts may review prosecutor's decision forbad faith). And
the Guidelines set no "floor" for such departures. Accordingly, in a great number of federal prosecutions,
especially multiple defendant conspiracy cases, the prospect of a "substantial assistance motion" motivates a
number of defendants to bargain by offering to cooperate with prosecutors and testify against their former
partners in crime.
295 In multiple defendant cases, the first defendant "through the door" often gets the most favorable
consideration by the prosecutor. Defendants are most likely to win the government's favor, and the prized
substantial assistance motion in federal cases, when they cooperate early enough to provide real assistance to
the government. If a defendant waits until a handful of his codefendants have agreed to cooperate, his plea
overtures are likely to be rejected by a prosecutor who already has all the assistance she wiii need. In the
cooperation game, the familiar adage holds true: "He who hesitates is lost."
296 In cases involving "plea and cooperation" agreements, disclosure may present an entirely different set
of problems. Concerns over the credibility of cooperating defendants as trial witnesses are well documented.
See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (lOth Cir. 1998) (holding that a prosecutor violates the federal
anti-gratuity statute by offering sentencing leniency in exchange for testimony), re1•'d, I 65 F. 3d I 297 (I Oth
Cir. 1999) (en bane), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1024 (1999). See generally Stephen Trott, Words ofWamingfor
Prosecutors Using Criminals As Witnesses, 47 HAsTINGS LJ. 1381 (1996). A careful prosecutor. intent on
getting the "straight story" from a potential cooperator during initial interviews, should be careful to avoid
influencing or "tainting" the witness by disclosing other evidence in the case. If Brady required prosecutors to
disclose ali favorable evidence in the course of negotiating a "plea and cooperation" deal, such disclosures
could ailow some cooperators to tailor their responses in an effort to curry favor with prosecutors. In such
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At a minimum, a nonwaivable obligation would reduce the value of the
principal commodity a defendant has to "sell" in a plea bargain: his right to
take the case all the way through trial. Put simply, a defendant may get a
better deal if he can sell his plea before discovery than if he is prohibited from
doing so by a nonwaivable Brady-like rule.297 A rational defendant may well
prefer a relatively uninformed, but "cheap" plea to a more thoroughly
considered, but more expensive one. Of course, one might debate whether the
option of a quick, relatively uninformed plea is worth preserving. As long as
parties remain free to make such deals, prosecutors could use nondisclosure as
a tactic to induce ill-advised pleas. Still, if our aim is to protect some
defendants against that tactic through a nonwaivable rule of pre-plea
disclosure, we should at least recognize what we are givin~ up. The ultimate
cost may be higher sentences for defendants on the whole?9
3. Costs of Post-Plea Litigation

In addition, there are costs associated with enforcing Brady through postplea litigation. Any rule enforced primarily after conviction carries the cost of
protracted litigation. Post-guilty plea Brady litigation may pose higher costs
than most post-trial claims, for the simple reason that reviewing courts have no
trial record to rely upon. If courts are serious about determining the likely
persuasiveness of withheld information on the defendant's decision, they may
have little choice but to conduct evidentiary hearings regarding what the
defendant knew and when he knew it. If existing case law is any indicator,
those expenditures will prove futile in most cases?99 Ironically, even the

instances, Brady disclosure for one defendant might reduce the accuracy of testimony presented against other
defendants.
297
"Rights that may be sold are more valuable than rights that must be consumed ...." Easterbrook,
supra note 7, at 1975.
293
One might argue that the capacity to promote more favorable bargains for guilty defendants may not
be the best measure of a rule of criminal procedure. Still, as long as our system allows-indeed, encouragesprosecutors to make "plea and cooperation" deals, and as long as the rules of discovery continue to recognize
and protect legitimate interests in witness protection, then we must acknowledge these "costs" of a mandatory
pre-plea rule of disclosure. Prosecutors, quite legitimately, will see mandatory disclosure as a substantial
burden in some cases, especially those cases where their aims include timely cooperation, or secrecy to protect
a witness. If rules of disclosure require prosecutors to pay those costs, then they almost certainly will pass
along some portion of their increased costs to defendants in the form of less favorable "deals." In some cases,
that will mean no deal at all.
299 See supra note 184.
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occasional post-plea Brady "winners" may conclude their cases with another
plea bargain, albeit on terms more favorable than the original deal. 300
The costs of post-conviction litigation involve more than just the time and
effort of courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel. There are intangible costs as
well. The deterrent effect of criminal convictions necessarily suffers to some
degree when their fmality is subject to ongoing debate. Even more significant,
justice suffers whenever courts and litigants divert their efforts into largely
futile pursuits (as post-plea Brady challenges almost always turn out to be) if
those efforts could be better spent elsewhere.301 To the extent that courts,
defense counsel, and policymakers are attracted by the false hope of Brady,
they will not be pursuing alternatives that might more effectively promote
302
informed plea bargains.
On balance, defendants would be better off, and the system of plea
bargaining no less fair and no less accurate, if we simply left Brady to the
world of trials rather than straining it to solve problems it was not designed to
solve. The Fifth Circuit has suggested just such an approach, treating Brady as
a component of the Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial, waived like many
other fair-trial rights when defendant pleads guilty.303 In considering the
practical impact of its ruling, the Fifth Circuit observed: "In light of the
existing protections afforded individuals pleading guilty . . . , we doubt that
new rules allowing individuals to challenge the validity of their pleas on
300 Successful post-plea Brady challenges have been so rare that it is hard to generalize about the likely
result of a "win" by the defendant. Winners of post-trial Brady claims, by comparison, quite typically
negotiate a favorable plea agreement with the government. See, e.g., Banks v. United States, 920 F. Supp.
688, 690 n.2 (E.D. Va. 1996) (noting that codefendants were resentenced under agreements with the
government when Brady violations came to light after trial).
301 Cf. John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the
Right to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 191,222 (1999) (arguing that, when defendants devote
efforts to litigating admissibility of evidence under the Confrontation Clause, they may do so at the expense of
other, more effective efforts to challenge the credibility of that same evidence before the jury); Stuntz, supra
note 57, at 3-6 (arguing that modern criminal procedure doctrines often steer resources into procedural
litigation when such resources could be spent on efforts aimed more directly at protection of the innocent).
302 The California defense bar has itself fallen into such a trap. See infra Part V. California defense
counsel seem intent upon challenging "Brady waivers," although their clients might be better served by
embracing those very waivers and inviting courts to take them seriously. See infra text accompanying notes
300-06.
303 See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 364-67 (5th Cir. 2000). I would disagree with the narrow
characterization of Brady as a "trial right" to the extent that term suggests the right has no application in the
pretrial context. Many rights which aim to promote fairness or accuracy at trial cannot be fully effective
unless they have the power to control some pretrial behaviors. The right to counsel may be the clearest
example. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (finding due process violation where counsel had no
meaningful opportunity to prepare for trial).
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grounds that the state failed to supply them with exculpatory information prior
to entry of their plea will seriously enhance the accuracy of convictions."304
In light of Brady's limited value in plea bargaining, the Fifth Circuit is
probably right. But that does not mean we should give up on disclosure
Brady's biggest weakness stems from its bad timing: its
altogether.
substantive weakness, namely a narrow concept of materiality, is inextricably
linked to its procedural weakness-retrospective enforcement.305 Better
informed plea bargaining will result by addressing the issue when it matters:
before the plea. Ironically, at the moment when a defendant waives his
traditional Brady right (the right to disclosure to assure a fair trial) we may fmd
an opportunity to enhance the likelihood of a better informed plea.

V.

BREAKING OFF THE ENGAGEMENT:

BRADYWANERS

The California federal courts have become the ~rincipal battleground in the
current debate over Brady and plea bargaining.3 6 Prosecutors have placed
07
explicit "Brady waivers" in standard plea agreements? The defense bar has
308
For our purposes, the
responded that such waivers are unenforceable.
resulting controversy is worth exploring for three reasons. First, if "plearelated" Brady disclosure can be waived in a plea bargain, then a prosecutor
with a word processor can easily undo what the majority of federal courts have
done in applying Brady to plea bargains. It is doubtful that those courts will
allow that. 309 Second, the California debate demonstrates and fosters a
fundamental misconception about Brady and plea bargains. In advocating a
nonwaivable, pre-plea Brady right, the defense bar overestimates the scope of
that right because it fails to recognize how limited Brady becomes when we try
to apply it to plea bargains. As a result, the debate is really about a great deal
less than may appear on its surface, because Brady, when applied to plea
bargains, is worth a great deal less than its proponents in the California defense
bar have acknowledged. Third, and most important for purposes of this

3W
305

Matthew, 201 F.3d at 370.
See supra text accompanying notes 132-50.

306 There are several, detailed accounts of the ongoing Brady-waiver debate in California. See Blank,
supra note 17, at 2042-45; Franklin, supra note 36, at 567-69; Kupers & Philipsbom, supra note 36, at 64-66.
307 See Blank, supra note 17, at 2042-43.
303 See id. at 2043-45.
309 In an opinion issued shortly before this Article went to press, a divided Ninth Circuit panel ruled that a
defendant's right to receive Brady material cannot be waived through a plea agreement. United States v. Ruiz,
241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra note 315.
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Article, the kind of Brady waivers actually at issue in the California debatethat is, waivers of "trial-related" rather than "plea-related" Brady disclosurepresent a valuable opportunity to arrive at better-informed plea bargains. In
other words, defendants in California and elsewhere would benefit more by
embracing, rather than challenging, such waivers and by inviting courts to take
them seriously.
A. The California Brady- Waiver Debate
In Sanchez v. United States, the Ninth Circuit ruled that a guilty plea
"cannot be deemed 'intelligent and voluntary' if 'entered without knowledge
of material information withheld by the prosecution.'"310 The Sanchez Court
adopted the now-familiar post-plea standard of materiality, holding that the
defendant may withdraw a guilty plea if "there is a reasonable probability that
but for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant would have
refused to plead and would have gone to trial."311 Prosecutors in both the
Northern District and the Southern District of California responded to Sanchez
by including "Brady waiver" provisions in standard form plea agreements. 312
In essence, the provisions call upon defendants to waive their rights to Brady
material as part of the plea agreement. 313

The outcry from the defense bar was as immediate as it was predictable.
Even as defendants continued to plead guilty and to sign such agreements/ 14
310
50 F.3d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Following the typical pattern in cases which reach the merits of a post-plea Brady challenge, however, the
Ninth Circuit found the prosecutor's nondisclosure was not "material" to Sanchez's plea and, accordingly,
affirmed her conviction.
311
/d. at 1454. Without further analysis, the Sanchez Court merely borrowed the materiality st.mdard
from the Second Circuit's opinion inAngliker. 848 F.2d at 1322. Angliker, in tum, had derived that standard
through analogy to the standard applied by the Court in determining prejudice where a defendant claims his
guilty plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. 848 F.2d at 1322 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474
U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); see supra text accompanying notes 165-68.
31 2 SeeBlank,supranote 17,at2042n.177.
313 The waivers have taken a variety offorrns. See Blank, supra note 17, at 2042-43. One example reads
as follows:

The defendant understands that discovery may not have been completed in this case, and that there
may be additional discovery to which he would have access if he elected to proceed to trial. The
defendant agrees to waive his right to receive this additional discovery which may include, among
other things, evidence tending to impeach the credibility of potential witnesses.

/d. at 2043 (quoting Pamela A. MacLean, Defense Groups Oppose Plea Bargain Waivers, DAILY J. (San
Francisco), May 27, 1998, at 1).
314
Defense counsel have refused to sign such agreements and have advised their clients not to sign them.
See Blank, supra note 17, at 2043. Clients sign, and plead guilty, nonetheless. See id. That somewhat
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defense counsel argued that Brady waivers were unenforceable because,
without Brady disclosure, the plea itself would be invalid? 15
B. "Plea-Brady" vs. "Trial-Brady": Defining the Rights to be Waived

The solution to the California debate lies in defining the scope of the
waivers. If the waivers are properly limited, then the answer to the
enforceability debate is that both parties are right. The defendants fear that the
rights they won in Sanchez would be meaningless if the defendants could be
forced to waive those rights in exchange for a plea bargain. That argument
makes sense as long as Sanchez is the law.316 For their part, prosecutors resist
the obligation to provide all pretrial Brady disclosure-especially Giglio
disclosure regarding government witnesses-in advance of every plea.317

peculiar scenario leaves one to wonder whether the attorneys' "advice" and refusal to sign are, for the most
part, aimed at preserving an issue for appeal rather than actually suggesting that the defendant should go to
trial. Some defense attorneys contend that they cannot sign such agreements, because to do so would violate
the rules of ethics. See Kupers & Philipsbom, .supra note 36, at 66. The accuracy of that contention is
doubtful. It appears to be based on the three-step argument that: (1) a prosecutor cannot ethically require a
defendant to waive potential claims of prosecutorial misconduct, (2) a defense attorney cannot ethically advise
a defendant to agree to such a waiver; and, most critically, (3) a prosecutor commits an act of "misconduct" by
entering into a plea agreement before all pretrial Brady and Giglio material has been produced. Regardless of
the merits of points (1) and (2), I believe a prosecutor's ethical duties to disclose exculpatory material in
advance of a plea are far from clear. See supra note 10.
315 See Blank, supra note 24, at 2043-45. In an opinion published shortly before this Article went to
press, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant's right to Brady disclosure is not waivable,
even by explicit terms in a plea agreement In United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), the
defendant challenged the government's "Fast Track" program, a case-disposition method under which the
government offered a two-level downward sentencing departure for defendants who agreed to plead guilty,
waive indictment, forego pretrial motions, waive appeal, and waive the right to Giglio disclosures regarding
government witnesses. See id. at 1160-61, 1165-66. Ruiz pled guilty without such a plea agreement, then
argued that the government violated her right to due process by failing to move for a downward departure
solely because of her refusal to waive her Brady rights. I d. at 1161. In part, Ruiz claimed that the government
could not penalize her for refusing to waive a right that is not waivable. See id. The Ninth Circuit panel
agreed, holding that, "'The disclosure of Brady evidence is just as important in ensuring the voluntary and
intelligent nature of a plea bargain as it is in ensuring the voluntary and intelligent nature of a guilty plea." !d.
at 1164. By definition, the court held, a plea agreement waiving the right to discover unknown evidence
cannot be voluntary and intelligent
As long as Sanchez is the law of the Ninth Circuit, Ruiz is not surprising. But because of the unusual
procedural posture of the case, the Ruiz Court has never reached the more difficult problem of defining
materiality in relation to a plea bargain. The court never had to explain what sort of exculpatory information
might be "material" to a defendant who explicitly chose to plead guilty knowing nothing about the
government's case, or how Giglio evidence might be relevant to a defendant unaware of the identity of
government witnesses.
316 Of course, also doubtful is that those rights are worth much, for the reasons already described here.
317
Prosecutors often delay Giglio disclosure until late in the pretrial process to protect against harassment,
threats, or harm to witnesses. See supra note 72. It is hardly surprising, then, that pre-plea Giglio disclosure
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They are also right, because Sanchez does not require them to go that far with
.
318
di sc1osure m any event.
The rhetoric of the California debate has obscured the fundamental
difference between "plea-related" materiality and "trial-related" materiality
under Brady. Sanchez does not require a prosecutor (as the predicate to a plea
bargain) to disclose all information that might become Brady material if the
case ultimately went to trial. Instead, Sanchez requires disclosure only of that
favorable evidence that is material to the defendant's decision to plead
guilty. 319 And not all favorable evidence that might become material at trial
will be "material" to a defendant when he chooses to plead guilty. Because of
the matching phenomenon that Part IV considered, not all evidence that might
become Brady material in relation to trial will be "Sanchez material," that is, in
320
relation to a defendant's decision to plead.

If we understand this distinction, then the California waiver debate comes
into better focus. To the extent that the Brady waivers purport to waive future
challenges to a guilty plea entered in the absence of favorable evidence
material to a defendant's decision to plead, they are not enforceable as long as
Sanchez itself remains the law. After all, the Ninth Circuit has already ruled
that such a plea would be invalid because it is not "voluntary and
321
intelligent."
A prosecutor trying to defend a Sanchez waiver would find
herself in the awkward position of claiming that the plea was unintelligent but
the simultaneous waiver was not. Moreover, Sanchez would essentially be a
nullity if prosecutors could avoid it merely by placing a Brady waiver in the
same plea agreement that they induced defendant to sign in the first place by
violating Brady.
However, to the extent that the California Brady waivers purport to waive a
defendant's right to receive other pretrial discovery that Brady and Giglio

seems to be at the heart of prosecutors' concerns in drafting Brady waivers. Though the waivers genemlly
cover a broad range of favorable information, they take pains explicitly to include evidence relating to the
impeachment of witnesses. See Blank, supra note 17, at 2042-43 (quoting two sample waiver provisions, both
of which make explicit reference to impeachment evidence).
318
See supra text accompanying notes 202-09, 246-57.
31 9 See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1454.
320
See supra text accompanying notes 246-57.
321
Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453. Of course, as the Fifth Circuit noted in Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353,
367 (5th Cir. 2000), the fundamental ruling in Sanchez-that an "uninformed" plea is an "unintelligent" and
therefore invalid plea-may be at odds with much of what the Supreme Court has said about plea bargains.
See supra text accompanying notes 125-30.
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might require in the event of trial,322 there is no reason why the waivers could
not be enforced. Sanchez itself does not require that kind of disclosure, nor
does Sanchez hold that defendants' pleas are "unintelligent" if all trial-related
Brady discovery is not complete.323
The literature generated by the California debate, which is written primarily
by defense attorneys, opposes Brady waivers but recognizes no distinction
between trial-related materiality and plea-related materiality?24 The logical
extension of that position is that no plea is valid until full trial-related Brady
disclosure, including all Giglio disclosure, is complete. That argument seeks
broader pre-plea disclosure than any court has yet required under the umbrella
of Brady or, for that matter, under any other theory. The implication of that
argument is that defendants who are considering a plea have greater discovery
rights than those who contemplate going to trial. 32 Boiled to its essence, the
322
In a rough way, this is what some of the California waivers attempt to do. They acknowledge the
government's obligation to disclose "information establishing the factual innocence of the defendant," but then
seck to waive any obligation to disclose, e.g., impeachment material. See Blank, supra note 17, at 2042 n.l78
(quoting waiver agreement); see also Kupers & Philipsborn, supra note 36, at 65 (describing prosecutors'
argument as follows:

The prosecutors have taken the position that their standard plea terms do not amount to a "Brady
waiver" but rather a waiver of "discovery"' after the plea is entered. That "discovery" includes
Giglio material but not Brady material. The former can be waived; the latter cannot. They argue
that it is standard practice throughout the country for defendants to enter into plea agreements
without the benefit of information they would have received had they gone to trial. Chief
examples of such information are Jencks materials and Giglio materials.

ld.).
323

Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1455-54.
See Blank, supra note 17, at 2040 (arguing that "at the plea bargain stage," Brady material includes
impeachment evidence, without suggesting that the doctrine might be limited in cases where defendants were
not even aware of the identities of government witnesses); Kupers & Philipsborn, supra note 36, 66-67
(arguing Brady disclosure cannot be waived, but not addressing limits on materiality in the plea-bargaining
context).
325 In federal courts, for example, defendants in non-capital cases have no right to require the government
to identify its witnesses before trial. The Jencks Act explicitly provides that witness statements are not subject
to discovery until trial has begun. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994). Pretrial disclosure of impeachment evidence,
i.e., Giglio material, however, often results in identifying witnesses and sometimes would include disclosing
their statements. In most cases, prosecutors disclose both Giglio and Jencks material (witness statements)
before trial. But often they elect to delay such disclosure until trial out of concern for the safety of witnesses.
In such cases, a prosecutor's Giglio obligation may conflict with the time limits in the Jencks Act. Some
federal courts have held that the Jencks time limits restrict Giglio disclosure before trial. Others have adopted
a case-by-case "balancing" approach. See, e.g., United States v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 780, 789-92 (E.D. Va.
1997) (identifying federal circuit court split and collecting cases). But none has held that Giglio material must
always be produced in advance of trial. The position of the defense advocates in the California debate, by
contrast, would have the effect of requiring Giglio production in advance of the plea and therefore, in most
cases, in advance of trial.
324
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California defense position would require federal prosecutors to disclose their
witnesses for defendants contemplating a guilty plea, where Congress and the
federal courts have declined to require such disclosure for defendants
26
While I am sympathetic to arguments for expanding
contemplating trial?
pretrial discovery, courts merely encourage gamesmanship when they pursue
that goal through the back door of the guilty plea.
Whether the California defense position makes sense as a tactical matter is
also questionable. There are plenty of cases in which both prosecutors and
defendants may benefit from striking a deal without awaiting all discovery that
Brady and Giglio might require in the event of trial. 327 The case of the
defendant who seeks to minimize his punishment by cooperating at the earliest
possible stage in the investigation and prosecution of others may be the most
typical. There, speed is often of the essence and full disclosure is often
impractical and sometimes inadvisable.328 If the Brady-waiver opponents
really seek to outlaw such pleas, I would caution them to "be careful what they
ask for." They might achieve more ''justice" than their clients really want.
C. Turning Adversity into Opportunity: Taking Brady Waivers Seriously

To the extent that the California waivers address "trial-related" rather than
the narrower category of "plea-related" Brady material, they do not call upon
defendants to give up anything that most defendants do not already give up
when they enter a plea before pretrial discovery is complete. The principal
effect of an explicit "Brady waiver," therefore, may be to inform the defendant
of another trial-related right that he is giving up by pleading guilty. As a
result, and somewhat ironically, explicit Brady waivers may actually lead to
better informed pleas. At a minimum, a defendant confronted with a Brady
waiver must give a moment's thought to issues of disclosure. That is more
than may now occur before many guilty pleas.
More importantly, a waiver of rights at the time of a guilty plea should
require at least a moderate dose of judicial scrutiny.329 In the Brady context,
326
See Douglass, supra note 51, at 2136 (describing unsuccessful efforts to expand witness-related
discovery rules in federal courts).
327 See supra text accompanying notes 293-96.
328
See supra note 295.
329
Cf. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (holding that a court must apprize defendant in person,
on the record, regarding rights waived by guilty plea). Similarly, in the context of a waiver of the right to
counsel, the Court has long held that such waiver may not be presumed from silence. See, e.g., Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938). Instead, the Court requires a detailed, open-court examination of the
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an appropriate inquiry might begin with the simple question, "What has the
prosecutor told you about her evidence?" The Court might then describe the
available avenues of discovery that, by pleading guilty, defendant would
forego. At a minimum, then, a defendant would plead guilty with a more
precise idea of what he was "missing." Moreover, the anticipation of that kind
of judicial inquiry might spur the prosecutor to be more forthcoming with
discovery at the pre-plea stage.330 Whether defendant waives his Brady rights
explicitly in a plea agreement-as in the California cases-or by virtue of the
plea itself-as under the Fifth Circuit's approach331 -the waiver should require
a court to do something that few courts otherwise do: to address issues of
disclosure at the time of the guilty plea colloquy in order to determine whether
the Brady waiver itself is a voluntary and intelligent waiver of rights. 332
There are two substantial benefits that would flow from such a colloquy.
First, it would thrust courts into a more active role in reviewing disclosure
issues before the plea, a time at which judges will be much less tolerant of
nondisclosure than in the typical post-trial or post-plea Brady review. 333
Moreover, even that limited judicial involvement, in many cases, would spur
both prosecutors and defense counsel to be more explicit in defining the terms
of their informal discovery. 334 Because misunderstandings and false assumptions, rather than deliberate deception, are at the heart of many Brady
claims,335 a dose of clarity would go a long way in the plea bargaining
accused to make certain that the waiver represents "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right." !d. at 464.
330 It might also encourage prosecutors to scrutinize charging decisions more thoroughly. See infra text
accompanying note 292.
331 Seel\1atthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 367-69 (5th Cir. 2000).
332 By comparison, under current federal rules, waiver of the right to jury trial, the right of confrontation,
and the right against self-incrimination all must be addressed explicitly in the guilty-plea colloquy. See FED.
R. CRJM. P. ll(c); see also supra note 77.
333 It would be hard to pursue such a colloquy with the defendant without at least some judicial inquiry of
the prosecutor regarding the nature of information already disclosed, and some discussion of the categories of
infommtion that remained undisclosed. The mere asking of those questions would be enough to encourage
many prosecutors, before the guilty plea proceeding, to make certain that they conducted both discovery and
plea bargaining in a manner that would be viewed favorably by the court. While the existing rules of pretrial
discovery might allow a prosecutor to respond, "Your honor, I told defendant nothing because I'm hoping that
he will plead in total ignorance," few prosecutors would want to subject themselves to the judicial rejoinder to
~uch a position. And a court unsatisfied with the prosecutor's response would have the power to delay
acceptance of a guilty plea until pretrial discovery had progressed to a more satisfactory stage.
334 A detailed "discovery colloquy" before guilty pleas would have an additional benefit as well. It would
$pur defense counsel to pursue discovery more actively before recommending a guilty plea, because he would
have to describe-and perhaps defend-his discovery efforts in open court.
335 Brady applies "irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373
83, 87 (1965).
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environment. Second, in those jurisdictions that allow post-plea Brady
challenges, such a plea colloquy would create the record that is now missing
from post-plea Brady claims. If courts took such Brady waivers seriously, as
they should, they would put a foundation under the post-plea Brady "castle in
the air."336

In sum, the California Brady-waiver debate is about less-and more-than
may appear on its surface. A victory for defendants-in rendering the waivers
unenforceable-ultimately may mean little, because Brady functions so poorly
as a rule for governing disclosure in plea bargaining. Still, the debate points
the way toward something potentially more valuable: a chance to obtain
judicial scrutiny of disclosure issues before a defendant enters his plea. If a
guilty plea-or an explicit provision in the plea agreement-waives Brady
claims, then courts should take that waiver seriously: something few courts do
under current practice. The waiver process itself might offer more meaningful
protection than courts could ever wring out of Brady through retrospective
enforcement.
CONCLUSION

Brady presents a rule with noble aspirations. It reflects the highest calling
of a prosecutor, "not to achieve victory but to establish justice."337 The notion
that the same rule might govern plea bargaining-the process that decides most
criminal cases-is almost too attractive to resist. Regrettably, that is a fatal
attraction. Plea bargaining brings out the worst in Brady.

In the context of trial, Brady suffers from a severe case of bad timing.
Brady establishes a retrospective standard for defining a prospective
obligation. That is, it requires the prosecutor to disclose favorable evidence
before or during trial. But it measures that obligation by looking back on the
outcome of trial. The resulting standard of narrowly limited "materiality" is
Brady's greatest weakness. A guilty plea only magnifies that weakness, by
336 Thoreau wrote, "If you have built castles in the air, your work need not be lost; that is where they
should be. Now put the foundations under them." THOREAU, supra note 242, at 245. Promoting disclosure in
plea bargaining is a laudable goal, a "castle in the air" that appeals to our sense of fair play. But the current
pursuit of that goal through a modified Brady doctrine is doomed, at least in part, because guilty pleas do not
create a foundation: the record necessary for enforcing that doctrine. See supra text accompanying notes 18797. If, on the other hand, courts made even limited efforts to establish a "disclosure record" at the time of the
guilty plea, then post-plea review might become a more realistic possibility.
337 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 n.2 (quoting Simon E. Sobeloff, Solicitor General of the United States, Address
before the Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit (June 29, 1954)).
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requiring a court to assess the materiality of evidence not in relation to the
record from a trial, but in relation to the complex and largely undocumented
factors which may have affected the defendant's choice to plead guilty. Worse
yet, because the prosecutor controls pre-plea disclosure of most inculpatory
evidence, she often can control which favorable evidence does, or does not,
become "material" to the defendant's decisionrnaking. In plea bargaining,
then, Brady emerges as a diluted version of an already weakened rule. For
defendants who plead guilty, Brady offers little of the promise that its noble
origins might suggest.
We would contribute more to the fairness of plea bargaining by considering
pre-plea procedures aimed at promoting disclosure, rather than relying upon an
after-the-fact remedy that is doomed to failure. If we are serious about betterinformed guilty pleas, then we should address the problem when it matters
most: before the plea. Providing a fully informed waiver of Brady, as a trial
right, may offer more to many defendants than the strained effort to reinvent
Brady as a right attached to plea bargaining.
In the end, much of the futility in applying Brady to plea bargaining arises
because courts have tried to force Brady to do more in the context of a guilty
plea than the rules of discovery-including Brady-can do for defendants who
go to trial. It is unrealistic to expect courts to develop a broad right for
defendants to be well informed in advance of a plea when there is no
corresponding right to be well informed in advance of a trial. When we
struggle to define distinct "plea-related" discovery rules, we are really asking
the wrong questions. We would do better by pursuing discovery reforms that
offered all defendants a right to be ready for their adversarial contest with the
government, whether the contest ended in a plea or a trial.
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